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Deregulation and the Market Failure in
Minority Programming:
The Socioeconomic Dimensions of
Broadcast Reform
by KURT A. WIMMER*
You think your souls are saved because you can invent radio,
but of what elevation to man is a method of broadcasting if you
have only drivel to send out?

-M.K

Gandhi
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I
Introduction
The sculpting of regulatory policy to meet societal reality is a
governmental ambition that is crucial to a topic as pervasive in
the national conscience as telecommunications. Yet, a contradiction of striking proportions is developing between current
regulatory treatment of minority issues and the reality of minority media use. Although minorities are consuming television programming in unprecedented amounts, the medium is
growing less responsive to minority needs; in the face of the
broadcast market's failure to provide minority-oriented programming, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) is implementing regulatory policy that relies entirely upon the market for programming choices.
The contradiction inherent in this treatment of minority issues presents a social problem that is of greater magnitude
than appears at first glance. Governmental decisions affecting
allocation of access to the media marketplace carry with them
strong symbolic messages of social priorities. It is commonplace that "television absorbs extensive time daily, and is a medium from which children are acquiring their conceptions of
social order."' Indeed, television brings with it the potential for
racial accommodation or polarization. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has explained:
To the extent that the viewers' beliefs, attitudes and behavior are affected by what they see on television, relations between the races and the sexes may be affected by television's
limited and often stereotyped portrayals of men and women,
both white and non-white.2
Broadcasting shapes societal values and opinions to a degree
unrivaled by other communications media, and has a pervasive
influence on the lives of Americans.3 Moreover, its impact on
racial stratification cannot be overlooked, as the social problem
of inequality continues despite gains in the social position of
minorities over the past decades.4
1. DeFleur, OccupationalRoles as Portrayedon Television, 28 PUB. OPINION Q.
257 (1964).
2. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WINDOW DRESSING ON THE SET:
WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON TELEVISION (1979).
3. See E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION (1982).
/
4. See, e.g., R. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES: NARROWING THE GAP? (1984);
Rose, Postscript Twenty Years Later in AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (Myrdal ed. 1962).
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The Commission is charged with regulating in the public interest, and this regulatory charter has traditionally included
ensuring that minority views are heard 'and that minority access to ownership of broadcast outlets is facilitated. "It has
long been an established policy of broadcasters themselves and
the Commission that the American system of broadcasting
must serve significant minorities among our population, and
the less dominant needs and tastes [that] most listeners have
from time to time."5 The Commission's policy extends to facilitating minority ownership of broadcast facilities, because "minorities should be fairly represented in the broadcast industry
of a society [that] mandates an unrestricted flow of diverse
ideas and equal opportunity for all."6 Preserving access for minority views, then, has been a traditional regulatory concern of
the federal government.
Unfortunately, this concern has been overshadowed by the
recent trend toward communications deregulation. In particular, the movement toward "marketplace regulation" advocated
by the dominant forces within the Commission is allowing the
strictures of the commercial market to determine allocation of
broadcast media access, and would allow broadcast outlets to
be purchased by the highest bidder without regard to traditional concerns for minority opportunities.7 Supporters of deregulation justify this laissez-faire approach by claiming that
the major predicate for broadcast regulation, the "scarcity doctrine" or "scarcity rationale," has lost its vitality in light of
plentiful new communications technologies.
While there may be a greater number of video outlets in the
marketplace, scarcity and inaccessibility of media remain a continuing economic reality for minority groups in the United
States. Just as the lower economic status of many minority
groups precludes meaningful ownership of electronic media,
lack of economic power signifies an inability to partake of the
new communications media. Services such as cable television,
direct broadcast satellites, and microwave distribution systems
are financially burdensome luxuries to families barely able to
stay above the poverty line. If scarcity of media remains a fact
5. Federal Communications Comm'n, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast
Licensees (1974).
6. Federal Communications Comm'n, Report on Minority Ownership in Broadcasting (1978).
7. See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982).
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of life for a large segment of the American population, it should
certainly remain a vital regulatory justification.
A deregulatory, market-based policy under current economic
conditions could have disastrous consequences. American society prides itself on its use of a legal system to lessen inequality
and social stratification. Telecommunications undoubtedly influences perceptions of social order and justice for a majority
of the population. Pursuit of a regulatory policy that leaves
the economic forces of the telecommunications marketplace
unchecked would be irresponsible if done without consideration for all segments of the market-including the groups that
have been underserved by the market in the past. Such a policy places regulators in a role of exacerbating institutionalized
inequality rather than lessening it. This role is antithetical to
the traditional role assigned to the legal order in the American
system.
This inquiry examines the socioeconomic consequences of
broadcast reform-whether the market would provide programming responsive to minorities without regulatory encouragement, and whether minorities would have a voice in
Commission decisions in the event of a market failure. It does
so by analyzing the empirical and theoretical evidence on regulation, deregulation, economics, minority media use, and sociology. Analysis of the literature indicates that the economics of
broadcasting preclude the existence of an effective voice for
minority viewers,' and that a market failure currently exists in
the area of minority-responsive programming.' The empirical
evidence also reveals that minority groups are unable to afford
new media, thus making the scarcity rationale for broadcast
regulation a continuing economic reality.1 ° The inquiry then
examines the extent to which deregulatory rule changes have
had an adverse impact on the ability of minorities to apprise the
Commission of market failures.1 ' Finally, the article examines
the consequences of a failure to remedy the inequities inherent
in a shift to marketplace regulation. 2
The proper province of government, in the classic American
sense, is to pursue the potential held by law to lessen economic
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See
See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

712-807 and accompanying text.
18-83 and accompanying text.
84-139 and accompanying text.
283-314 and accompanying text.
315-440 and accompanying text.

COMM/ENT

L. J.

[Vol. 8

differences and disputes fostered by social inequalities. 3 Communications regulation has tremendous potential for facilitating equality in race relations, and this role justifies careful
consideration of changes in regulatory policy. This consideration should include an inquiry into the efficacy of the marketplace in serving racial and ethnic minorities. Such an inquiry
follows.

II
The Possibility of Minority Influence in
Programming Choices
Three mechanisms exist that allow viewers to exert influence over television programming. 4 The first is the traditional
broadcasting marketplace-viewers make a program choice attractive to advertisers, and thus influence programming. 5 The
second is the new market for communications technologiesviewers purchase content without the need for advertiser participation. The third is the Federal Communications Commission's public participation policies-by petitioning to deny
license renewals, viewers who have not exerted influence in
the first two markets may influence future programming
choices. 7 Each will be discussed in turn.
A.

The Traditional Marketplace: Anatomy of a Market Failure

An examination of minority influence in the traditional
broadcasting market encounters a paradox that is both intriguing and troubling. Blacks and other minority groups are society's most voracious consumers of broadcast television, yet this
overwhelming use of the medium occurs in a context of stark
underrepresentation of minorities in television programming.
Because minority groups overwhelmingly prefer programming
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
14. Control over the marketplace is crucial for minorities seeking to promote responsive programming. "The first problem for women and minorities is to get on
television. The second is to have some control over how they are depicted." O'Conner,
TV and Civil Rights: The Medium is Still the Message, 14(3) PERSP. 39, 40 (1982).
15. See infra notes 712-68 and accompanying text for a description of the market
system's allocation of programming.
16. See infra notes 84-139 and accompanying text for a description of the market
for new communications technologies.
17. See infra notes 140-314 and accompanying text for a description of the Commission's public participation policies and an empirical effort to determine the continuing efficacy of such policies in the face of deregulation.
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dealing with minority characters or issues, this paradox
presents a classic failure of the market system in allocating television programming: those who spend the most time with the
medium are effectively disenfranchised from tailoring it to
their needs because of their relative lack of power in the
marketplace."
1.

Minority Television Use

Minorities put broadcast television to high levels of both
quantitative and qualitative use-the former through sheer
time spent with the medium, and the latter through intensive
use of the medium for socialization and information. Minority
television use signals a clear demand for minority-oriented programming from the marketplace.
An effective infrastructure exists through which broadcasting reaches the minority community. As Block has observed,
the mass media do reach the black community; further, blacks
are favorably disposed toward the use of the medium.' 9 Similarly, Greenberg and Dervin find that blacks do have significant access to television, and that television is believed to
represent reality to many urban blacks.2" Indeed, blacks are
more likely than whites to state that television programming
represents reality.21 High reality correspondence is noted
among black children as well as adults. 2 The medium, then,
18. See infra notes 769-805 and accompanying text for a description of the current
Commission's efforts in dealing with minority concerns.
19. Block, Communicating with the Urban Poor: An Exploratory Inquiry 47
JOURNALISM Q. 3 (1970).
20.

B. GREENBERG & B. DERVIN, USE OF THE MASS MEDIA BY THE URBAN POOR

(1970). Recent studies show that minority reality correspondence has not changed
since the landmark Greenberg and Dervin study. See Slowik and Paquette, Antipoverty Programs,Use of the Mass Media, and Low-Income People, 27 Soc. WORK 250
(1982).
The belief that television represents reality appears to be in place by early childhood. See Greenberg & Atkin, Learning About Minorities from Television (1978)
(paper presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Annual Convention), which found that 46% of black children agreed that
"blacks on television behave like blacks in real life," and that 60% agreed that "the
jobs men/women do on television are like the jobs men/women do in real life." But
see Asante, Television and the Language Socialization of Black Children in TELEVISION AND THE SOCIALIZATION OF THE MINORITY CHILD (G. Berry & C. Mitchell ed.
1982) (finding that television had little effect on language because children did not
believe that language spoken by television characters represented reality).
21. See Greenberg & Hanneman, Racial Attitudes and the Impact of TV Blacks, 4
EDUC. BROADCASTING REV. 27 (1970).

22. See Donohue & Donohue, Black, White, White Gifted and Emotionally Dis-
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has the potential to communicate effectively with the minority
community.
This access and favorable disposition combine to produce a
striking tendency to consume television programming in massive amounts. The trend toward great minority use of television was noted in 1963 by Steiner2 3 and elaborated ten years
later by Bower;2 4 the pattern continues into the 1980s.2 5 Bower
found that blacks liked television substantially more than
whites, and spent much more time with the medium; moreover,
blacks were more likely than whites to report that they do not
watch enough television. 26 A comprehensive study by Bogart
compared black media exposure to that of whites and found
that the substantial differences between the races cannot be explained in terms of differential social positions and geographic
location. 2 Bogart concluded that differences in media exposure must be explained in terms of black media behavior as a
distinct social experience. 28 The tendency toward greater exposure by blacks in general has been shown to be in place by early
childhood. 29 The research clearly establishes that blacks, as a
turbed Children's Perceptions of the Reality of Television Programming,30 HUM.
REL. 609 (1977); Dates, Race, Racial Attitudes and Adolescent Perceptions of Black
Television Characters,24 J. BROADCASTING 549 (1980).
23. G. A. STEINER, THE PEOPLE LOOK AT TELEVISION (1963).
24. R. BOWER, TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC (1973).

25. See Poindexter & Stroman, Blacks and Television: A Review of the Research
Literature,25 J. BROADCASTING 103, 108 (1981) ("Blacks are among the heaviest consumers of television").
26. See R. BOWER, supra note 24. Bower found that higher use and more
favorable attitude is not an artifact of lower socioeconomic status, as education and
television use were positively correlated. Id.
27. Bogart, Negro and White Media Exposure: New Evidence, 49 JOURNALISM Q.
15 (1972).

28. Id.; see also Ryan, Media Attitudes and News Preferences: An Analysis of
Demographic Variables for a Sample of the Urban Poor, 12 J. BLACK STUD. 275
(1982). Another study, however, found that black television exposure does follow
traditional education-level determinants, similar to that of whites. See Allen & Bielby,

Blacks' Attitudes and Behavior Toward Television, 6 COMM. RES. 437 (1979). This
study found that higher exposure existed among blacks of less education, contrary to
the trend established by Bogart and Bower. It was limited, however, to a San Francisco sample, while Bogart used a national sample.

29. See Stroman, The SocializationInfluence of Television on Black Children, 15
J. BLACK STUD. 79, 84 (1984) ("When black childrens' and adolescents' viewing of television is compared to that of other children, their viewing time almost always exceeds
that of other children"). See also Comstock & Cobbey, Television and the Children of
Ethnic Minorities, 29(1) JOURNALISM Q. 104, 105 (1979) ("ethnic minority children
have a distinctive orientation toward television and other mass media"); Lee &

Browne, Television Uses and GratificationsAmong Black Children, Teenagers &
Adults, 25 J. BROADCASTING 203 (1981); Lyle & Hoffman, Explorations in Patternsof
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group, spend a great amount of time with television and hold
favorable attitudes toward the medium. Although the research
deals most comprehensively with blacks-the largest and most
visible minority group-studies show that other minority
groups follow patterns of heavy television use. °
The uses to which blacks put television differ markedly from
uses noted among white audiences.3 1 In the area of public affairs and news programming, the differences are great. Blacks
tend to use television more for such programming than any
other medium.2 In a direct comparison to white audiences,
Stroman and Becker 33 found that blacks are more likely than
whites to rely on television, in comparison to other media, for
political news and information. Indeed, blacks have been
shown to choose television to discover information about the
black community.3 4 Even though blacks choose television as a
source of information, 35 research has shown that blacks watch
less news and public-affairs programming than do whites. 6
There is evidence, however, that black audiences consider such
programming more important than they have in the past.3 7 It is
possible that the lesser volume of viewing is due to the absence
Television Viewing by Preschool-Age Children, in 4 TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1972); and Lyle and Hoffman, Children'sUse of Television and Other Media, in 3
TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 283 (1972) (Hispanic children spent more time
with television than other racial groups).
30. See Newby, Robinson & Hill, Preferences of Mexican-American Childrenfor
Parentsor Television, 105 J. PSYCHOLOGY 239 (1980). The study built upon prior findings of heavy television use by Hispanics to show that Hispanic children chose television over their mothers 35 percent of the time, and over their fathers 32 percent of the
time. See also Hispanic Study, BROADCASTING, Aug. 12, 1985, at 46.
31. Carey, Variations in Negro/White Television Preferences, 10 J. BROADCASTING 199 (1966).
32. McCombs, Negro Use of Television and Newspapersfor PoliticalInformation,
12 J. BROADCASTING 261 (1968).
33. Stroman and Becker, RacialDifferences in Gratifications,55 JOURNALISM Q.
767 (1978).
34. Allen & Clarke, Ethnicity and Mass Media Behavior: A Study of Blacks and
Latinos, 24 J. BROADCASTING 23 (1980). See also Shosteck, Some Influences of Television on Civil Unrest, 12 J. BROADCASTING 371 (1969).
35. Robinson, The Audience for National Television News Programs, 35 PuB.
OPINION Q. 403 (1971); Tan & Tan, Television Use and Self-Esteem of Blacks, 29 J.
COMM. 129 (1979).
36. Israel & Robinson, Demographic Characteristicsof Viewers of Television
News Programs,in 4 TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1972). This finding is qualified, however, by the finding that viewing of news is high among college-educated
blacks. Among blacks of other educational statuses, however, violent programming
was viewed more often than public affairs programming. Id.
37. See Tan, Mass Media Use, Issue Knowledge & PoliticalInvolvement, 44 PUB.
OPINION Q. 241 (1980); see also Allen, Mass Media Use Patternsin a Negro Ghetto, 45
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of blacks from much of such programming."
Although the black audience is far from homogeneous,39 certain broad patterns of consumption have been established.
Blacks rate television highly as a leisure activity,40 and express
preferences for informative programming 4' and adventure
drama. 42 Blacks view more than whites outside prime-time
hours, but tend to conform to patterns in the overall population
in other aspects of viewing. One major difference, however, is
the manner in which television is used as a socializing agent for
sex-role and familial functions in black development.
This use of television in social development underlines the
importance of television to black audiences, 44 and could imply
great influences of television over time. 45 Black and white children have divergent programming preferences, with blacks
JOURNALISM Q. 525
MEGALOPOLIS (1967).

(1968); Lyle, The Negro and the Mass Media, in

THE NEWS IN

38. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
39. See Smith, Black Television Audience Heterogeneity: A Uses and Gratifications Approach (1985) (master's thesis). Inquiry into intra-racial differentiations in
program choice, as opposed to inter-racial choices, has not generated a substantial
body of literature. See Fife, The Missing Minority in Mass CommunicationResearch,
in MYRICK & KEEGAN, IN SEARCH OF DIVERSITY (1981).
40. Meyersohn, Television and the Rest of Leisure Time, 32 PuB. OPINION Q. 102
(1968).
41. See Darden & Darden, Middle-Class Females' Media Usage Habits, 11 J.
BLACK STUD. 421 (1981); Greenberg & Dominick, Racial and Social Class Differences
in Teen-Agers' Use of Television, 13 J. BROADCASTING 331 (1969).
42. See National Analysts, Attracting Minority Audiences to Public Television
(1981); Lee & Browne, Television Uses and GratificationsAmong Black Children,
Teenagers and Adults, 25 J. BROADCASTING 203 (1981); Carey, Variations in Negro!
White Television Preferences, 1 J. BROADCASTING 199 (1965).
43. Bogart, Negro and White Media Exposure: New Evidence, 49 JOURNALISM Q.
15 (1972).
44. See Berry, Children, Television, and Social Class Roles: The Medium as an
Unplanned Educational Curriculum, in CHILDREN AND THE FACE OF TELEVISION
(1980) (finding that children use televised portrayals to reinforce and validate their
beliefs, and grant television a role comparable to traditional socializing agents). See
also Conway, Wyckoff, Feldbaum & Ahern, The News Media in Children'sPolitical
Socialization, 45 PUB. OPINION Q. 164 (1981) (news media are an important source of
political socialization for children).
45. Socialization influences are felt not only from television content, but from
advertising as well. Although Ward, Effects of Television Advertising on Children
and Adolescents, in 4 TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, (1972), finds that black and
white children do not differ appreciably in their capacity to respond to television advertising, Meyer, Donohue and Henke, How Black Children See Television Commercials, 18 J. ADVERTISING RES. 51 (1978), find that black children are more likely than
white children to find television commercials influential, presumably because they
show a lower level of sophistication in understanding the advertisers' profit motives.
Another study found no lack of sophistication in Hispanic teenagers' responses to advertising, which were characterized as cynical. See Meyer & Hexamer, Perceived
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preferring programs in which the central character has no
mate.46 As the child moves into adolescence, however, preferences shift to programs in which a family unit is depicted.4 7
The hypothesis is that blacks from a single-head-of-household
culture utilize television to learn about perceived mainstream
family life; recent evidence suggests that black children choosing such programming hold strong beliefs that the programming conforms to reality.4 8 Similarly, Gerson finds that black
adolescents use television to acquire norms, information, and
general socialization patterns.4 9
The experience of minority television use, then, differs both
quantitatively and qualitatively from the viewing experience of
majority groups. Minorities express demand both through extensive time spent with television, and intensive attention to
television content. The unique minority experience defines the
special needs the broadcast marketplace must fulfill for the minority audience.
2.

Minority Issues in the Broadcast Market

There is little evidence that the marketplace is fulfilling minority needs. The amount of minority-oriented programming in
the broadcasting market is miniscule-a 1983 House Telecommunications Subcommittee study found that large network affiliates produced less than 30 seconds of minority-oriented
programming per day in an average week. Moreover, there is
Truth and Trust in Television Advertising Among Mexican-American Adolescents:
Socializationand Developmental Considerations,25 J. BROADCASTING 139 (1981).
46. Fletcher, Negro and White Children's Television ProgrammingPreferences,
13 J. BROADCASTING 359 (1969).
47. Greenberg & Gordon, Racial and Social Class Differences in Teen-Agers' Use
of Television, 13 J. BROADCASTING 331 (1969); Surlin & Dominick, Television's Function as a "Third Parent"for Black and White Teenagers, 15 J. BROADCASTING 55
(1970).
48. Buerkel-Rothfuss, Greenberg, Atkin & Neuendorf, LearningAbout the Family from Television, 32(3) J. COMM. 191 (1982).
49. Gerson, Mass Media Socialization Behavior: Negro-Hwhite Differences, 45
Soc. FORCES 40 (1966).
50. See HOUSE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION,

(1983). The study
obtained a representative sample of 850 commercial licensees, and found that both
local and national production of minority-oriented programming was rare. Local production took up .004 hours of the VHF network affiliates' days, or about 24 seconds on
the average. Network-affiliated UHF stations spent less time (.003 hours). Independent VHF stations spent .012 hours, and independent UHF stations spent .017 hours.
When national programming was added to the analysis, network-affiliated VHF stations aired .09 hours, network-affiliated UHF stations aired .10 hours, independent
AND FINANCE, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF TELEVISION DATA SURVEY
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striking empirical evidence that the broadcasting market has
not responded to strongly held minority preferences. Minority
groups overwhelmingly prefer television programming featuring minority characters and issues, 51 but the broadcasting marketplace seldom accommodates this preference. Blacks and
other minorities are clearly underrepresented in television programming. This absence of minorities is especially significant
when considered in tandem with the heavy use and socialization function television serves for blacks. However the marked
absence of. minority concerns is explained, 52 its status as a market failure of nationwide proportions is obvious.
The underrepresentation of blacks in programming was
noted as early as 1954. 53 The startling pattern revealed by later
studies shows that black portrayals increased somewhat during
the early 1970s, but have decreased significantly since then.
Black portrayals decreased from six percent of total roles in
1971 to 5.2 percent in 1973; a similar decrease is found from 1973
to 1980.1' Portrayal of other minorities decreased even more
sharply, from 12.4 percent of total roles to 8.7 percent, while
the percentage of white characters rose from 81.6 percent to
VHF stations aired .16 hours, and independent UHF stations aired a surprising .45
hours. See id.
51. The research literature leaves little doubt that black adults, teenagers, and
children prefer programming with black characters. See Dates, Race, RacialAttitudes
and Adolescent Perceptions of Black Television Characters,24 J. BROADCASTING 549
(1980); R. FRANK & M. GREENBERG, THE PUBLIC'S USE OF TELEVISION: WHO WATCHES
AND WHY (1980); LIFE ON TELEVISION: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF U.S. TELEVISION
DRAMA (B. Greenberg ed. 1980); Stevenson, Use of Public Television by Blacks, 56
JOURNALISM Q. 141 (1979); Anderson & Merritt, Using Television to Enhance the SelfEsteem of Black Children (1978) (paper presented at Association of Black Psychologists annual convention); James, Predicting Black Viewer Preferences in Black-Oriented Television Programs (1975) (master's thesis); Greenberg, Children'sReactions
to TVBlacks, 49 JOURNALISM Q. 5 (1972); Greenberg and Hanneman, RacialAttitude
and the Impact of Television Blacks, 4(2) EDUC. BROADCASTING REV. 27 (1970). See
also Greeley, Black Viewers Tune in Soul and Cronkite, VARIETY, Sept. 18, 1974, at 35
(reporting study of blacks in Washington, D.C.).
52. The stunted development of black characters in meaningful roles can be seen
as a form of social control supporting the established order. See Taylor and Dozier,
Television Violence, African-Americans, and Social Control, 1950-1976, 14 J. BLACK
STUD. 107 (1983); Clark, Television and Social Controls: Some Observations on the
Portrayalof Ethnic Minorities, 8 TELEVISION Q. 18 (1969). But see GANS, DECIDING
WHAT'S NEWS (1980) (suggesting that programmers adopt an audience image that conforms to their own middle- or upper-class social status; exclusion of other social
classes may not be deliberate).
53. Smythe, Reality as Presented by Television, 18 PUB. OPINION Q. 143 (1954).
54. Seggar, Hafen, & Hannonen-Gladden, Television's PortrayalsofMen and Women in Drama and Comedy Drama, 1971-1980, 25 J. BROADCASTING 277 (1981).
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86.1 percent.55 Moreover, when black appearances occur, they
tend to be confined to "a few bursts of broadcasting" rather
than being laced throughout other programming.5 6 Hispanic
characters are even less visible than black characters. When
analyzed by social class rather than race, underrepresentation
is even more pronounced. 5 Although there is some anecdotal
evidence that minority representation improved with the most
recent television seasons, 59 it is fair to conclude that minorities
are underrepresented in television programming.
The analysis holds for all types of programming categories.
Seggar noted the pattern of exclusion in prime-time programming.6 0 O'Kelly and Bloomquist show that the trend toward
exclusion of minorities exists across all programming categories--of 2,309 characters analyzed, only 4.9 percent were
black.6 1 The trend is documented in daytime drama as well; a
1982 study by Greenberg established that black presence in
daytime television is dwindling.6 2 Of 301 characters studied,
less than three percent were non-white, compared to four percent six years earlier.63 The trend in minority television portrayals, then, is not an improving picture. Despite critical
awareness of a massive exclusion of minorities from network
programming, the isolation of non-white races continues.
Underrepresentation is not limited to entertainment programming. In much news and public affairs programming,
55. Id.
56. Weigel, Loomis & Soja, Race Relations on Prime-Time Television, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 884 (1980).

57. See B. GREENBERG, LIFE ON TELEVISION: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF U.S. TELEVI-

(1980). Greenberg found that there were so few Hispanic characters that
no quantitative analysis could be made. Only 53 of 3,549 characters were of Spanish
origin.
58. Although the working class is undoubtedly the largest social class in America,
see Wright, Costello, Hachen & Sprague, The American Class Structure, 47 AM. Soc.
REV. 709 (1982), less than 8.4% of television programming depicts any working-class
families. See Butsch & Glennon, Social Class: Frequency Trends in Domestic Situation Comedy, 1946-1978, 27 J. BROADCASTING 77 (1983). The affluent dominate programming, although 65% of the public is of the working class. Id.
59. See Women FareBetter on TV in '84 Season, BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at
84. Any improvement seen can be almost exclusively attributed to the success of The
Cosby Show, which features several black characters, but "the majority of characters
are still young, white and single." Id.
60. See Seggar, supra note 54.
61. O'Kelly & Bloomquist, Women and Blacks on Television, 26 J. CoMM. 179
(1976).
62. Greenberg, Neuendorf, Buerkel-Rothfuss & Henderson, The Soaps: What's
SION DRAMA

On and Who Cares, 26 J.
63. Id.

BROADCASTING

519 (1982).
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blacks are relegated to minor roles. Although a 1973 study
found that race relations as an issue was covered in a balanced
manner during a "typical" week of news programming by the
networks,6 4 analyses of particular incidents in which tensions
were high reveals no such objectivity. In an analysis of media
coverage of a particular racial crisis, Warren found that coverage of the race issue tended to exacerbate racial polarization.6"
In less volatile race-relations contexts, media coverage of
blacks and black issues has been found to be lacking in both
quality and quantity. The National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders found that coverage of black life in general has
failed to communicate the antecedent factors that precipitated
racial conflict.6 6 Similarly, another study found that black
viewpoints are seldom expressed on network television newscasts. 67 Local newscasts have also been found to be stereotypically negative and conflict-oriented. 6 The lack of minority
viewpoints exists in all quarters of television programming.
The same is true for television advertising, although representation is improving somewhat. Dominick and Greenberg
found that minority appearances in commercials increased over
three seasons studied, but also found that appearances in which
a minority was featured were still rare.6 9 Roberts found that
blacks had increased substantially in visibility, appearing (at
least peripherally) in about ten percent of all commercials. 0
The Greenberg study was replicated in 1977, and increases in
black commercial appearances were found. Part of the increases noted, according to Cully and Bennett, could be attrib64. Pride & Clark, Race Relations in Television News: A ContentAnalysis of the
Networks, 50 JOURNALISM Q. 319 (1973).
65. Warren, Mass Media and Racial Crisis: A Study of the New Bethel Church
Incident in Detroit,28 J. Soc. ISSUES 111 (1972).
66. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT (1968).
67. Roberts, The Presentation of Blacks on Television Network Newscasts, 52
JOURNALISM Q. 50 (1975). The same may not be true for other minority groups; see
Heeter, Greenberg, Mendelson, Burgoon, & Korzenny, Cross-Media Coverage of Local
HispanicNews, 27 J. BROADCASTING 295 (1983) (Hispanic news was treated as prominently as non-Hispanic news).
68. Gardner, Cooperative Communication Strategies: Observations in a Black
Community, 14 J. BLACK STUD. 233 (1983). Even those reporters attempting to portray the black community "positively" tended to focus on negative aspects of black
life. The effect was depiction of a situation based on conflict rather than cooperation,
even though cooperation did exist in the community to a great extent. Id. at 234.
69. Dominick & Greenberg, Three Seasons of Blacks on Television, 10(2) J. ADVERTISING RES. 21 (1970).
70. Roberts, The Portrayalof Blacks on Network Television, 15 J. BROADCASTING
45 (1970).
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uted to appearances of blacks in auxiliary roles that were
minor or inconsequential. 7 '
Exclusion from programming portrayals is even more pronounced when one analyzes the types of roles minorities are
given when they do have the rare opportunity to appear. Almost 92 percent of black men appeared in minor roles in 1980,
up from 80.8 percent in 1970. Major roles for black women
plummetted from 9.6 percent to 2.4 percent in the same time
period.7 2 Similarly, Seggar and Wheeler found that blacks tend
to appear in demeaning roles. 73 Reid reached the same conclusion, noting that black portrayals follow stereotyped role
categories. 4
Stereotyping of black roles is a problem of endemic proportions.7 5 When the market responds to black preferences for
programming with black characters, it almost always does so by
portraying blacks stereotypically.7 6 The medium has not lived
up to early hopes that it would portray blacks realistically, and
"the outlook is not promising" for realistic portrayals today.7 7
Blacks are consistently portrayed as inferior, disadvantaged,
and deprived,7 8 and the portrayal of black social situations fails
71. Cully & Bennett, Selling Women, Selling Blacks, 26 J. COMM. 160 (1976).
72. See Seggar, supra note 54.
73. Seggar & Wheeler, World of Work on Television: Ethnic and Sex Representation in Television Drama, 17 J. BROADCASTING 201 (1973).

74. Reid, Racial Stereotyping on Television: A Comparison of the Behavior of
Both Black and White Television Characters,64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 465 (1979).
75. See Powe, American Voodoo: If Television Doesn't Show it, Maybe it Won't
Exist, 59 TEX. L. REV. 879 (1981). "There is a very useful data base from which one
can conclude, without fear of contradiction, that a problem exists. There is an incredible amount of stereotyping on television from sign-on to sign-off." Id. at 880 (footnotes omitted).
76. See Greenberg & Baptista-Fernandez, The Context, Characteristics,and Communication Behaviors of Blacks on Television, in LIFE ON TELEVISION: CONTENT
ANALYSIS OF U.S. TELEVISION DRAMA 13 (B. Greenberg ed. 1980) (75% of black actors
appeared in sitcoms or cartoons, and were most likely to be poor, jobless, or in lowstatus jobs).
77. See J. F. MACDONALD, BLACKS AND WHITE TV: AFRO-AMERICANS IN TELEVISION SINCE 1948 248 (1983). Initially, many hoped television would serve as a catalyst
to eradicating black stereotypes, as "Americans had confronted the horrendous results of institutionalized prejudice and theories of racial superiority" in World War II.
Id. at 4. This optimism had dissipated by the end of the 1970s. The new era in programming allows blacks to be visible, but only in stereotypical and subordinate roles.
See id. at 150.
78. See Berry, Television and Afro-Americans: Past Legacy and PresentPortrayals, in TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: BEYOND VIOLENCE AND CHILDREN 247 (S.
Whitney & R. Abeles ed. 1980). See also Greenberg, supra note 76, at 13-21 (finding
that blacks were visually "younger, leaner, funnier, and flashier" than whites, and
economically "poorer, jobless, or in jobs below the top echelons").
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to provide racial perspective.7 9 The impact of such stereotyping
on black children, who watch television heavily, should not be
overlooked.8 0 Black children are among the least realistically
portrayed on television.8 ' The responsibility of those in the
marketplace to serve the minority aspects of their audience
cannot be met by portrayals that are offensive and degrading. 2
The overall picture of minority television portrayals is a grim
one. Although the problem is one that is widely acknowledged,
the situation is worsening rather than improving. There is no
reason to anticipate that the trend toward greater minority
viewing and less representative portrayals will be mitigated by
adaptation among audiences. The problem is likely, rather, to
become a more salient one. Recent studies show that younger
blacks are relying even more heavily on television and are becoming more convinced of its importance in their lives.8 3
If
removal of regulatory encouragement allows the two trends to
continue, the market failure will be exacerbated. Blacks will
79. See A. JACKSON, BLACK FAMILIES AND THE MEDIUM OF TELEVISION (1982) (television fails to provide racial perspective and perpetuates stereotypic myths). See also
Powe, supra note 75, at 889, describing blacks in the situation comedy:
Although we might expect just a white family painted black, there are differences. First, there is more yelling and screaming. Second, there is no that's right, no - strong, intelligent father figures. Finally, in marked contrast to the beautiful people syndrome that occupies most of the television
day, the black mothers still look like Aunt Jemima.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Even the "progressive" situation comedies, such as those created by Norman Lear, are despised by many blacks because of their depiction of
blacks as "bickering simpletons." See Holly, The Role ofMedia in the Programmingof
an Underclass, 10(1) BLACK SCHOLAR 31, 33 (1979).
80. The television content to which children are exposed is filled with underrepresentative portrayals; such content "fails to provide behavioral models that are
worthy of imitation and conducive to wholesome growth and development." Stroman,
The Socialization Influence of Television on Black Children, 15 J. BLACK STUD. 79,
84-87 (1984).
81. In the 1984-85 television season, for example, no black children, except those
on The Cosby Show, lived with their natural parents. Further, 80 percent of black
children lived in upper-middle-class or wealthier homes. In reality, one out of two
black children lives in poverty. See Gaps Found Between TV Families and Reality,
BROADCASTING, Sept. 2, 1985, at 44.
82. Although much stereotyping is on network television, broadcasters may exert
some control. Those who "promote images have [an] amazing capacity and opportunity to be the prime educators in our society." Promotion: Broadcasting's New
Growth Discipline, BROADCASTING, June 17, 1985, at 71-72 (remarks of Rev. Jesse
Jackson to industry convention). Jackson listed six ways in which blacks and Hispanics are stereotyped: by being depicted as less hard-working, more violent, less intelligent, less patriotic, less universal, and less serious than they are. Id. at 72.
83. Lee & Browne, Television Uses and GratificationsAmong Black Children,
Teenagers, and Adults, 25 J. BROADCASTING 203 (1981).
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consume programming in greater amounts, and the programming will be even less reflective of their program preferences.

B.

The New Marketplace: A Socioeconomic Bias
in Market Power

The advent of new communications technologies produced
the spark that fuels the deregulatory fervor of the Fowler
Commission. Because alternative means of video delivery are
available, less reason exists to regulate existing media. 4 If a

service is not provided by over-the-air transmission, the new
video marketplace will provide the service, thus relieving a
broadcast licensee of the burden of providing public-interest
programming. 85
Questions about the efficacy of the new technologies, however, are appropriate.8 6 Although technological change does
create uncertainties within current regulatory doctrine, 87 it is

not certain that the proper response to regulatory uncertainty
is complete reliance on the marketplace for new communications technologies.8 8 Whether new media will service publicinterest aspects of programming that are not profitable in the
84. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 222 ("technology is an independent
variable that makes scarcity a relative concept").
85. The Commission has held, with substantial judicial affirmance, that a broadcast licensee may consider cable television when deciding whether to air children's
programming, a prevalent aspect of public-interest programming. See Television Programming for Children, Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634 (1984), aff'd sub noma.
Action for Children's Television v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 756 F.2d 899
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The court added an important caveat, however, in stating that a
broadcaster would be held responsible for children's needs where cable television
penetration is "insubstantial or nonexistent." Id. at 901. The case was met with delight in the industry, which saw it as a redefinition of the television marketplace. See
ACT's Appeal of FCC's Children'sProgrammingOrder Turned Down, BROADCASTING,
March 25, 1985, at 53; Real-World Decision, BROADCASTING, March 25, 1985, at 106
("The larger meaning of this court opinion is that the FCC, in any relevant context,
may define television for what it is, a profusion of broadcasting and cable networks
). ..
86. Whether we have truly arrived at a "television of abundance" is questionable.
See Geller, FCC Media Ownership Rules: The Casefor Regulation, 32(4) J. COMM. 148
(1982). Whether the new media that have evolved will develop fully is also questionable. See The New Order Passeth: A Long, Hard Look at Promise Versus Performance

of the New Media, BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 43.
87. See Hagelin, The FirstAmendment Stake in New Technology: The BroadcastCable Controversy, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 427 (1975). "Law can be described as the authoritative ordering of conflicting values and interests within a finite range of physical
choices. Technology determines the available number of physical choices and, as new
technology increases the range of possible accommodations, existing legal doctrine
becomes uncertain." Id. at 437.
88. See supra notes 19-83 and accompanying text.
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traditional broadcasting marketplace 9 is a doubtful proposition; each of the new technologies, whether it be cable television, subscription television (STV),90 direct broadcast satellite
service (DBS), 9 ' microwave distribution system (MMDS),92 or
video-cassette recorder (VCR),93 carries with it a price that may
be beyond the reach of many of the lower-socioeconomic-status
groups for which public-interest programming is meant. Only
low-power television (LPTV) is free, and it is a service of limited reach.94
Analysis of the marketplace in new communications technologies reveals that minorities are no more likely to command
greater clout in the new marketplace than in the traditional
broadcasting marketplace. Inquiry into the nascent new media
need not be entirely speculative, as cable television provides a
technological case in point. Cable television, certainly the most
established and prevalent new medium, has not performed up
to its potential for minority audiences. Its failure raises doubt
about the ability of other expensive new media to succeed in its
stead.
89. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
90. Subscription television electronically scrambles and broadcasts commercialfree programming to subscribers through full-power television stations. The medium
reached, at its high point, 1.3 million subscribers in 18 markets through 27 stations.
See Stern, Krasnow & Senkowski, The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a
Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 529 (1983).
91. Direct broadcasting satellite systems beam broad signals to subscribers who
own satellite-receiver dishes. Depending upon the power of the satellite transponder,
the medium could reach the entire nation with four satellites. See Stern, Krasnow &
Senkowski, supra note 90; see also The Long Arm of Satellite Broadcastingand the
Search for Ubiquity in Television, BROADCASTING, July 8, 1985, at 52.
92. Microwave distribution systems use line-of-sight microwaves to deliver programming to subscribers who own suitable antennas. The medium does not use
broadcast frequencies, and has been allowed to operate as a common carrier. See
Stern, Krasnow, & Senkowski, supra note 90. Newer versions of the medium, termed
multi-channel, multi-point distribution systems (MMDS), provide up to five channels.
See The PromisingFutureof DirectBroadcastSatellites in America: Truth or Consequences?, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 221 (1981).
93. Video cassette recorders allow off-the-air recording for later playback or the
playing of pre-recorded cassettes providing alternative programming. See Levy &
Fink, Home Video Recorders and the Transience of Television Broadcasting, 14 J.
COMM. 56 (1984).
94. Low-power television requires television stations that broadcast with a low
effective radiated power to reach limited areas. Stations may originate programming,
or air programming obtained from other sources. Low-power television is considered
a secondary service, meaning that any interference caused by the station to existing
broadcasting will cause the low-power service to be curtailed. See Kendrick, The FCC
and Low-Power Television: Managing the New Gold Rush, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 233,
235 (1983).
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The development of cable television reveals that it has not
met its early potential in providing an alternative source of
public interest programming to minority audiences. When
cable first appeared as a viable new medium, it carried with it
considerable promise to provide minority-oriented programming. Services such as Black Entertainment Television9" and
Spanish International Network,9 6 on consumer cable, and
Black College Educational Network, 97 on institutional cable,
appeared to deal with minority issues. More importantly,
pledges of universal service from cable franchises promised to
bring diversity of programming into minority homes that could
not afford to purchase cable. 98
Years after cable was to have ushered in the new communications age, 99 however, it is clear that its performance has not
lived up to its potential for minority-audience service. 10 0 Mi95. Black Entertainment Television began programming in 1980. It airs about 18
hours a day of video music clips of black artists, plus off-network series with black
actors and some talk shows dealing with black issues. See BET Still Small, but Determined, BROADCASTING, Feb. 18, 1985, at 67.
96. The Spanish International Network is the oldest minority-oriented network
and one of the most successful. See Anselmo, Distributionof Specialized Programming to Minority Audiences, in M. BOTEIN & D. RICE, NETWORK TELEVISION AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST (1980).
97. The Black College Educational Network interconnects nine black colleges by
satellite, and airs videoconferences on career opportunities. It is financed by cable
operators, manufacturers, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
See The Black College Network, BROADCASTING, Feb. 11, 1985, at 10.
98. Cities franchise cable systems because the systems use the public right-of-way
(streets, telephone poles, underground ducts) to string cable. Disruption of the public
right-of-way allows the state to require a franchise. See Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1981). This franchising power
allows the city to exert influence over the type of facility the cable system will con-

struct.

See NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON CABLE TELEVISION, CABLE TELEVISION
FRANCHISING WORKBOOK, chs. 4, 5 (1980). Cable systems competing for scarce city

franchises were often faced with the requirement of universal service, basic cable to
all households in the city, as a prerequisite to obtaining a franchise. See Cable TV:
Channels to Burn, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1984, at 27 (Warner-Amex cable asked Milwaukee to forego free basic service). A case in point is the franchise process for the
District of Columbia. The city council clung to the concept of universal service and
refused to allow District Cablevision's request to exclude households costing more
than $500 to wire from its universal-service requirements. See DistrictCable Conces-

sions, BROADCASTING, July 15, 1985, at 6.
99. See Chisman, Beyond Deregulation: Communications Policy and Economic
Growth, 32(4) J. COMM. 69 (1982) ("Despite all the talk, much of the 'communication
revolution' is simply not happening or is happening very slowly").
100. See Berkman, Coming to Terms with Deregulation,ACCESS, January 1984, at
1. "The argument for deregulation rests on the alleged proliferation of competing
sources-an argument which ignores the fact that cable penetration is below 40 percent, and may never get above 50 percent; not to mention the increasing failure of all

COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 8

nority-oriented services exhibit slow growth, 1°1 and Congress
has recently allowed cable systems to renegotiate expensive
franchise agreements that include universal or low-cost service.'0 2 This development is a complete reversal of early Commission policy, which required operators to wire all sections of
a city "equitably.' ' 0 3 Further, cable still remains unavailable to
the majority of American homes 0 4 and has yet to penetrate urban areas that are highly populated by minorities.0 5 The paradigmatic cable consumer lives in an upscale, predominantly
10 6
white, middle-income area.
There is little doubt that a considerable gap exists between
the "wired city" visions of the cable industry and the current
performance of cable in the cities.0 7 The hard reality is that
those specialized cable services we once so naively thought could attract audiences
sufficient for commercial success." Id.
101. Black Entertainment Television is among the oldest basic cable services, but
has remained one of the smallest. It serves only 8.5% of cable homes. The service has
suffered from the inability of cable services to wire the major urban areas where
many blacks live, and insensitivity bordering on "overt racism" by white cable operators. See BET: Still Small, but Determined, supra note 95. The service does well in
the black homes that it does serve, however. See Looking Up, BROADCASTING, July 29,
1985, at 11. Distribution difficulties could be eased by BET's recent affiliation with
Home Box Office, a major pay service. See HBO's New BET, BROADCASTING, April 15,
1985.
102. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat.) 2779, allowing cable systems to "renegotiate"
franchise terms with cities. This provision was seen as a major victory for cable systems, because many franchises contained requirements that cut back on profitmaking
potential and threatened continuing economic viability. See Cable Industry is Ready to
Roll, BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 31 (National Cable Television Association president stating that the Cable Act will allow the medium to realize its full competitive
potential).
103. The policy was intended to prevent companies from wiring the most profitable
areas and leaving the poorer neighborhoods without service. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.31(a)(2) (1970). It is obvious that all neighborhoods "are not created equal," and
some are more attractive to cable services than others. See Berkin, Hit or Myth?: The
Cable TV Marketplace,Diversity and Regulation, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 41, 45 (1983).
104. National cable penetration is most recently placed at 45.3% of television
homes. See PenetratingFigures,BROADCASTING, June 17, 1985, at 10.
105. No one in the cable industry disputes that "wiring the big cities will be difficult." Cable's Final Frontier, BROADCASTING, Feb. 4, 1985 (reporting statement of
John Malone, president of the nation's largest multiple-system owner). Because large
urban areas are where most minorities live, the inability of cable systems to penetrate
such areas has stunted the growth of minority-oriented cable services. See BET: Still
Small, but Determined, supra note 95.
106. See Engsberg, Cable Employment: Where Have All Those New Jobs Gone?, 15
PERSPECTIVES 51, 53 (1983) (cable employment reflects the demographics of those who
subscribe to cable).
107. See Moss & Warren, Public Policy and Community-Oriented Uses of Cable
Television, 20 URB. AFF. Q. 233 (1984).
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"relatively poor areas, and in particular inner-city poor areas,
may not seem worth the investment of time and money" to
cable operators.""8 This reality is reflected in black cable subscription rates, which lag significantly behind white subscription rates. 0 9 Indeed, the lowest subscription rates are among
cities with high urban minority populations. 110 When socioeconomic status is considered, the urban minority is even more obviously foreclosed from the cable television market-lower
socioeconomic classes account for only 3.5 percent of cable subscribers."' Demographic research shows that cable subscription is an upper- and middle-class phenomenon. 1 2 Even at
modest subscription rates, few inhabitants of poor minority areas may be expected to subscribe to cable television. 11 3 Early
estimates that consumers would be willing to pay current
1 14
prices for cable television were "clearly quite unreasonable,
especially when one considers that such necessities as telephone service 1 5 and basic utilities 1 6 may be beyond the reach
108. Berkin, Hit or Myth?: The Cable TV Marketplace,Diversity and Regulation,
35 FED. COMM. L.J. 41, 45 (1983). Berkin finds that "it is important that the ability to
compel full wiring be vested in some government body. In particular, system operators must not be allowed to discriminate solely on the basis of race or ethnic group."
Id. at 46.
109. The most recent available black cable subscription rate is 35.1% of homes
passed, as opposed to total figures of 45.3% of homes passed (the total figure is lower
than actual white subscription, because it includes black subscribers). See Letter from
Howard M. Shimmel, Research Manager, Nielson Media Research, to Kurt Wimmer
(June 27, 1985) (November 1984 figures).
110. Among the lowest penetration figures in the nation are Washington, D.C.
(23%), Chicago, Ill. (25%), Baltimore, Md. (25%), Milwaukee, Wisc. (27%), and Detroit, Mich. (30%). Cable Penetration, BROADCASTING, May 13, 1985, at 11.
111. See ADVERTISING RESEARCH FOUNDATION, RESEARCHING THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA II: PROGRESS AND PRIORITIES, MAJOR IMPACTS ASSESSED 85 (1983).
112. See id. at 84 (finding that "nationally, cable television appears to be a middleclass phenomenon.., but the story skews upward... nearly 40% of the cable households [in markets Arbitron meters] reside in the affluent urban and suburban
clusters").
113. See Smith, Ownership Policy and the Cable Industry, 7 YALE REV. OF L. &
SOC. ACTION 266-67 (1972) (finding that even at a fee of $3.50 per month, "only 18 to 33
percent of Washington residents could be expected to subscribe to a cable system offering a conventional assortment of services"). See also R. ADLER, THE HUMANISTIC
CLAIM ON THE CABLE

(1973).

114. Ellickson, Hedonic Theory and the Demand for Cable Television, 69 AM.
ECON. REV. 183, 189 (1979); cf Park, Prospectsfor Cable in the 100 Largest Television
Markets, 3 BELL J. ECON. 130 (1972) (consumers would be willing to pay up to 21% of
their income).
115. See I. POOL, TALKING BACK: CITIZEN FEEDBACK AND CABLE TECHNOLOGY
(1973). "Although telephone charges are relatively modest... credit restrictions keep
telephones out of precisely those areas that are in need of access to information and
action sources. The cities' poor normally have no phones." Id. at 108.
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of the urban poor. The claimed abundance of diverse electronic
programming is simply beyond the financial capabilities of
many minority viewers." 7
The trend will not reverse itself. The Cable Communications
Policy Act of 19841 provides that basic cable rates will be deregulated in sufficiently competitive" 9 markets; this provision
is a virtual guarantee that basic cable rates will rise. 20 When
pricing is determined wholly by the profit-making decisions of
the cable-system operator, it is inevitable that higher costs will
result.' 2 1 As the trend continues, minorities will be excluded22
and disenfranchised from the communications mainstream.
This inevitability was noted a decade ago by a presidential commission, which recommended universal service as a national
116. See Henderson, Public Utility Regulations: The Socioecomic Dimensions of
Reform, 9 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 260 (1979). "The access of minorities and the
poor to energy resources remains inferior. Unemployment, underemployment, racial
and class discrimination limit poor and minority incomes." Id. Deposits, billing
charges, and penalties for disconnections are more likely to be problematic for poor
and minority households. Id. at 266.
117. See Well-Done: FCC Chair Grilled at Oversight Hearings, ACCESS, Feb. 1984,
at 2. Children's programming is a prime example. A House Telecommunications
Subcommittee investigation found that broadcast children's programming has decreased from 11.4 hours per week in 1982 to 4.2 hours per week in 1984, and much of
the programming available was on pay television which many could not afford. See id.
118. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779.
119. Congress left to the Commission the determination of when a market is sufficiently competitive to allow basic cable rates to be deregulated. The Commission has
suggested that the presence of four unduplicated broadcast signals, including those of
the major networks, would constitute "effective competition." See FCCStarts Action
on Revising Cable Rules, BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 93. More recently, however,
the Mass Media Bureau has said it is likely that the Commission will recommend a
"less onerous" standard. See Action on Act, BROADCASTING, March 18, 1985, at 7.
120. In the new cable atmosphere, cable operators will "take advantage of the basic
rate deregulation to increase their rates." CCPA Fallout: Basic Rates Up, Pay May
Fall, BROADCASTING, June 10, 1985, at 62. One cable-system owner expressed his hope
that his basic rate of $9 would increase to $15 in two years. Id. Ability to increase
rates adds to the "enormous benefits to be reaped from cable in the deregulated environment." Cable Looking Good as an Investment, BROADCASTING, June 10, 1985, at 77.
121. See K. BECK, CULTIVATING THE WASTELAND: CAN CABLE PUT THE VISION
BACK INTO TELEVISION? (1983). The trend away from regulation makes issues of access more difficult; "most cable operators would rather see their electronic real estate
being used to earn more money." Id at 114.
122. See Tate, Community Control of Cable Television Systems, in I. POOL, TALKING BACK: CITIZEN FEEDBACK AND CABLE TECHNOLOGY (1973), (stating that "if the
present trends continue, minority communities will be excluded and disenfranchised
... the white middle class that manages and operates major educational, social, and
cultural institutions is actively vying to dictate public programming policies for cable
systems, including those serving black communities"). Id. at 56-57 (parenthetical
deleted).
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policy. 123 The policy implications of new-media availability
should be fully considered, 124 as the many positive uses of new
technologies may never be realized if the communications
125
revolution exists only for the few.
The capabilities of cable television would certainly benefit
the minority community. 126 Cable television, with its potential
for public-access programming, could help to create neighbor27
hood cohesiveness, and could help to revitalize urban areas.
Voting on local issues by television could increase urban awareness of government, but the innovation would be useless if residents could not afford the medium. 128 The potential cable
television holds for expanding the electronic forum is meaningless without equal access to all. 129 "In order for truth to prevail,
each member of the public must have access to the various dif123.

THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE: REPORT TO

THE PRESIDENT (1974). The Committee found that "if cable is to become a constructive force in our national life, it must be open to all Americans," and recommended
that "authorities should assure that cable is available to the poor." Id. at 15, 19. Universal service "could avoid the emergence of a class of citizens cut off from what could
well become the information mainstream of the future." Id. at 47.
124. See R. NOLL, P. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION
REGULATION (1973) (stating that "the fears of low-income groups that pay TV will
price them out of the television viewing market should not be dismissed summarily".)
Id. at 21.
125. See Noam, The PoliticalEconomy of Cable Television Regulation, in GANDY,
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE TENTH ANNUAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH
CONFERENCE (1982); Moss & Warren, Public Policy and Community-Oriented Uses of
Cable Television, 20 URB. AFF. Q. 233 (1984).
126. See Tate, supra note 122, at 55 (access to cable television is critical to minority
communities); see also id. at 59 (finding that "cable television provides a substantial
opportunity for urban minority communities to develop and control the most powerful cultural and social instrument in their communities"). See also CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 123:
It could provide minority groups, ethnic groups, the aged, the young, or
people living in the same neighborhood an opportunity to express, and see
expressed, their own views. Yet, it would also enable all of these groups to be
exposed to the views of others, free of the homogeneity which characterizes
contemporary television.
Id. at 15.
127. See Jeffres & Dobos, Communication and Neighborhood Mobilization, 20
URB. AFF. Q. 97 (1984).
128. See Becker, Teledemocracy: Bringing Power Back to the People, 15 FUTURIST
6 (1981). Two-way television for voting "would, in 'real' voting, represent a 'poll tax'
that poor people might be hard-pressed to pay." Id.
129. See Olenick, Cable Television Jbr Whom?. 50 EKISTICS 400 (1983). "Democracy depends for its legitimacy not simply on the acquiescence of the governed, but on
their informed consent, which means that they should not be deprived of the full
range of viewpoints and information and of opportunities for discussion, nor should
they be coerced." Id.
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fering views. '130 Such access is impossible as long as the minority community has differential ability to afford the new
communications technologies.
Other new communications technologies exhibit similar differential access. Direct broadcast satellite service, which may
become viable, 13' carries both start-up costs (purchasing a dish)
and subscription costs. 132 Microwave distribution systems carry
parallel costs, and are restricted to a few entertainment channels. 3 3 Video cassette recorders have similar cost structures,
and tend to attract an audience similar to that subscribing to
cable television. 34 A sole exception is low-power television.
Low-power television is free (albeit limited in its ability to
reach a wide audience), and "a low-power station located in a
dense racially or ethnically homogeneous community could
35
provide a much-needed service to the dominant local group.'
With the exception of low-power television, then, each new
technology shares a common disadvantage with cable television: high costs make it difficult for those of lower socioeconomic status to participate in the new video marketplace.
A socioeconomic bias in the ability to afford new media certainly exists. Scarcity of the channels of communication is,
130. Davis, Eliminating the Network/Cable Cross-Ownership Ban: Does a Free
Market Protectthe Marketplace of Ideas?,6 COMM/ENT L.J. 163, 183 (1983). See generally I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983); Melnick, Access to Cable Television:
A Critique of the Affirmative Duty Theory of the First Amendment, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 1393 (1982).

131. After early difficulties in defining a market and finding investors, DBS appears to have a future. See Not Dead Yet, BROADCASTING, Jan. 21, 1985, at 75; Satellite
Broadcasting: The Wonder of it All, BROADCASTING, July 8, 1985, at 106. An example
of early difficulties was the decision of Communications Satellite Corporation to end
its joint venture to provide a DBS system because of "unacceptable risks." See Ander-

son, The Economic, Legal and Scientific Implications of Direct BroadcastSatellites, 7
COM. & L. 3, 25 (1985).
132. See Backyard Charge, BROADCASTING, July 8, 1985, at 8.
133. See The Expanding World of Multichannel TV, BROADCASTING, March 11,
1985, at 38. The first major-market system began broadcasting in Washington, D.C., at
the end of 1984. Its installation cost was $250, and subscription charges ranged from
$12.95 for a two-channel package to $28.95 for a four-channel package.
134. The demographics of pay-television subscribers and VCR owners are similar;
both groups are younger and have higher incomes than the general population. See
Probing VCR-Pay Cable Compatibility,BROADCASTING, Feb. 18, 1985, at 69. The VCR
technology currently has about a 20 percent penetration, and is expected to reach onethird of homes by 1986. See VCR Growth, BROADCASTING, July 8, 1985, at 14.

135. Kendrick, The FCCand Low-Power Television: Managingthe New Gold Rush,
36 RUTGERS L. REV. 233, 236 (1983). Such a policy is favored by the Commission. See
Low-Power Television Inquiry, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 82 F.C.C.2d 47, 48
(1980).
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then, a continuing economic reality for many in the minority
community. "A distinction must be drawn between availability
and accessibility; '"136 expensive new media are clearly not accessible to the minority community. 1 37 Cable television is not
likely to produce public interest programming on a par with
broadcasting. 3 The ability to command the marketplace for
expensive new video technologies is contingent upon sufficient
economic power to purchase services. This economic power is
missing in the minority community.
Overall, an examination of the marketplace power of the minority community reveals that minority groups have little influence on either the traditional broadcasting marketplace or
the new technologies marketplace. The history of the market
has been one of minority exclusion; "the de facto exclusion of
minorities from equitable controls over broadcast services has
reached a point where blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and
Native Americans have become second-class citizens in the
American world of broadcasting.' 39 With such a conspicuous
absence of market influence and the compelling case for a nationwide market failure in provision of minority-oriented programming, it is little less than sophistry to contend that the
current television market will serve the minority viewer.
136. Berkin, supra note 103, at 49.
137. See Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
473 F.2d 16, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) ("Ought we not instead focus
our attention on how we can make the cable medium economically accessible to those
who assert a right to use it?"); see also supra notes 118-22 (legal developments making
it likely that cable will become more expensive).
138. Early in cable's history, the Commission found that basic policies of the Communications Act required that cable not be treated as broadcasting's equal:
Because cable is not free, because it provides little programming tailored to
the needs of its local service areas, and because it was not clear that cable
could achieve market penetration comparable to that of broadcast television,
only broadcasting could fully satisfy the act's preference for universal, free,
local programming.
Report and Order in Docket 20487, 57 F.C.C.2d 625, 699 (1976). See also Simon, The
Collapse of Consensus: Effects of the Deregulationof Cable Television, 7 COLUM. J.
L. & ARTS 19 (1982) and Besen, The Economics of Cable TV "Consensus," 17 J. L. &
ECON. 39, 41 (1974).
139. See CaliforniaStudies Reveal Sharp Decline in Access to Minorities,BETTER
RADIO AND TELEVISION 1, (Winter 1985). This conclusion was drawn from studies by
the California State Advisory Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and
the National Association for Better Broadcasting. The results, showing white male
dominance of the broadcasting market, "indicate that the relegation of the public interest in broadcasting to a secondary role has become an accomplished fact." Id.

354
C.
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The Prospect for Minority Influence in Public Participation

When markets fail, as the evidence indicates the market for
minority-oriented programming has, an alternative mechanism
exists by which citizens may attempt to influence broadcasters'
programming choices. Public participation in the Commission's
license-renewal processes was created by Congress 140 and expanded by the courts 14 1 to include citizens who claim that a
broadcast licensee has not served the public interest adequately. 4 2 A viewer may file a petition to deny a license re-

newal alleging that the licensee has failed to air sufficient
public service programming.

The process is one that holds great potential for minority influence in the broadcasting marketplace. 4 3 Because a petition

to deny places a valuable license at risk, a licensee may be willing to produce minority-oriented programming in response to a

petitioner's complaints. One petition, for example, elicited a
million-dollar pledge of black- and Hispanic-oriented program-

ming. 44 Granting the public the right to appear before the
Commission puts public representatives in a strong bargaining

position. Rather than spend large amounts on an administrative battle, a broadcaster may produce public service programming. 14' The success of some minority petitioners has spawned
public interest groups 14 6 to represent minority interests in
140. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (creating the petition to
deny).
141. See United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.).
142. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has maintained that the
public has "a limited avenue of redress within the F.C.C. to ensure that broadcasters
are truly serving the 'public interest, convenience, and necessity.'" Rosen, Communications Law, 1982 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 183 (citing Gottfried v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 655 F.2d 297, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
143. See generally Note, Use of Petitions by Minority Groups to Deny Broadcast
License Renewals, 1978 DUKE L.J. 271, 272 ("It would appear that 'petitions to deny'
would be particularly valuable to minority groups.").
144. The petition was filed in 1970 by the Citizens Communication Center against a
sale of stations to Capital Cities Broadcasting in Fresno, Calif.; Philadelphia, Pa.; and
New Haven, Conn. See PROwITT, GUIDE TO CITIZEN ACTION IN RADIO AND TELEVISION
29 (1971).
145. See Symons, Making Yourself Heard (and Seen): The Citizen's Role in Communications,in HAIGHT, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE CITIZEN: PUBLIC INTEREST PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT REWRITE 17 (1979).

146. For purposes of this analysis, a public interest group may be defined as "an
organizational entity that purports to represent very broad, diffuse, non-commercial
interests which traditionally have received little explicit or direct representation in
the processes by which agencies, courts, and legislatures make public policy." Schuck,
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Commission procedures.14 7 The efficacy of the petitioning process for minority groups depends, however, on the receptivity
of the Commission and the amount of institutional barriers that
are raised against petitioners.
This section will consider whether the trend toward deregulation has raised such barriers against minority groups seeking
to utilize the Commission's public participation processes to influence broadcast programming. It will do so by means of an
empirical study designed to correlate the filings of petitions to
deny 1 48 with deregulatory changes in the radio marketplace,
which has been substantially deregulated. 149 If such an inquiry
reveals that minority groups have more difficulty filing in a
deregulated atmosphere, the result will be that the minority
public will be deprived of the only remaining mechanism 5 ° by
which it may influence broadcast programming.
1.

The Evolution of the Public's Right of Participation

Although the petition to deny has been a long-standing part
of the Communications Act, participation of the viewing public
in the petitioning process is a relatively recent phenomenon.
For the first 30 years of the Communications Act, participation
in Commission processes had been limited to other broadcasters competing in the marketplace - those who might suffer
economic injury from a grant of a license to a competitor,' 5 '
those who might suffer electrical interference from a new sigPublic Interest Groups and the Policy Process,PUB. ADMIN. REV. (March/April 1977),
at 133.
147. Such groups, although concentrated in Washington, exist throughout the
country. "It is hard to find a community of any size without its organizations of
blacks, Chicanos, Latinos, liberated women, activist mothers, or other concerned
types negotiating for stronger representation in broadcasting." Zeidenberg, The Struggle Over BroadcastAccess II, BROADCASTING, Sept. 27, 1971, at 24.
148. The petition to deny, described more fully below, is a statutory remedy by
which an interested party may petition the Commission for an order denying the license renewal of any broadcast licensee. Interested parties, then, may be citizen
groups wishing to influence the nature of the programming a licensee has broadcast,
challengers seeking the frequency for their own use, or established broadcasters seeking to limit the competition in their market. Public interest groups may propose access to the facilities for programming, or may seek pledges of programming
responsive to the needs of their constituencies. See generally Note, supra note 143.
149. See infra notes 283-304 and accompanying text.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
151. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940).
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nal, 152 or those also seeking to enter the marketplace, whose
applications were mutually exclusive with the new application.153
Including the public in the Commission's processes has an intuitive appeal; the Commission is charged with regulating in
the "public" interest,154 and it is logical to expect that the public
itself is an appropriate gauge of the parameters of its interest.

55

The Commission, however, did not recognize the logic of the
approach until it was forced to do so by federal courts reviewing its denials of participatory rights.
The roots of the right of participation lie in the judicial decisions elucidating the responsibilities of the Commission. In the
classic description of the rationale for broadcast regulation,
Justice Frankfurter held that "the 'public interest' to be served
under the Communications Act is thus the interest of the listening public in 'the larger and more effective use of radio.' """
At the very beginnings of regulation, then, determination of
the interest of the listening public was a major part of the Commission's responsibility. The importance of this responsibility
became more evident after the Court's disposition of Red Lion
Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission.'5 7 In
upholding the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, the
Court stated that "it is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."' 58 This
view is less than surprising, in light of the Commission's repeated assertions that citizens "are the owners of the channels
of television - indeed, of all broadcasting."' 59 The public's par152. See National Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n (KOA),
132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
153. See Ashbacker Radio Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 326 U.S. 327
(1945).
154. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
155. See United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n [I], 359 F.2d
994, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("consumers are generally among the best vindicators of the

public interest").
156. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (emphasis added).
157. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (White, J.).
158. Id. at 390. It should be noted that this widely quoted dicta does not depend on
the scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation, and would not cease to be a vital statement of the Commission's responsibilities even if the Commission and the industry
were to succeed in current efforts to overturn Red Lion and eliminate the fairness
doctrine. See Meredith Wants a Shot at the FairnessDoctrine, BROADCASTING, Jan.
27, 1986, at 32.
159. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PRO-
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amount right in receiving broadcast communications would be
an empty one without a concomitant right to make its interests
heard in Commission decisions.
The logical necessity of according such a right to the public
was recognized by Chief Justice [then Judge] Burger in United
Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Commission
M]. 16° Although the public's interest in broadcasting had been
accorded great importance by the courts, 6 ' the issue of
whether representatives of the public had standing to intervene
in Commission proceedings was one of first impression.'6 2
Minority claims were the centerpiece of the case. At issue
was the Commission's "unusual" action of granting a restricted
and conditional renewal of a television station's license.'6 3 The
broadcaster, WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi, stood accused of
egregious racial discrimination.'6 4 Numerous complaints
charged that the station's programming urged racial segregation and that the station had refused to grant time to those with
opposing views, as well as other discriminatory actions.'6 5 The
time period was marred by great racial unrest in Mississippi.
Although complaints against the station dated back to 1955, the
Commission had taken no action against it.'6 6 Finally, a group
of public representatives attempted to block renewal of the station's license by intervening directly in proceedings before the
1 67
Commission.
CUREMENT, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1963) (cited in United Church
of Christ[I], 359 F.2d at 1003).
160. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
161. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
162. See United Church of Christ [I], 359 F.2d at 997.
163. Id.
164. The intervenors claimed that the station failed to give fair accounts of black
issues. The station had gone so far as to flash "Sorry, Cable Trouble" on viewers'
screens to delete network coverage of Thurgood Marshall, then the general counsel of
the NAACP and now Supreme Court Justice. Id. at 997-98. Also at issue was an excessive amount of commercials and entertainment programming.
165. After the outbreak of racial tensions in 1962, WLBT had presented programs
concerning racial integration in which only one viewpoint was aired. These broadcasts led to the complaints of the intervenors, who sought to participate on their own
behalf and as representatives of "all other television viewers in the state of Mississippi." Id. at 998.
166. Complaints had been made in 1955, 1957, 1958, 1962, and 1964; failures to comply with the Fairness Doctrine had been noted but had not been seen as egregious
enough to justify nonrenewal of the station's license. The intervenors charged that
blacks were given little television exposure on the station, even though blacks comprised 45% of the local population. Id. at 998 n.4.
167. Intervenors were the United Church of Christ and a local Church of Christ,
which had had substantial membership in the area. Two individuals also sought to
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standing before the Commission may be predicated only on
"the invasion of a legally protected interest or an injury which
is direct and substantial," and stated that the petitioners could
claim no greater injury than members of the general public.' 69
Ironically, the public's general injury was precisely the issue
petitioners sought to bring before the Commission, 70 and was
among the Commission's reasons for refusing the group's plea
for participation. 7 '
The court of appeals eschewed this narrow view of standing,
and noted that the Commission had attempted to restrict standing at every opportunity in the past. 72 The importance of minority issues had been specifically denied by the Commission:
Here petitioners, as members of a minority group, can assert
no greater interest or claim of injury than members of the general public. Otherwise, any minority group based on race,
creed, color, or national origins could gain standing as a representative of the public interest despite the lack of an individual
substantive right to protect or a73substantial and immediate interest in the matter protested.

The court disagreed. In fact, standing in other areas was
granted not for the personal interests of the intervenors but for
the general interests of the public.7 4 The Communications Act
intervene. Both Dr. Aaron Henry, president of the Mississippi NAACP, and Robert
Smith were residents of Mississippi and owned televisions. One of the men lived in
the prime viewing area of WLBT, and both had had controversies with the station. Id.
at 998.
168. Id. at 999. In its denial, the Commission stated that it does consider the types
of contentions the intervenors sought to raise, and argued that it did so in WLBT's
case.
169. Id.
170. The intervenors contended that WLBT had engaged in discriminatory programming practices, and stated that the Commission could not renew its license even
provisionally "without a hearing to resolve factual issues raised by their petition and
vitally important to the public." Id. at 1000.
171. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
172. The court surveyed the approved areas of standing and concluded that "it is
interesting to note, however, that the Commission's traditionally narrow view of
standing initially led it to deny standing to the very categories it now asserts are the
only ones entitled thereto." Id. at 1000.
173. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143, 1149 n.11 (1965).
174. Indeed, the prior grants of standing had been crafted because the parties in
question were the only potential litigants with a sufficient interest to intervene. The
court noted that "standing is accorded to persons not for the protection of their private interest but only to vindicate the public interest." Id. at 1001, citing Federal
Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940)
("these private litigants have standing only as representatives of the public interest").
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provided for rights of standing, and those rights were to be used
to represent the public interest.'75 It was logical, then, to allow
the public to intervene
directly and voice its complaints directly
176
to the Commission.

The Court held that audience participation must be allowed
in license renewal proceedings. Because "consumers are generally among the best vindicators of the public interest," responsible representatives of the public are granted standing before
the Commission. 77 Limited participatory rights had already
been established by the Commission17 and the Administrative
Procedure Act

79

but the new right of public participation in

license renewal proceedings gave public interest petitioners a
greater opportunity to influence the direction of programming
decisions.
175. The Communications Act of 1934 grants rights of appeal to persons "aggrieved
or whose interests are adversely affected" by Commission action. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(b)(6); see also United Church of Christ[I], 359 F.2d at 1000 (standards for standing before the Commission and standing to appeal an order to the court are interchangeable). The court interpreted the Congressional intent behind § 402(b)(6) not to
limit the classes of parties that may intervene. See United Church of Christ[I], 359
F.2d at 1001.
176. See United Church of Christ[I], 359 F.2d at 1005. The court held that "responsible spokesmen for representative groups having significant roots in the listening
community" must be allowed to participate in Commission decisions, but left the task
of determining how it should delineate "which community representatives are to be
allowed to participate and how many are reasonably required to give the Commission
the assistance it needs in vindicating the public interest." Id. at 1005-06.
177. The court did not enumerate which groups should be allowed to intervene,
but stated that such community organizations as civic associations, professional societies, unions, churches, and educational institutions could be helpful. Id. at 1005.
These groups would be beneficial, the court said, because they generally represent a
broad range of interests rather than narrow special interests. Id.
178. The Commission has always allowed public participation to the limited extent
of writing letters to its complaint bureau. See United Church of Christ[I], 359 F.2d at
1001. Further, the Communications Act allows "any party in interest" to file a petition to deny; the filing of a petition may trigger a hearing if the Commission determines that the petition raises a "substantial and material question of fact." See
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(2). The hearing resulting from such a petition is a "full" hearing, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e), indicating the formal adjudicatory procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554. See also id. at § 554(a)(3)
(adjudication required in "proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections,
tests, or elections").
179. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that an agency shall grant "all
interested persons an opportunity to participate" through "submission of written data,
views, or arguments, with or without opportunity for oral presentation." See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). Whether oral presentation will be allowed
is a matter left up to the agency's discretion; the entire participatory provision may be
avoided if the matter (1) involves military or foreign affairs functions, or (2) relates to
management, personnel, public property, or loans. See id., 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) & (2).

COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 8

The court remanded the case to the Commission, demanding
that it allow the minority-interest petitioners to intervene. The
Commission did so, but granted renewal of WLBT's license."' 0
The Commission explained that the public-interest intervenors
had failed to prove allegations of discriminatory programming."' On appeal, the court again reversed the Commission,
and elucidated the responsibilities the Commission holds toward public interest intervenors.8 2
The Commission had treated the minority intervenors as enemies rather than allies; in so doing, it had misunderstood its
proper role. The court held that the Commission had mistakenly placed a strict burden of proof on the intervenors and had
ignored its duty to assist them in their efforts." 3 Public interest
intervenors were not to be treated as "interlopers," but as complaining witnesses presenting evidence to a tribunal "whose
duty it is to conduct an affirmative and objective investigation
of all the facts."' 84 The Commission's duties did not end by simply providing a forum for the petitioners; "its duties began at
that stage."'8 5 The duty the Commission owed the intervenors
was clear: "The Commission and the examiners have an affirmative duty to assist in the development of a meaningful record
which can serve as the basis for the evaluation of the licensee's
performance of his duty to serve the public interest."' 6 The
Commission, then, has a duty to assist public interest intervenors in their efforts.
2. The Petition to Deny and Minority Participation
The mechanism through which the public may exercise this
180. See United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n [II], 425
F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J.). Although the station's license was renewed for
a probationary period of one year in the action appealed as United Church of Christ
II], on remand the Commission renewed the license for the standard licensure period.
See United Church of Christ[II], 425 F.2d at 545.
181. Id. at 546.
182. The Commission had renewed WLBT's license as the intervenors had failed to
carry their burden of proving discriminatory programming; the court held, however,
that that burden was too onerous for the intervenors to bear. Id. at 547.
183. Id. at 550.
184. Id. at 546. After the public interest intervenor has presented a case to the
Commission, it is the Commission's duty to "pursue [its] prosecutorial or regulatory
function if there is probable cause to believe a violation has occured." Id.
185. Id. at 547, stating that it "was not the correct role of the... Commission to sit
back and simply provide a forum for the intervenors" without taking positive action
to assist them.
186. Id. at 548.
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judicially created right of participation, and thus influence the
direction of the broadcast market, is the petition to deny. Public interest groups seized on petitioning as an opportunity to intensify their efforts

to

influence broadcast

programming

87

practices." The groups challenged a plethora of Commission
policies. 88 The right of participation has been of certain value
to minority groups:
It did even more than encourage minority groups around the
country to assert themselves in broadcast matters at a time
when unrest was growing and blacks were becoming more activist. It provided practical lessons in how pressure could be
brought, in how the broadcast establishment could be
challenged.'8 9

The judicial evolution of participatory rights has coalesced minority efforts, and inspired minority groups to become more active in the broadcast regulation arena. 190
Although the presence of petitioners has been pervasive,
their influence is questionable.' 9 1 The presence of petitioners
may solidify Commission resolve in favor of the challenged
broadcaster. 92 Indeed, fewer conditions may be placed on a
pro-broadcaster outcome when a petitioner is present.' 93 This
does not mean that minority efforts are useless; public interest
groups "have helped sensitize broadcasters to the needs and demands of groups in their communities, even if few stations have
187. Other circumstances during the early 1970s contributed to the emergence of
public interest groups, including broad-based public approval, social and political turmoil, effective leadership, and the availability of funding. See J. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 385 (1980). One public interest lawyer argues that the
deregulatory movement itself "turns back the clock to the kind of situation we had in
the 1960s, where stations were ignoring large segments of the population. It permits
abusive economic power [by] removing accountability to the community." See Early
Showdown Developing Over BroadcastDeregulation, 1984 CONG. Q. 93, 94.
188. See Heffron, The Federal CommunicationsCommission and BroadcastDeregulation, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 48 (J. Havick ed.
1983).
189. See The Pool of Experts on Access, BROADCASTING, Sept. 20, 1971, at 36.
190. See R. LABUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICS OF
BROADCAST REGULATION 104 (1981).
191. See Linker, Public Intervenors and the Public Airwaves: The Effect of Interest Groups on FCC Decisions, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 149 (J. Havick ed. 1983). Linker performed empirical analysis of the results of
public participation in broadcast proceedings to conclude that public interest groups
have had adverse effects on the issues they litigate, rather than positive effects for
their constituencies. See id. at 164.
192. See McLauchlan, Agency-Clientele Relations: A Study of the FederalCommunications Commission, 1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 357.
193. See id. at 298.
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actually lost licenses."1 9' 4 Moreover, it is not unusual for a petitioner to persuade a minority of the Commission to find in its
favor. More nonunanimous decisions, of some symbolic value,
occur when a petitioner is present. 9 ' To the extent that public
interest groups do not succeed, however, their bargaining position in the process is undermined and responsive programming

may not result from their intervention.

96

Lack of public inter-

est group efficacy may be explained by the breadth of the policy
issues such groups seek to address; more modest efforts could
produce a more positive record. 97 Broadcast industry groups,
however, are more successful intervenors than citizens' groups;
this result seems to point to a Commission tendency to prefer
industry viewpoints to public interest viewpoints.'
This preference is facilitated by the large amounts of discretion contained in the statutorily determined 99 petitioning process. A petitioner must explain why it is a "party in
interest, '20 0 and set out specific allegations of fact against the
licensee. 20 ' The broadcaster has ten days to respond, and the
194. Symons, Making Yourself Heard (and Seen): The Citizen's Role in Communi-

cations, in

TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE CITIZEN: PUBLIC INTEREST PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT REWRITE 17 (T. Haight ed. 1979).

195. See Linker, supra note 191. at 155 (finding that public interest intervenors
may create dissatisfaction within the Commission even if they do not influence the
ultimate outcome). Persuading even a minority of a viewpoint may have symbolic
value, depending upon the visibility of the decisionmaking body. See Wasby, The Communication of the Supreme Court's Criminal Procedure Decisions: A Preliminary
Mapping, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS 556 (S.Goldman & A. Sarat ed. 1978).
196. See Symons, supra note 194, at 17.
197. See Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE
L.J. 388, 389-404 (1972), and Cramton, The Why, Where, and How of BroadenedPublic Participation,60 GEo. L.J. 525, 525-50 (1972).
198. See Linker, supra note 191, at 164. Linker states that the findings indicate
that the Commission is captured by its clientele-the broadcasting industry-because
only industry intervention seems to influence the Commission's decisionmaking.
Given such a conclusion, the liberalization of participatory policies could work against
minority groups rather than in their favor.
199. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1).
200. See id. "Any party in interest may file with the Commission a petition to deny
any application .. " See generally Kuklin, Continuing Confusion: The Renewal of
Broadcast Licenses, 27 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 95 (1983).
201. Allegations must include specific information and exhibits. "[H]earsay, rumor,
opinion, or broad generalizations are not acceptable." See PROWITT, GUIDE TO CITIZEN
ACTION IN RADIO AND TELEVISION (1971). See also License Renewal Applications of
Certain Broadcast Stations Licensed for and Serving the Metropolitan Los Angeles,
Calif., Area, 68 F.C.C.2d 75 (1978) (requiring affidavits and specific allegations of fact);
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (affidavit must be from one with personal
knowledge).
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petitioner then has five days to reply to the opposition.20 2 If the
Commission determines that the petition raises a "substantial
and material question of fact," a hearing will be scheduled. °3
Time limits surrounding the license renewal must also be followed, or a petition will be treated as a complaint.20 4
The manner in which the Commission exercises its discretion
will determine whether public-interest petitioners will be successful in their endeavors. After the landmark case establishing rights of public participation2 5 against the Commission's
determined opposition,20 6 the Commission raised the evidentiary burden a petitioner must sustain to get a hearing. Out of
500 public interest petitions filed in the first decade of participation, only twenty were decided. 20 7 The Commission also
made it clear that it would sort petitions slowly, to discourage
filings,20 8 and it supported settlements between broadcasters
and petitioners.20 9
The endemic hostility the Commission had shown to public
interest petitioners after the first United Church of Christdecision was not wholly dissipated by the subsequent judicial repri202. See PROWITT, supra note 201, at 27.
203. See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(2): "If a substantial and material
question of fact is presented," the Commission shall formally designate the application for hearing under Section 309(e). If such a question is not presented, the license

will be granted without a hearing and the petition will be denied. See Hartford Communications v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 467 F.2d 408, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Even if a hearing is not allowed by the Commission, public participation can have
great value. The process brings forth varying viewpoints on licensee performance
that would not be heard under other circumstances. In affirming the denial of a hearing, the court of appeals stated that "we do not view this as a defeat for petitioners,
but as successful public intervention which this court has consistently welcomed as
supporting the public interest." Stone v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 466 F.2d
316, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
204. A complaint may be filed at any time against a licensee; petitions to deny,
however, must be filed by the first day of the last full month of the license period. See
PROWITT, supra note 201, at 18, 27.

205. See United Church of Christ [I], 359 F.2d 994; see also supra notes 160-79 and
accompanying text.
206. The Commission has uniformly opposed each class of petitioners allowed by
the courts. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
207. See M. BOTEIN, WHEN CITIZENS COMPLAIN: UCC v. FCC A DECADE LATER 1-2

(1978).
208. See id.
209. See Policy Statement on Agreements Between Broadcast Licensees and the
Public, 57 F.C.C.2d 42 (1975). Such settlements are not, of course, inherently in opposition to the needs of minority petitioners; a settlement can produce precisely the type
of responsive programming a group desires without the costly and time-consuming
use of the Commission's procedures. See J. GRUNDFEST, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
BROADCAST LICENSING BEFORE THE FCC (1976).

COMM/ENT

L. J.

[Vol. 8

mand it received.2 1 ° The history of public interest petitioning
has been characterized by Commission opposition. "The record
may be interpreted as a direct result of the FCC's insensitivity
to the public and a failure to carry out its mandate of regulating
the broadcast industry in the public interest." ' ' Minority issues, in particular, have been burdened by "insurmountable"
institutional limitations. 2 2 A petition alleging unresponsive
programming will not be granted on grounds that the percentage of minority participants is miniscule 21 3 or because the programming will offend minority viewers.214 Allegations that
news coverage of minorities is biased will not be heard unless
extrinsic evidence of deliberate distortion is presented.2 1 5
Although it is not impossible to succeed on such a petition,2 16 it
is, at best, exceedingly difficult.2 1 7
The salient inquiry becomes whether deregulatory rule
changes will place minorities at a further disadvantage in petitioning the Commission. Elements of recent discretionary exercises by the Commission seem to point toward decreasing
overall access of proceedings to the public. The Commission is
seeking authority to dismiss petitions to deny filed "as threats,"
and has proposed granting a right of action for licensees to sue
petitioners filing such petitions. 1 8 Indeed, the Mass Media Bureau has recently taken the unprecedented step of recommending that a settlement agreement between a public interest
petitioner and a licensee be rejected by the Commission, claiming that a Philadelphia licensee was "held hostage" by the Na210. See United Church of Christ[11], 425 F.2d at 543.
211. See M. BOTEIN, supra'note 207.
212. See Note, Use of Petitions by Minority Groups to Deny Broadcast License
Renewals, 1978 DUKE L.J. 271, 277.
213. See KSD/KSD-TV, 61 F.C.C.2d 570, 575 (1976).
214. See CBS, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1127, 1133 (1976); American Broadcasting Co., 52
F.C.C.2d 98, 106 (1975); Taft Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 770, 793 (1973).
215. See CBS, Inc., 56 F.C.C.2d 296, 300 (1975); WOIC, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 355, 367
(1973). Extrinsic evidence required can be testimony from those who have "direct
personal knowledge of an intentional attempt to distort, stage, or slant the news."
Outlet Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 355, 363 (1972).
216. See CBS, Inc., 46 F.C.C.2d 903, 910-11 (1974). The petition must be supported
by affidavits showing that the licensee failed to meet a substantial number of community problems in its programming in bad faith. See id.; see also Note, supra note 212,
at 277 n.48.
217. See Radio Akron, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 987, 995 (1977); State Telecasting Co., 62
F.C.C.2d 309, 315 (1977).
218. See Pay-Off Prevention, BROADCASTING, April 1, 1985, at 7. The proposal
would also prevent settlements from exceeding the petitioner's actual cost of pursuing
the petition.
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tional Black Media Coalition.2 1 9 The Commission has also
followed procedures that prohibit public comment on proposed
transfers of control, despite the unanimous protest of minority
groups.2 2 ° It has also begun to vote on "noncontroversial" items
without taking a public vote at an open meeting.2 2 1 Whether
such changes are part of an overall plan to decrease public input is a matter of speculation,2 2 2 but such a conclusion does not
seem unwarranted.
The deregulatory attitude of the Commission may itself decrease the efficacy of the public participation process for minority groups. Deregulation substantially diminishes the grounds
219. The Bureau objected to a settlement between the National Black Media Coalition (NBMC) and Independence Broadcasting in Philadelphia, stating that "NBMC is
using the commission's processes to obtain a lucrative payoff." FCC Bureau Says
Agreement Contains "Payoff" to NBMC, BROADCASTING, Dec. 16, 1985, at 104. The
agreement would allow two station sales, a $200,000 payment to American Minority
Communications, Inc., for a withdrawal of its competing applications, $250,000 to
NBMC for job referral and consulting, and $125,000 to David Honig, NBMC counsel,
for fees and costs. The Bureau objected most strenuously to the payments directly to
NBMC and Honig, finding that the broadcaster was "held hostage" to NBMC's job
referral offer because of its eagerness to consummate the deal. "It appears that Honig
and his associates are taking advantage of a potential settlement to use the commission's processes to acquire compensation for the advocacy efforts in this and other
proceedings," the Bureau charged. Id. In response to the decision, characterized as
"very racist" by the NBMC, the NBMC asked the Commission to approve the underlying sale while leaving the issue of compensation and consulting to -the litigants after
the sale. See In Brief BROADCASTING, Dec. 23, 1985, at 89.

A second proceeding attacked the NBMC's ongoing effort in petitioning to deny
WYEN (Des Plaines, Ill.) on equal employment opportunity grounds. The charges
were made with the Commission by a disappointed purchaser who was apparently not
aware that the EEO petition had been pending against the station since 1982, and
complains that the NBMC interfered with its agreement to purchase the station
before the NBMC "pressured" the licensee to seek a minority purchaser. See NBMC
Accused of Trying to Force Sale of FM to Minority Buyer, BROADCASTING, Dec. 30,
1985, at 41.
220. The Commission has attempted to require all petitions to deny a transfer of
control to be filed within 30 days, a proposal opposed by Storer Communications, the
company in question, as well as every major public-interest group that files petitions.
The proposal met with a dissent from Commissioner Rivera, who did not agree that
"the public can be excluded from the examination process." See FCC Clears Way for
Full Value, Storer Goes to Court, BROADCASTING, April 29, 1985, at 32; Storer Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 763 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
221. See Out of Sight, BROADCASTING, Feb. 25, 1985, at 7. Among the "noncontroversial items" decided without public scrutiny were waivers of prime-time access
rules, must-carry rules, and a rulemaking to delete a provision blocking authorization
of new AM operations that don't bring service to underserved areas.
222. See Landau Criticizes Government Limits on Information, BROADCASTING,
April 29, 1985, at 84 ("no administration has as comprehensively and consistently attempted . . . to shut down so many different areas of government information in so
many different ways").
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on which petitions may be filed.22 3 As ascertainment and quantitative guidelines for minority-responsive programming are
lifted, minority issues may be difficult to present in a petition to
deny.22 4 This aspect of deregulation "will significantly reduce
the ability of public-interest groups to pressure the Commission. 1 225 Indeed, minority interest groups have found that petitions filed to promote minority issues have been largely ignored
by the Commission.2 2 6 Although other recent changes such as
fiscal crises among public interest groups seeking funding22 7
may also decrease the ability of such groups to file petitions, the
prognosis that the deregulatory thrust of the Commission will
push minority-oriented reformers out of participatory
processes appears well-founded.2 28
223. See Campbell, The FCC's Proposal to Deregulate Radio: Is It Permissible
Under the CommunicationsAct of 1934?, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 233, 263 (1980).
224. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582
(1981), in which the Court allowed the Commission to find that change of entertainment format was no longer grounds for a petition to deny because the Commission
would depend upon market forces to govern entertainment formats.
225. See Heffron, The Federal Communications Commission and Broadcast Deregulation, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 66 (J. Havick
ed. 1983).
226. See Citizen Groups Versus FCC,ACCESS, April 1984, at 2. Pluria Marshall,
chairman of the National Black Media Coalition, pointed out to Fowler that the
group's 62-point petition had not received complete rulemaking numbers, and asked
"is it a waste of time for us to file paper with you?" Sam Simon, of the Telecommunications Research and Action Center, reported that "despite constant and competent
participation by public groups in Commission proceedings, we are being ignored." Id.
This does not mean that the National Black Media Coalition has stopped filing petitions, however. See Petitions to Deny, BROADCASTING, Aug. 12, 1985, at 50.
227. Citizens Communications Center, a major public interest law firm supporting
minority issues, has been in substantial danger of elimination, as a result of funding
difficulties. See Hard Times for Citizens Communications Center, BROADCASTING,
April 8, 1985, at 153. If the Center were to die, it would have a massive impact upon
the Telecommunications Research and Action Center, the nation's largest reform
group, which is Citizens' major client. See id. The firm was founded "when minorities around the country were feeling excluded from the power structure that fashioned the broadcasting service and the programming it offered," id. at 154, and has
advocated minority issues "in scores of petitions to deny." Id.; see also We Ware Case
(editorial), BROADCASTING, April 8, 1985, at 186 (CCC and TRAC account for most of
the public-interest communications law in Washington). The Center appears to have
found funding sources sufficient to continue its activities. See Rescue Missionfor Citizens, BROADCASTING, May 20, 1985, at 46.
228. See BRANSCOMB & SAVAGE, BROADCAST REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (1978).
The authors find that reformers will be prevented from using Commission processes
and be forced into using alternative efforts, such as lobbying in Congress, producing
programming, and putting pressure on shareholders. Id. at 28. Minority issues have
not fared well in Congress. Although an office of ethnic and minority affairs has been
proposed to "serve as a clearinghouse for complaints and suggestions regarding radio
and televison broadcasting which affects ethnic and racial minorities," the proposal
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The deregulatory policy that has the greatest potential for an
adverse impact on public and minority participation is the elimination of programming logs.229 Programming logs were kept
by licensees, and were available to the public. Within the
broadcasting industry, the requirement that licensees maintain
a log of all programming aired is seen as a costly burden with
no appreciable benefits. 230 To public interest groups, however,
the programming logs may be the sole source of information on
23
which a petition is based: '
Effective participation in broadcast regulation can require a
great deal of data, and without ready access to the public file,
citizen groups can be confronted with almost insurmountable
problems in appearing before the Commission. It is hard to
overstate its importance in providing critical information for
informed citizen participation.2 3 2

If the elimination of programming logs is eventually approved
has failed. See In Brief, BROADCASTING, Feb. 11, 1985, at 97; see also Minority Affairs
Office Wanted, BROADCASTING, April 8, 1985, at 134.
229. At least one writer traces the elimination of programming logs to personal
influences of the Commission's chairman. See Nader, Fowler: DerailingFairness,ACCESS, June/July 1984, at 1: "He has sharply reduced the amount of information you
can obtain about your local stations at the FCC. These data are important for citizens
or community groups at station license and renewal time." Id.
230. A General Accounting Office statistic the Commission characterized as "stunning" claimed that compliance with logging requirements by radio licensees required
a total of 18,233,940 hours per year. See Deregulation of Radio, 46 FED. REG. 13,896,
13,904 (1981) (citing FederalPaperwork: Its Impact on Small Business, General Accounting Office, Nov. 17, 1978, at 43). The Commission acknowledges that "the burden seems highly exaggerated, especially in light of the fact that these rules largely
operated only to standardize industry record keeping that is necessary in the ordinary
course of business .... ." See id.; see also Geller, Broadcast Deregulation: The Emperor's New Clothes, BROADCASTING, April 8, 1985, at 14 (arguing that the new "issues/programs list" required under the deregulation rules will require more time to
compile, as "it's undisputed that broadcasters still have to keep logs of all programming in order to meet any challenge and to satisfy advertisers"). A response to Geller
admitted that "people still log," but praised the elimination of logs because "program
log regulations served no other purpose than to allow government officials and citizen
groups to dissect and second-guess a station's nonentertainment programming decisions." See Letter of John B. Summers, Executive Vice President, National Association of Broadcasters (reprinted in BROADCASTING, April 15, 1985, at 35-36).
231. See Judge J. Skelly Wright's statements in United Church of Christ[III], 707
F.2d at 1441:
Citizens groups in the past have found the program logs to be essential to
obtain the concrete information necessary to demonstrate a radio station's
inadequate performance in a petition to deny .... [Under the deregulation
rules] there appears to be no way, short of constant monitoring, to gauge a
station's overall public service performance.
232. J. GRUNDFEST, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN BROADCAST LICENSING BEFORE THE
FCC 12 (1976).
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by the courts, 233 the right of public participation in broadcast
licensing proceedings may be a hollow one.2 34 Without the information traditionally contained in programming logs, public
interest intervenors are faced with the discouraging burden of
monitoring broadcasts.2 3 5
The Commission's proposal to eliminate programming logs
has provoked a tense conflict between the Commission and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In reviewing the Commission's radio deregulation order, which will certainly act as
precedent for the largely parallel television deregulation order,
the court recognized that the elimination of programming logs
could have an adverse impact on the public's "unassailable
right to participate," and held that it would "not allow this
right to be undermined indirectly by the Commission's inadequately explained refusal to require licensees to make2available
36
information on their issue-responsive programming.

Judge J. Skelly Wright noted for the court that programming
logs were "essential" to citizens' groups who needed concrete
information to document a licensee's failure to operate in the
public interest. 237 The lack of available information could force
a potential intervenor to undertake constant monitoring; "such
a dearth of information is hardly conducive to encouraging the
public participation envisioned by the Congress and by this
233. The Commission's decision to eliminate programming logs has again been reversed and remanded to the Commission. See United Church of Christ v. Federal
Communications Comm'n [IV], 779 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A further rulemaking
and further appeals will necessarily follow.
234. After then-Judge Burger's statements in United Church of Christ [II], 425
F.2d at 543, there is little doubt that the right to public participation must be a meaningful one. "[T]he Commission and the examiners have an affirmative duty to assist
in the development of a meaningful record which can serve as the basis for the evaluation of the licensee's performance of his duty to serve the public interest." Id. at 54748.
235. The Commission acknowledges the greater burden monitoring would place
upon citizens seeking to participate in the Commission's processes. See Deregulation
of Radio, Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 930, 941 (1984), rev'd sub nom.United
Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n [IV], 779 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir.
1985) ("any need for such monitoring would of course impose some burden on
petitioners").
236. See United Church of Christ[II], 707 F.2d at 1441.
237. The court noted "an extensive listing of cases" in which petitions to deny
rested exclusively on programming logs. See id. at 1441 n.93; see also J. GRUNDFEST,
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN BROADCAST LICENSING BEFORE THE FCC

(1976) (report

documenting the Commission's indecisive attitude toward citizen petitions and the
problem of coerced licensee settlements); Comment, Enforcing the Obligationto Present ControversialIssues: The Forgotten Halfofthe FairnessDoctrine, 10 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 137, 168-70 (1975).
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court as essential to the formulation of an informed regulatory
policy. '23 The court recognized that this aspect of deregulation
could decrease the public's ability to participate in license
renewals.
The Commission, however, disagreed, and continued in its efforts, which are within its discretion, to eliminate programming
logs. Although requirements that broadcast licensees keep program logs had been in place for 50 years before the radio deregulation order,23 9 there is little doubt that the Commission has
the authority to dismantle them. 24 ° Establishing that the Commission has the power to eliminate logs does not, of course, establish the wisdom of changing program documentation.
Logs have been important tools for intervenors, 24 1 because
the Commission has accorded primary weight to a licensee's
past service when evaluating a license renewal application.2 4 2
In using evidence of past performance to attempt to unseat an
incumbent licensee, a second party faces a formidable challenge. From 1961 to 1978, for example, there were 31 comparative renewal proceedings, none of which resulted in
displacement of an incumbent.2 4 3 The bias toward renewal is
strengthened by the Commission's view that industry stability
promotes the public interest. 244 In theory, a second party promising better public service should prevail. In reality, however, it
is difficult for "a newcomer to make the comparative showing
necessary to displace an established licensee. '245 Whether an
238. See United Church of Christ[III], 707 F.2d at 1441.
239. See id. at 1439. This 50 years of uninterrupted policy practice necessitated a
"hard look" before the doctrine could permissibly be eliminated.
240. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(j). It may be significant that
Congress found programming logs a sufficiently important aspect of broadcast regulation to include them specifically in the Communications Act, but this possibility was
not discussed by the Commission or the court. See also United Church of Christ[III],
707 F.2d at 1439 (noting that the statute "vests discretion" in the Commission).
241. See United Church of Christ [III], 707 F.2d at 1441 n.93; see also id. at 1439
("[c]itizens groups in the past have found the program logs to be essential to obtain
the concrete information necessary to demonstrate a radio station's inadequate performance in a petition to deny").
242. See Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 598 F.2d 37,
43 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
243. See id. at 61 n.23.
244. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. National Citizen's Comm'n for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1978).
245. Ashbacker Radio Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 326 U.S. 327, 332
(1945). Indeed, recent developments promise to give incumbents a further "leg up"
against challengers at renewal hearings; the Fowler Commission is reportedly exploring whether it can create "standards for renewal expectancy that wouldn't be based
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intervenor may make such a showing without program logs is
an open question, and such an impact was not an element of the
Commission's cost-benefit analysis-an analytical method that
seldom accomodates public interest factors.2 4 6
In choosing to eliminate logging requirements, the Commission exercised a straightforward cost-benefit analysis that
yielded less than an obvious result. In evaluating the costs of
logging, it noted that a study on federal paperwork concluded
that compliance with the logging requirement consumed
18,233,940 hours each year. 247 The Commission did not consider
that logs would necessarily be kept for broadcast business purposes. The only expenses created by a federal requirement are
those implicit in uniformity of method248 and public access.2 4 9
on program content." See End to Content Criterion,BROADCASTING, April 15, 1985, at
7; see also What's New at the FCC, BROADCASTING, April 22, 1985, at 58. One of the
mechanisms considered is a plan to base renewal expectancy solely on whether the
incumbent licensee complied with non-programming-related Commission rules and
statutory obligations. Id. Were such a plan to be created, renewal expectancy would
be virtually unchallengeable. Moreover, a plan to eliminate character-related rules
upon which reliance would be placed is being implemented by Fowler. See FCCNo
Longer Wants to be Judge of Character,BROADCASTING, Dec. 16, 1985, at 49; cf.Policy
Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 87 F.C.C.2d 836 (1981);
Character Count, BROADCASTING, June 10, 1985, at 7; More Dereg on Way, BROADCASTING, May 13, 1985, at 7 ("FCC's hope is to confine its perusals of licensee character
to broadcasting conduct or relevance"). Cf.Sharp & Lively, Can the Broadcasterin
the Black Hat Ride Again? "Good Character"Requirementsfor BroadcastLicensees,
32 FED. COMM. L.J. 173 (1980).
246. See, e.g., Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, (1985) ("The constitution cannot be cabined in any
calculus of costs and benefits... the substantive values implicit in the Court's emerging approach are deeply at odds with the constitutional enterprise"); Schwartz, CostBenefit Analysis in Administrative Law: Does It Make Procedural Rights Worthless?, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1985); Shaw & Wolfe, A Legal and Ethical Critique of
Using Cost-Benefit Analysis in Public Law, 19 Hous. L. REV. 899, 926 (1982) (costbenefit analysis "exudes false objectivity and presumes to weigh alternatives which
cannot fairly be weighed against one another").
247. See United Church of Christ [III], 707 F.2d at 1439, citing Deregulation of
Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1099 (1981).
248. Advertising and copyright requirements force stations to keep logs. "A station can no more get along without logs than can a store without an inventory count."
Parker, Should Congress Approve the Senate-Adopted Approach to Radio Deregulation?, 63 CONG. DIG. 106, 109 (1984). Indeed, Commission officials urge licensees to
continue program documentation in case of a license challenge; the question is not
whether to keep program documentation, but whether to make documentation available to the public. See FCCOfficials Urge Broadcastersto Keep Good Records, BROADCASTING, Sept. 16, 1985, at 39-40.
249. Resentment at the cost of providing public access to logs and other public
records at stations may result in decreased public access to statutorily required materials. Evidence that public access to the public file at stations has decreased is not
merely anecdotal, or limited to the experiences of public interest intervenors. One
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In evaluating the continued benefits of logging under the new
deregulatory scheme, the Commission explained that logs
"would not provide a scintilla of information relative to the
content of the programming. "250 The new regulatory plan
would require only a simple "issues/programs list" that would
provide information on five to ten issues addressed by the station during a broadcasting year.25 1
After the court held this reasoning to be inadequate,2 2 the
Commission reconsidered its decision.25 3 The Commission decided to replace programming logs with the same "issues/programs list" found suspect by the court of appeals. The
Commission "again decided not to impose a general logging requirement. ' 254 The Commission decided, first, that requiring
licensees to document programming "whose [sic] nature and
quantity we have said will no longer concern us" would serve
no valid purpose.25 5 Included in this category is news, public
former broadcaster, now a professor, reported that his assignment requiring student
searches of public files disclosed a full 30% of New York City area stations ("including
some of the biggest in the country") refusing access to public files. Four responses to
requests were quoted: (1) "You think you can just barge in off the street and ask for
the public file?" (2) "Oh, you have to make an appointment, at least two weeks in
advance;" (3) "The person in charge of that is on vacation. You'll have to call back;"
and (4) "I'm sure there's no public file at this station. Are you sure there is such a
thing?" See Learning Experience, BROADCASTING, Dec. 30, 1985, at 30 (letter to

editor).
250. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 797, 809 (1981).
251. See United Church of Christ[III], 707 F.2d at 1439.
252. See id. at 1440. The court stated that it could not "accept either the Commission's reasoning or its conclusions in this area.... The fundamental problem is the
Commission's complete failure to examine in an orderly fashion the informational
needs created by its revised scheme and the possible ways in which those needs may
be met."
253. See Deregulation of Radio, Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 930 (1984),
rev 'd sub nom. United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n [IV], 779
F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Second Report and Order].
254. Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C. 2d at 939.
255. Id. at 938. Because licensees are no longer required to provide specific types of
nonentertainment programming, the Commission reasoned that it need not require
logging of such programming. The licensee, however, does have a "bedrock obligation" to provide nonentertainment programming under the deregulation rules, and
licensees can undeniably lose broadcast licenses for not providing sufficient
nonentertainment programming. See Committee for Community Access v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 737 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This aspect of the Second Report and Order arguably does not meet the court's explicitly expressed concern about
citizens' need for documentation when challenging a station for lack of nonentertainment programming. See United Church of Christ [III], 707 F.2d at 1441 ("Under the
Commission's current rules, a citizen seeking to support his petition to deny based on
a station's inadequate nonentertainment programming would now find very little information of any value in the station's public file"). Indeed, the court recognized that
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affairs programming, and commercial content, even though the
Commission had stressed that a "bedrock obligation" to provide
public interest programming remained.256 The Commission
stated that it was "confident" that any market failure in these
areas would be brought to its attention by listener complaints.5 7 The Commission weighed the possibility of market
failure against the certainty of licensee expense in record-keeping. "We do not believe that to guard against such possible, almost certainly limited problems, we should now impose a
costly, general logging requirement on our licensees.

2 58

In an apparent reference to the court of appeals' concern that
an issues/programs list would not facilitate public participation,
the Commission made two changes in its planned procedure.
First, the Commission lifted the requirement that no more
than ten issues be listed.25 9 Second, the Commission decided to
require the lists to be made available quarterly rather than annually. 260 Finally, the Commission clarified its expectations of

the contents of the lists. It noted that licensees are expected to
describe issues addressed by stating how the issue was treated
and the time of the programming, but the Commission said it
was no longer interested in knowing how the licensee determined the issue to be an important one. 261 This "strengthening"
of the issues/programs list requirement will better enable the
"clearly, a citizen could believe that a station was providing a grossly inadequate
amount of such programming and could seek to file a petition to deny on those
grounds." Id. at 1441 n.94.
256. Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d at 938. Deregulation rules were found
to be valid in these areas. See infra notes 692-95 and accompanying text.
257. Id. Under the Second Report and Order, it is clear that the Commission will
rely on listener complaints and filings to assess the workings of the radio marketplace. See infra notes 308-13 and accompanying text.
258. Id. (emphasis in original).
259. Id. at 941.
260. Id. This modification in the plan for issues/programs lists will not, of course,
produce a quantitative increase in the amount of information available to the public;
the concern of the Commission was with producing "fresher" information. How this
modification fits in with the concerns of the United Church of Christ [III] court is
unclear. The court was concerned primarily with the "vital information role" that
programming logs play in citizen participation. See United Church of Christ1111], 707
F.2d at 1442.
261. Second Report and Order,96 F.C.C.2d at 942 n.14. The Commission stated that
"radio licensees were to be free to determine the issues facing their community that
warranted programming consideration and could do so by any reasonable means." Id.
Whether the Commission intends to determine which means are "reasonable" and
which are not is unclear. It is clear, however, that failure to ascertain can mean loss of
a broadcast license. See Committee for Community Access v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 737 F.2d 74, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Commission and the public to assess licensee performance, the
Commission concluded.2 6 2
The Commission acknowledged that the lists would not facilitate public participation in license renewal proceedings in the
same manner as did comprehensive logs. While stating that
"we agree with the court that a logging requirement might be
devised which could be useful to monitoring of licensees' fulfillment of their service obligation," the Commission declined to
craft such a requirement.2 63 It assumed that complaints from
listeners would continue to aid its regulatory efforts,2 6 4 but
stated that petitioners to deny would have to provide their own
documentation by monitoring a station's service. 265 "Any need
for such monitoring would, of course, impose some burden on
petitioners, "266 the Commission noted. If the burden on petitioners were to become too heavy, the Commission stated that
it would revisit the issue.26 7
Although the Commission stated that it was not indifferent
to the concerns expressed by the court of appeals, 268 the sole
modifications to the first report and order involved qualitative
changes in the issues/program list. 269 Neither change is calculated to expand the quantitative information contained in the
lists; quantitative information that would assist public interest
262. See Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d at 942 (regulatory flexibility
analysis).
263. See id. at 939. The Commission found that these acknowledged benefits were
outweighed by the costs of logging. Whether logging does in fact produce more costs
than production of an issues/programs list remains to be seen. The newer lists may
require management time for compilation, while programming logs could be produced
by rote manpower or minimal computer effort. In addition, logs will probably still be
produced to help licensees carry the burden of proving public interest service if the
need arises and to bill advertisers. See Geller and Summers, supra note 230.
264. See Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d at 938.
265. See id. at 941. The Commission noted the court's observation that logs have
been a valuable source of information to petitioners to deny, but stated that such petitions are "rare." Id. This assertion seems questionable, in light of the fact that an
investigation by this researcher has turned up more than 600 petitions to deny filed
since the effective date of the deregulation rules. See infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
266. See Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d at 941. It may be noteworthy that
the considerable costs of monitoring by public interest groups was not part of the
Commission's cost-benefit analysis; rather, the costs factored into the analysis were
those borne by the industry. See id. at 939.
267. See id. at 941. The Commission did not state how it would (or could) determine that the burden on petitioners had become too heavy to bear.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 941-42.
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intervenors was the main concern of the court of appeals.2 7 °
The disposition of the remand provoked a separate statement
from Commissioner Rivera, who saw the Second Report and
Order as satisfying the letter of the remand but not its spirit. 1
On appeal of the Second Report and Order, the court resoundingly reversed the Commission's continued efforts to replace programming logs with a wholly qualitative measure of
program documentation. In United Church of Christv. Federal
Communications Commission [IV], 272 Judge Wright vehemently rejected the Commission's mere "cosmetic improvements" on the previously insufficient proposal.2 7 3 The less
stringent listing requirements contradicted the Commission's
stated policy of relying on public participation in the renewal
process. 2 7 4 The court found the juxtaposition of the decreased
information available after the Commission's abandonment of
long-form renewal, approved in Black Citizensfor a FairMedia
v. Federal Communications Commission,275 and the decreased
information available after the elimination of programming
logs to be incongruous. "The new streamlined renewal process
'is premised, in part, on the Commission's belief that sufficient
information is available in the public file' to facilitate petitions
to deny. ' 276 In the intersection between the two deregulatory
changes, the dimunitive issues/programs list had become the
critical component of the public file upon which the public relies for participation. 7
270. The court of appeals found that quantitative information from programming
logs was invaluable to public representatives attempting to satisfy the onerous burden
of producing a substantial and material question of fact by means of a petition to deny.
See United Church of Christ [III], 707 F.2d at 1441 & n.94.
271. See Second Report and Order,96 F.C.C.2d at 946 (Rivera, Comm'r, filing separate statement).
272. 779 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
273. Id. at 704.
274. Id. at 707-710.
275. 719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3545 (1984).
276. United Church of Christ [IV], 779 F.2d at 708-09.
277. See id. at 709. The court found that the Commission was even more explicit
on this point in enacting the postcard renewal policy, where it stressed the importance
of the public file in the deregulated atmosphere:
Under the rules and policies adopted herein, the information necessary to
conduct an in-depth review of a licensee's performance will be available at
the station in the public inspection file .... Our concerns for assuring the
ability of local citizens to monitor the operations of licensees who serve them
are fulfilled by maintainance of local public files.
Radio Broadcast Services: Revision of Applications for Renewal of License of Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM, and Television Licensees, 40 Rad. Reg. 2d
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The list was firmly rejected by the court because it did not
contain sufficient quantitative detail to facilitate public particiBecause the "petition to deny
pation in renewal proceedings.
plays a critical role in the current regulatory scheme," the
Commission owes the public a duty to devise a method of program documentation that is effective in facilitating public participation.2 7 9 This duty cannot be diminished by requiring
public interest groups to undertake their own monitoring of
stations that might be challenged.2 8 ° The Commission had "incredibly" cited the court's earlier opinion for approval of such a
monitoring requirement, but Judge Wright interpreted that
opinion to hold that "reliance on such private monitoring was
'beyond belief.' ",21 The court also found that the Commission's
"promise" to revisit the issue if monitoring became too heavy a
burden was an empty pledge, as the court had previously determined that imposition of a monitoring responsibility on public
interest groups was unacceptable.28 2 The case was once again
remanded to the Commission for an attempt to craft a proper
source of program documentation.
3.

EmpiricalData on Ability to Participate

Deregulation has prompted changes in the relationship between the public and the Commission. The elimination of pro(P&F) 740, 747 (1981). Moreover, the Second Report and Order stated that "the most
significant source of issue-responsive information under the new regulatory scheme
will be the issues/programs list." Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d at 940,
(quoted in United Church of Christ[IV], 779 F.2d at 709).
278. See United Church of Christ [IV], 779 F.2d at 710. Judge Wright stated that
"[i]f the Commission's goal is public participation in the license renewal process, the
least it can do is assure that public files contain the minimum amount of information
Id.
required to begin the process .
279. See id. at 710.
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. See id. n.10. The court found that both it and the Commission had already
concluded that monitoring was "burdensome," see United Church of Christ[III], 707
F.2d at 1441 and Maintainance of Program Records, 44 F.C.C.2d 845, 852 (1974). "Until
and unless the agency presents us with a new analysis, explaining why its previous
factual determinations were unfounded, we see little reason to reject those findings."
United Church of Christ[IV], 779 F.2d at 710 n.10. The court's statements imply that
it is impermissible to construct a program documentation policy that would force any
monitoring to satisfy the prima facie case standard in filing a petition -to deny.
Although the court stated that its decision "has not the slightest effect on the Commission's discretionary authority to deny hearings or renew licenses," id. at 710 (citing
Citizens for Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 775 F.2d 392
(D.C. Cir. 1985)), an implicit requirement of its holding is that no monitoring may be
required to satisfy the standard of demonstrating a prima facie case in a petition.
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gramming logs, along with the Commission's laissez-faire
deregulatory attitude, creates a possibility that minority groups
will have more difficulty influencing programming choices
through participation in Commission processes.
To test this possibility, this research collected data through
two avenues. First, quantitative information was collected
from the Commission files. Dates of each petition to deny that
was filed from April 4, 1977 to April 4, 1985, four years before
and four years after the deregulation rules were put in place,
were collected. 2 3 No sampling was done; each station's file was
2 4 The hypothesis to be tested
searched.
was whether public
participation has declined since the advent of deregulation. The
petitions were analyzed by date of filing, ethnic diversity of the
market, size of the market, and region of the country. 2 5 Radio
was chosen not because of its importance to the minority community, which appears to be great, 8 but because deregulation
has been in place since 1981 and a substantial database exists
for analysis, and because radio deregulation is a certain precedent for television deregulation.
A decrease in the amount of petitioning would not, standing
alone, confirm that elimination of programming logs caused a
decrease in public participation. Indeed, "public silence supports an inference that a licensee has been complying with
Commission policies. ' 28 7 The Commission has presumed com283. The effective date of the radio deregulation rules is April 3, 1981. See Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981).
284. Petitions to deny since 1981 were garnered from the applications and facilities
reports available from the Commission. The reports used were current to July, 1985,
to ensure that late-recorded filings would be included. Before 1981, however, no such
reports existed; for those dates, the history cards of each station were searched for
filing dates. The Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico were excluded from analysis.
285. The demographic data was taken from information collected by the Census
Bureau and the broadcasting industry. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 1983: A STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT SUPPLEMENT (1983); BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING
YEARBOOK 1984

(1985). The key variables (market size, ethnic diversity, and region of the country)
were chosen because of prior research indicating that ethnic minorities in certain
parts of the country may be more involved in the petitioning process. See generally J.
GRUNDFEST, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN BROADCAST

LICENSING BEFORE THE FCC

(1976).
286. See Parker, Should Congress Approve the Senate-Adopted Approach to Radio
Deregulation? 63 CONG. DIG. 106, 107 (1984) ("for local service, radio is more important than television .. .radio provides an outlet for the views of racial and cultural
minorities").
287. Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 719 F.2d
407, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3545 (1984).
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pliance when public outcry was not present; certain requirements were lifted after a finding that "there has been a
significant absence of formal protest."2 8' 8 The alternative explanation, then, is that the marketplace is working.
To investigate the likelihood of that alternative explanation,
a second inquiry gathered data from the Commission on complaints filed against stations in various categories and interviewed representatives of citizens' groups that participate in
proceedings before the Commission.2 9 Because complaints
need not rely on rigorous evaluation of programming, as must
petitions to deny, the trend of complaints provides a gauge of
how the public perceives the efficacy of the marketplace that is
not affected by the elimination of programming logs or the deregulatory attitude of the Commission. This gauge presents a
baseline along which to judge the level of petition filings.
(a)

Petitions to Deny

Filed petitions to deny have been graphed along a time line,
indicating the trend in filings of citizens and public interest
groups. An introductory caveat is in order: The information
collected is, of course, subject to the compilation practices of
the Commission. If an item is absent from a station's file, a researcher cannot confirm or deny its existence.
The total volume of petitions to deny has not decreased systematically since the elimination of logging requirements.
There have been several marked declines in filing activity,
however, the most notable being in the past year. The time periods are structured to break the eight-year period of analysis
288. See National Black Media Coalition v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 706
F.2d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
289. See Annual Reports (1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1984) (available from Complaints division of the Commission).
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into sixteen equal six-month blocks.290 The pattern of filings
may be depicted graphically:
Figure 1: Total petitions to deny, 1977 to 1985
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Source: Dates of all petitions filed, compiled from Commission facilities reports from 1981 through 1985, and a search of history cards
from 1977 to 1981. The data include all petitions filed, including those
not filed on programming grounds and those filed by competing media outlets.

It is also possible to tabulate the filing activity of those peti290.
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tioners known to be public interest groups.2 9 ' Unlike the general tabulation of all petitions, public interest petitions, in
isolation, show drastic increases and declines in the three years
since the elimination of logging requirements. The pattern of
filings in markets with high degrees of ethnic diversity follows
roughly the same pattern:
Figure 2: Total public-interest petitions filed
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Source: Reports kept by the Commission, from 1977 through 1985.
A "public-interest group" was operationalized as any group representing minority issues; the most visible of these is the National Black
Media Coalition. Other groups represent other ethnic minorities, as
well as other types of minorities (the Philadelphia Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, for example).
291. Not all public interest group petitions are represented in these figures. If a
group was not identified in the Commission's records, it could not be identified as a
public interest group. The absolute number, then, of public interest petitions is an
understatement. Variations over time, however, are probably valid measures, because
any variation in the identification of citizens' groups would probably be systematic
and would not vary over time.

[Vol. 8

COMM/ENT L. J.

Figure 3: Petitions filed in high-ethnic-diversity markets
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Source: Reports kept by the Commission, from 1977 through 1985;
current information from the Broadcasting Yearbook on market location, and current data from the Census Bureau on minority population of those markets. These figures are total petitions in cities of
high ethnic diversity, operationalized as those with 30 percent or
more minority population.

The filing patterns in high ethnic diversity markets follow
closely the pattern of filings by public interest groups. Other
data reveal that 41 percent of all petitions are filed in high diversity markets, indicating that participation and ethnic diversity are postively correlated. If this is, in fact, the case, then a
decrease in ability to file petitions to deny may have a particularly adverse effect on the minority community.
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Figure 4: Petitions filed in high-population markets
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Source: Reports kept by the Commission, from 1977 through 1985;
population figures taken from current Broadcasting Yearbook estimates of market size. These figures are total petitions in markets
with populations of at least 100,000.

Vestiges of discrimination have also been associated with
Southern states; for that reason, petitioning patterns in that geographic location were isolated for analysis. The pattern in
Southern states is depicted as follows:
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Figure 5: Petitions filed in Southern states
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Source: Reports kept by the Commission, from 1977 through 1985.
These figures are total petitions in Southern states, which was operationalized as states of the former Confederacy. Again, this graph does
not represent public-interest petitions only, but includes those filed
by competing media outlets and those not filed on programming
grounds.

4.

Complaints

Citizen complaints are yet another mechanism by which the
Commission may be informed of the workings of the marketplace. Because citizen complaints need not contain the rigorous
showings needed in petitions to deny,292 the pattern of complaints filed allows one to determine the extent to which the
public is pleased with the marketplace independent of the need
for programming logs. An increase in the volume of complaints
coupled with a decrease in the volume of petitions to deny
would imply that the market does not please the public but that
the public is unable to file petitions to deny because of other
292. See supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text.
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factors. One potential factor in a decline of petitions could be
the absence of programming logs.
A difficulty in tabulating complaints, however, is the irregularity with which such documents are compiled by the Commission. Regular tabulations of complaints were made for years
1978-1981 and 1984, but not for 1982 and 1983, coincidentally,
the years when deregulation took effect.2 9 3 It is difficult, if not
impossible, for a researcher to make independent tabulations,
as complaints are not placed in the station's public file and complaint files often contain "confidential" information that is not
available to the public.2 9 4 Using the tabulations available from
the Commission, however, the data is useful. The missing years
can be interpolated on a regular curve.
The major categories of complaints pertinent to this inquiry
are summarized in the following table:
Figure 6: Totals of complaints, major categories
Category

1978

1979

1980

1981

1984

General

90

78

106

158

171

Program

112

131

118

248

253

Stereotype

216

124

137

132

410

58

59

48

53

54

Minority

Source: Broadcast Bureau Fiscal Reports, Federal Communications Commission, 1978-1984 (1982 and 1983 not available). Full titles of categories
are (1) General criticism of programming; (2) Criticism of program, specific
station; (3) Racial/ethnic/religious criticism/ridicule/humor/stereotyping;
(4) Inadequate programming for minority special interest groups.

The most marked trends in filing of complaints have arisen in
criticism of specific programs, which was fairly stable until
1981, and rose significantly in 1981 and 1984. Stereotyping
showed a marked decline from 1978 to 1979, and a tremendous
increase in 1984 over 1981 levels. Minority claims have remained stable. Each category is depicted graphically on the following pages.
293. See Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981).
294. Interview with Polly Fletcher, Complaints Department of the Commission
(April 19, 1985).
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Figure 7: Complaints; general criticism of programming
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Figure 8: Complaints; criticism of program, specific station
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Figure 9: Complaints; racial/ethnic/religious stereotyping
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Figure 10: Complaints; inadequate programming for
minorities
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Discussion

Analysis of the frequency of petition filings reveals that petition filings have decreased markedly in the past year, and have
exhibited several periods of frenetic filing and subsequent decline since deregulation. Further, declines in filing activity
have been especially sharp in those types of markets in which
minority groups are most likely to file-those of high ethnic
diversity, high population, or Southern geography. The differences in frequency should be ascribed to petitions filed by public interest groups, as petitions filed by competing media outlets
have stayed constant.2 9 5 The decline is striking when compared
to the activity in complaints. Claims of racial/ethnic/religious
stereotyping have skyrocketed, and claims of inadequate programming for minority groups have remained at a steady level
throughout the study period.
The dissimilarity in patterns of petitions and complaints
points to institutional difficulties in the petitioning process.
Complaints present a gauge of the market that is independent
of difficulties implicit in petitioning; if petitioning were not hindered, petitions and complaints would follow similar patterns
over time. They do not. The alternative explanation, that the
market is working for minority issues and minorities need not
file petitions, is made implausible by the patterns of complaints. The remaining question is one of causation.
Among the leading explanations offered by public interest
groups is the lack of programming logs upon which an intervenor may base a petition to deny. Andrew Jay Schwartzman,
of the Media Access Project, states that absence of programming logs is a primary reason behind declining ability to file
petitions.29 6 Pluria Marshall, of the National Black Media Coalition, finds that the absence of logs has caused a "severe dropoff" in minority ability to file petitions. The task of gathering
295. Interview with Sam Simon, Telecommunications Research and Action Center
(October 3, 1985). The number of petitions filed by competitors has remained constant notwithstanding policy changes. Such petitions do not depend on programming
logs or grounds that have been eliminated by deregulation. Id.
296. Interview with Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Media Access Project (October 2,
1985). The elimination of programming logs has hurt public-interest petitioners because they do not have the information on which to base petitions. Logs have been
important because they provide an "overall grasp" on what a licensee is doing, and
allow a challenger to make statistical statements on a licensee's programming behavior. Logs are generally still being kept for advertising purposes, but they are not being made available to the public. Id.
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information has shifted from the licensee's duty to document
its performance to the minority community's burden to monitor programming.2 9 7 Jan Engsberg, formerly of the Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ, states that logs
were valuable in constructing skeletons of past programming,
although groups would have to monitor to succeed on a petition.2 9 8 Wilhemina Cook, Citizens Communication Center,
finds a "clear" decline in petitions based on programming
grounds, partly because of the disability of groups to deal with
monitoring. After all, "who can monitor for an entire license
period? '299 Although some monitoring is required to succeed,
logs allowed a group to ascertain whether monitoring results
were representative of a station's overall performance. °°
Each public interest organization recognizes, however, that
the absence of logs is only part of the problem. Sam Simon,
Telecommunications Research and Action Center, also attributes declines in petitioning to a shift in the nature of the consumer movement from a litigation orientation to a negotiation
orientation, fostered by early successes in petitioning.30 1 Deregulation has also meant fewer subjects on which a petitioner
may file and a decrease in information from long-form license
renewals, as well as a Commission that has fostered an atmosphere in which groups may feel that filing is "somewhat hopeless."30 2 Overall, the early prediction that the trend toward
297. Interview with Pluria Marshall, National Black Media Coalition (October 1,
1985). Few minority community groups can afford to monitor, and are thus foreclosed
from the petitioning process. Id.
298. Interview with Jan Engsberg, formerly of the Office of Communications,
United Church of Christ (October 2, 1985). Engsberg noted that her first advice to
local groups seeking to file petitions is to begin monitoring, because detailed documentation is required for a petition to deny; monitoring, however, cannot reconstruct
the past as can programming logs. Id.
299. Interview with Wilhemina Cook, Citizens Communication Center (October 3,
1985). Cook's experience parallels the decline in filing exhibited by the data. "I haven't done a traditional petition to deny in I don't know how long," she said, although
she had performed "five to ten in the course of a year" in her past work with Citizens.
Id.
300. Id.
301. Interview with Sam Simon, supra note 295. More broadcasters are willing to
meet and negotiate with citizens because of the success of early petitioners; the bargaining position of citizen negotiators may be undermined, however, by lessening
chances for success in filing. Pluria Marshall, supra note 297, also noted that the
Black Media Coalition is relying more on direct negotiations with broadcasters because of difficulties in filing with the Commission.
302. Interview with Wilhemina Cook, supra note 299. This view is supported by
each public-interest group. Marshall, supra note 297, states that the Fowler Commis-
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deregulation would push the public out of participatory
processes and into other forums seems to be empirically
validated. °3
This circumstance imposes special burdens on minority
groups. The most marked declines in petitioning activity have
occurred in markets that are of special importance to minority
issues. Minority public interest groups may also be the least
well-funded and thus least able to undertake prolonged monitoring of licensees. With the parallel evidence that the broadcast market is least likely to produce programming that is
aimed toward minorities, the eventual result of policy decisions
that cut back on ability to petition is the foreclosing of an option to the social group that has the greatest need for it. If the
same regulatory changes that make minority programming less
likely to appear also make minority efforts to protest market
failures more difficult, the Commission will insulate its policy
decisions from criticism and perpetuate the inequities inherent
in the broadcasting marketplace.
D.

Conclusion

Public participation is the primary means by which an audience which is not served by the market may attempt to influence the programming choices of broadcast licensees. The
minority audience has not been served by the marketplace.
Empirical evidence shows, however, that the minority audience
is not likely to find redress in Commission processes of public
participation.
The market failure in minority programming, then, may not
be remedied in the deregulatory atmosphere that characterizes
sion has been "recalcitrant" in dealing with minorities. Schwartzman, supra note 296,
points out that the long-form renewal abandoned by the Commission required a licensee to analyze programming data, and was a useful tool. The absence of the form has
caused some difficulties. Another reason is the elimination of many areas upon which
petitions could formerly be filed, pointed out by Cook, supra note 299; Simon, supra
note 295; and Schwartzman, supra note 296.
303. Indeed, Marshall, supra note 297, states that the National Black Media Coalition plans to "go to the marketplace" to attempt to influence programming. A mass
pamphleting campaign could be used during "sweeps week," when broadcasters are
especially conscious of ratings. Alternative methods of influencing programming are
becoming more necessary partly because of the lack of legal resources for pursuing
petitions. The United Church of Christ, for example, has been forced to curtail much
of its active petitioning. "I can't tell you the number of cases the Office of Communication turned away or channeled in another direction" because of lack of funding.
Engsberg, supra note 298. Accord, Simon, supra note 295.
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the current Commission. The Commission has effectively foreclosed the mechanisms by which such a market failure may be
noticed. It has diminished the amount of information it will
gather from licensees, 30 4 and it has shown no initiative in implementing its own study of the deregulated market, °5 even
though Congress has urged it to do so.306 The Commission has
determined that it will rely solely upon public participation to
gauge the workings of the marketplace. 0 7
This source, however, has apparently been undermined by
the trend toward deregulation and the elimination of programming logs. The importance of maintaining this source of information is critical. Indeed, much of the Commission's decision
to deregulate was based on programming-log information. ° It
has continually predicted that the market will provide sufficient public interest programming, 30 9 but failed to convince the
304. See Revisions of Applicationsfor Renewal, supra note 277 (allowing license
renewal upon filing of a postcard-size application bearing five routine questions).
305. Letter from James C. McKinney, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, to Kurt Wimmer
(March 21, 1985) (stating that the Commission has not compiled any aggregate data

regarding the effects of radio deregulation).
306. See BroadcastRegulation: Quantifying the Public Interest Standard,Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1983) (statement of Timothy Wirth, Chairman,
House Telecommunications Subcommittee to Mark Fowler, Chairman, Federal Communications Committee). After requesting data on television programming, Wirth
requested information on the then-recently deregulated radio market:
Mr. Wirth: The FCC has not provided any similar data for radio. What is the
most recent radio data that is available?
Mr. Fowler: 1980.
Mr. Wirth: Could you give us your assessment of how long and what resources to get that information for 1981 and 1982?
Mr. Fowler: Yes, sir. We can look at that and work with your staff on that
question .

.

. [within] two weeks.

Mr. Wirth: Given the spirit under which we are conducting this, let me say
for the record that I, for one, would greatly appreciate your having just that
preliminary assessment back to us more speedily.
Almost two years after Wirth's request, no data on the effects of radio deregulation
had been given to the telecommunications subcommittee. Telephone interview with
Nancy Leach, House Telecommunications Subcommittee (April 15, 1985).
307. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582
(1981) (stating that "the Commission should be alert to the consequences of its policies and should stand ready to alter its rule if necessary to serve the public interest
more fully"). Id. at 603.
308. See United Church of Christ [III], 707 F.2d at 1442: "Ironically, much of the
data that formed the basis for the very decision to deregulate came from compilation
of information available only from the logs." See also Deregulation of Radio, Notice
of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 560, 565, 572-80 (1979).
309. Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d at 938.
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reviewing court that it could confirm its predictions. "[T]his
court does not understand, for example, where the Commission
will obtain information to confirm its prediction that adequate
'310
amounts of nonentertainment programming will continue.
The Commission has consistently answered such queries by
stating that "we have found that the best vehicle for bringing
violations to our attention has been through public participation in our processes through petitions to deny, informal objections, and complaints." ' ' The court has allowed deregulatory
changes because the Commission "will have the input of the
public. 3 12 The statutory right to petition is the means by
which the Commission can receive this input, and should not be
limited. 1 3 Placing too heavy a burden on the petitioning pub310. United Church of Christ[III], 707 F.2d at 1442.
311. See Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 719
F.2d at 409.
312. See id. at 413. The court noted, however, that television logging requirements
remained and would facilitate public participation in the Commission's processes.
Judge Bork stated that such a requirement "is sufficient to permit the public to review a station's programming performance." Id. Since that decision, however, logging
requirements for television licensees have been eliminated along the lines of the radio
deregulation order. See Television Deregulation, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076
(1984) [hereinafter Television Deregulation]. The long-form audit relied upon by
Judge Bork ("all licensees will be affected by the knowledge some unknown number
will be examined and, if appropriate, visited with severe sanctions," Black Citizensfor
a FairMedia, 719 F.2d at 416) has also been eliminated. See Television Deregulation,
98 F.C.C.2d at 1111.
Judge Bork's decision provoked a vehement dissent by Judge J. Skelly Wright, the
author of United Church of Christ[111]. See Black Citizens for a FairMedia, 719 F.2d
at 418 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge Wright noted that public participation would be
the major mechanism by which the Commission's attention could be focused on a
problem. See id. at 421 ("Otherwise the Commission would presume licensee compliance with programming requirements"). He found the Commission's assumption that
it will be alerted to licensee performance by public participation to be a non sequitur.
"[R]eliance on public participation to ensure that most violators of the programming
obligation are caught is only valid if it can be shown that the public complains about
most violators. The Commission has not even attempted to make such a showing." Id.
at 434. Prior empirical research on public participation in the Commission's processes
bears out Judge Wright's concerns. The chances of having to respond to a petition to
deny are indeed slim. During one three-year period, a study found that the chances of
having a petition to deny filed against a licensee were 3.34% while the probability of
instant renewal was 93.24%. See J. GRUNDFEST, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN BROADCAST LICENSING BEFORE THE FCC (1976). During the same period, the FCC received
10,250 renewal applications and 156 petitions to deny. Id. at 61.
313. See Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888, 13,904-05 (1981). But see id. at
13,896 (limiting the statutory right to file petitions to deny). Although the Commission stated that the right to file petitions to deny was based on Section 309(d) of the
Communications Act, it defined those classes of comments that would be "appropriate" subjects for petitions. "Given the elimination of the nonentertainment program-
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lic, however, does limit the public's input.' 4
As deregulatory changes in attitude and access undermine
the participatory process by which disenfranchised audiences
may influence the market, the Commission's estrangement of
minority viewers becomes complete. Minority groups are powerless to influence the marketplace, whether in traditional
broadcasting or new communications technologies, and have effectively been denied access to the only remaining institutional
mechanism by which they may make their programming
choices known. The substantial segment of the American public that is of minority status has thus been written out of the
public interest by deregulatory rulemaking.

III
The Societal Impact of Minority Media
Disenfranchisement
The foreclosure of minorities from the broadcasting marketplace has broad significance in a progressive society. Mass media undoubtedly have substantial impact on relations between
ethnic groups.3 15 The images presented by television greatly inming guideline, the specific amount of nonentertainment programming being offered
by an individual station, standing alone, will not be appropriate for a petition to deny."
314. Wilhemina Cook, Citizens Communications Center, supra note 299, notes that
the elimination of logs causes a lack of uniformity in information that may be gathered by petitioners. Uniform logs allowed a nationwide picture of the state of the
broadcast marketplace that is now impossible. The irony is that such a change has
occurred during a period of rapid regulatory reform that is based on assumptions that
now cannot be tested.
One Commissioner has written that "if experience in the real-world radio marketplace shows these assumptions to be in error and leaves these expectations unfulfilled, then the Commission will have the clear duty to revisit its actions."
Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,954 (Fogarty, Comm'r, issuing separate statement), citing Geller v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir.
1979). The Commission recognized that logging requirements would be a valid way to
learn of the marketplace. "Having been alerted to any problem which arises, we can
document its scope by any of several means, such as special studies, investigations and
temporary logging requirements, etc., and take whatever regulatory action is needed."
Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d at 930. The Commission acknowledges, then,
the efficacy of program logs in facilitating market monitoring.
315. See Holly, The Role of Media in the Programming of an Underclass, 10(1)
BLACK SCHOLAR 31 (1979). Holly found that television can further civil-rights gains.
"Martin Luther King was not the first black man to try and free his people, but he
was the first to try it with television as an accomplice and it made all the difference."
Id. at 34. See also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WINDOW DRESSING
ON THE SET: WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON TELEVISION (1977 & 1979); and O'Connor,
Television and Civil Rights: The Medium is Still the Message, 14 PERSPECTIVES 39
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fluence the manner in which the majority deals with ethnic minorities." 6 Meaningful integration of racial groups in the
media carries increasing potential for diminishing the distance
3 17
between social groups that have been polarized in the past.
Law and regulation have the capacity to encourage mediasupported racial accommodation. The relationship between
law and social stratification is a critical one. Law has the innate
capability of reordering other social institutions and reducing
the distance between classes; it is, however, limited in its capability to do so by other social factors. 1 American law prides
itself on its attempts to redistribute resources in accordance
with conceptions of social justice, as the path of American constitutional law illustrates. Yet, studies show that the proportionate wealth between social strata was virtually unchanged
during the first sixty years of this century, notwithstanding the
law's strides in search of social equality. 19 Such correlations
lend credence to Black's theory that law acts to maintain social
stratification.2 ° This need not, however, be a continuing
reality.
Law may reduce stratification by "altering social interaction
a d perceptions of human worth," especially through laws that
"enhance the perception of reciprocity, mutual gain, and
human dignity across stratum lines."'321 This approach to re-

ducing stratification through law is particularly suited to race
relations and communications regulation. As Greenberg points
out, the administrative process may be particularly well suited
to reduce differences between races. 322 Although regulation
(1982) (television influences race relations by bringing black problems into white
households and by influencing the course of events through coverage). See also infra
notes 374-440 and accompanying text.
316. See Ethnic Images in American Film and Television (R.Miller ed. 1978), finding that ethnic stereotypes and underrepresentation reduce the majority public's exposure to ethnic diversity in American life.
317. The role of media in racial accommodation becomes greater as television becomes more dominant: "As our society becomes more dependent on electronically
communicated information, complete integration of minorities and women into all
communications media is essential to ensure that the conditions and needs of all segments of our nation will be met." Engsberg, Cable Employment: Where Have All
Those New Jobs Gone?, 15 PERSP. 51, 53 (1983).
318. Schwartz, The Limits and Possibilities of Government: A Perspective from
the Sociology of Law, in SHORT, THE SOCIAL FABRIC (forthcoming manuscript).
319. G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION (1965).
320. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976).
321. Schwartz, supra note 318, at 11.
322. Greenberg, The Capacityof Law to Affect Race Relations, in SOCIETY AND THE

No. 3/4]

DEREGULATION-MINORITY PROGRAMMING

393
J

32 3

generally gravitates to the needs of the entities it regulates, a
process for public inconcerted effort to utilize the regulatory
3 24
terests can accomplish social goals.
A.

Principles of Stratification

Theories of social stratification include the concepts of
power, class consciousness, and social mobility. The various approaches to stratification attempt to explain the class-based inequality that characterizes social structure. The genesis of

stratification theory can be traced to Marx,325 Durkheim,326 and
Weber.3 27 A leading formulation by Davis and Moore holds
that stratification is a societal necessity if rights and benefits

are unequally distributed.3 28 Functionalist theory holds that
stratification is a device by which societies use a system of differential rewards 329 to ensure that important positions are
LEGAL ORDER (R. Schwartz & J. Skolnick ed. 1970). Among the advantages noted by
Greenberg is the power to start cases on a commission's initiative rather than rely
upon individual plaintiffs. More systematic legal development is then possible. Id.
323. J. LOBENTHAL, POWER AND PUT-ON: THE LAW IN AMERICA (1970).
324. This might be especially true if the administrative process embodies opportunities for open participation, as does the media-regulation process. See Nonet, The
Privitizationof Public Welfare, in SOCIETY AND THE LEGAL ORDER, supra note 322.
325. Marx's concepts of institutionalized inequality pervaded his theory. To Marx,
modern industrialized society had not replaced feudal class antagonisms, but had simplified the class structure. The oppressed proletariat majority stands in opposition to
the oppressive bourgeoisie minority. See K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO 9-22 (1955).
326. Durkheim's classic elucidation of the division of labor led to conceptions of
institutionalized inequality. "A genuine regimen exists [that] fixes with relative precision the maximum degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimately aspire." E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 249-52 (New York: The Free Press, 1952).
327. Weber recognized unambiguously the link between social stratification and
law. See FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (Gerth & Mills ed. 1946), stating
that "law exists when there is a probability that an order will be upheld by a specific
staff of men who will use physical or psychical compulsion with the intention of obtaining conformity with the order, or of inflicting sanctions for infringement of it."
Weber also created the concept of life-chances-the manner in which property is distributed creates specific opportunities. The common holding of these opportunities is
a defining factor of social classes and determines one's social potential to a great degree. See VANFOSSEN, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY 201 (1979). The process of "getting ahead in America" depends largely on one's education, parents, race,
sex, and aspirations. Id. at 201-02. The concept of life-chances is central to the present inquiry: media access and ownership is a life-chance that is distributed unequally
by market forces. The question becomes whether this inequality is serious enough to
merit government intervention.
328. Davis & Moore, Some Principles of Stratification, 10 AM. SOC. REV. 242
(1945). See also Davis, A Conceptual Analysis of Stratification,7 AM. Soc. REV. 309
(1942).
329. The rewards conferred by society may be concrete or symbolic, in that they
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properly filled.3 3 ° Stratification and inequality may not, however, be societal necessities; other measures may perform the
functions of inequality without the concomitant injustices. 3 1
Replies to the functionalist theory stress the importance of
mass media to a system of stratification. One such reply
stresses that stratification systems distribute favorable selfimages across a population as well as economic benefits. 3 2
Tumin extends the analysis of the effects of stratification to
conclude that "participation and apathy depend on the sense of
significant membership in society," and "social stratification
systems function to distribute the motivation to participate unequally in a population. 3 33 Lenski finds that institutions such
as the media operate to legitimate a dominant group's power
and to create a consensus favorable to the existing social order. 33 4 The relationship between minorities and the media,
then, is important to stratification analysis on two fronts: by
decreasing portrayals of lower classes, the media present a scenario in which lower classes are denied significant membership
in society, and by legitimizing the existing social structure, the
media facilitate the exercise of power by the dominant majority
group.
The twin trends toward deregulation and exclusion of minorities from visibility in the broadcast arena, then, have broad
societal significance. The media function as agents of stratification by upholding the system's legitimacy. 33 5 They do so by depicting minorities as societally insignificant (or, worse, absent)
may constitute income or prestige. See Abrahamson, A Functional Theory of Organi-

zational Stratification,58 Soc. FORCES 128, 142 (1979), finding that rewards are best
explained by functional importance (contribution to success) and uniqueness (exclusiveness). Uniqueness is a more effective predictor of the efficacy of a reward. Id. at

142.
330. See LITTLEJOHN, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 11 (1972). Stratification theory can
be seen as encompassing two directions, the Marxist and the functionalist. The Davis
and Moore approach created the functionalist approach, namely that society must
have a stratified structure to function effectively. See id. at 30-33.
331. Schwartz, FunctionalAlternatives to Inequality, 20 AM. SoC. REV. 424 (1955).
332. Tumin, Some Principles of Stratification:A CriticalAnalysis, 18 AM. SOC.
REV. 387 (1953).

333. See id.
334. G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE (1966).

335. The major function of the media, according to Mosco, is to produce and sell
audiences that "absorb the goods of mass production and uphold the system's legitimacy." See Mosco, Audiences for Sale, 32(2) J. COMM. 202 (1982); see also SMYTHE,
DEPENDENCY ROAD: COMMUNICATIONS, CAPITALISM,

(1981).

CONSCIOUSNESS AND CANADA
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and diminish minority social participation.3 3 6 The media, and
other agents of stratification 3 37 have performed this function
well. The majority of the public believes that inequality in distribution of resources is essentially right and reasonable.3 38
The media also legitimate inequality by contributing to selfevaluations, which are the basis of a system of stratification.
One evaluates one's proper place in society by evaluating oneself in comparison with others. 3 9 Television contributes to internal conceptions of self-worth by its portrayals of
minorities. 4 ° If socially insignificant portrayals are internalized, stratification may be legitimated.3 4 1 Deregulation allows
the electronic media to support the system of inequality more
comprehensively than was possible in the past, by removing
any government encouragement of minority presence in broadcasting. Deregulation is thus a movement that intensifies the
media's role3 42 in upholding a system of institutionalized
336. See Holly, supra note 315. The media does so by its underrepresentative and
stereotypical portrayals of minorities: "As long as you allow the subtle message to
come across - that black people are automatically people of limited means, limited
gifts, limited skills, limited intelligence, and limited potential, you will be the
unexcusably naive accessory to the inexorable programming of black children into a
permanent underclass." Id. at 37.
337. Another such institution is law. See infra notes 359-70 and accompanying
text.
338. This legitimization, created by J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE Cambridge,
(1971), has almost universal support in the American public. Almost all Americans
agree that income variation is desirable and appropriate, and should be based on skill
and efforts. See S. VERBA & G. ORREN, EQUALITY IN AMERICA: THE VIEW FROM THE
TOP (1985); Verba & Orren, Rendering What's Due: Views on Income Inequality, 8(2)
PUB. OPINION 48 (1985). The rationale members share for unequal distribution of resources is the essential focus of any class system. See Leahy, Development of the
Conception of Economic Inequality: II. Explanations, Justifications,and Concepts of
Social Mobility and Change, 19 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 111 (1983). The rationale shared by
Americans is the "rags-to-riches" myth, in which they express high levels of belief.
See Robinson, ExplainingPerceptionsof Classand Racial Inequality in England and
the United States of America, 34 BRIT. J. Soc. 344, 353 (1983). "Attitudes toward
distribution of income make it clear that Americans do not support radical egalitarianism." Verba & Orren, Rendering What's Due, supra, at 52.
339. See Della Fave, The Meek Shall Not Inherit the Earth: Self-Evaluationand the
Legitimacy of Stratification, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 955 (1980).
340. See DIMAS, THE EFFECT OF MOTION PICTURES PORTRAYING BLACK MODELS
ON THE SELF-CONCEPT OF BLACK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN (1970).

341. See Della Fave, supra note 339, at 962.
342. The role of the media in upholding the system's legitimacy is largely unconscious and not a deliberate, political action. It flows from the economics of the broadcasting marketplace. Because the advertising market values certain types of
audiences, the broadcasting market will produce such audiences. The television world
is a creation of the market; "its demography reflects its purposes: to produce audiences for advertisers." Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli & Morgan, Television Violence,
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3 43

inequality.

1.

Race Relations, the Free Market, and Mass Media

The system that the electronic media uphold is one characterized by widespread inequality. Racial stratification exists on
a large scale in American society. Although vast gains in legal
status, income, education, and occupational possibilities have
been made since emancipation, the relative position of blacks in
society has not changed. Black gains are not only offset by corresponding white gains,3 44 but the economy allows upper-class
citizens to profit from any lower-class gains. The gap between
the races is widened further. 45 Minority economic well-being
appears to be declining in absolute terms, as well as in comparison with white economic status.34 6
Victimization, and Power, 23 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 705, 707 (1980). Programming catering
to high-demographic audiences will tend to exclude minority groups. See supra notes
14-83 and accompanying text.
343. The outcome of the struggle over deregulation will have multiple effects "in
all aspects of the private/public sector struggles going on outside the communication
field," because "the power to control the flow of information is the basis of all political
power." Smythe, Radio: Deregulationand the Relation of the Privateand Public Sectors, 32 J. CoMM. 192, 200 (1982).
344. The gap between blacks and whites has widened rather than narrowed. It
becomes optimistic to state that "the scope of inequality has remained nearly constant
since World War II." See Palley, Reaganomics and Class Cleavages in the United
States, 46 J. POL. 938 (1984). The widening of the gap between races may be clearly
drawn over the past decade. In 1970, black family income was 61% of white family
income. In 1975, it had risen to 62%. In 1981, however, black family income had
dropped to 56% of white family income. "Since then, the income gap between black
and white families has widened again, and the 1980s show little promise of improvement." See Reid, Black America in the 1980s, 37(4) POPULATION BULL. 3, 29 (1982).
The same is true for comparisons between whites and Hispanics, but the gap between
whites and Asian-Americans is less substantial. See Hirschman and Wong, Socioeconomic Gains of Asian Americans, Blacks and Hispanics, 1960-1976, 90 AM. J. SOC.
584, 595 (1984). Another study finds that the income gap between blacks and whites
widened 14% from 1960 to 1980, and the primary victims of the increased inequality
were black children. See EDELMAN, PORTRAIT OF INEQUALITY: BLACK AND WHITE
CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1980) ("After decades of systematic segregation and discrimination, the rising tide of opportunity that swelled during the 1960s was neither long
enough nor strong enough to enable most black children to gain the opportunities
most white children take for granted"). A black child is three times as likely to have
a mother die in childbirth as a white child, twice as likely to die in its first year, and
has a 50% chance of being born into poverty. Id.
345. Black gains are offset by white gains because of the economic structure. Any
increase in lower-income groups means a higher increase in the income of the owners
of the industry that profits from the resulting increased demand for goods and services. See Kerri, Black Progress: Myths and Realities, 36 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES.
431, 436 (1981).
346. The evidence suggests that black economic well-being is declining, and the
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The electronic media have the capacity to ease societal stratification indirectly. Although media do not confer economic
benefits, they can alter modes of social interaction that limit
proximity between races and close opportunities to minorities. 4 7 Changing the discriminatory nature of social attitudes is
critical. Once a population has been a target of discrimination,
it is confined to certain roles and is denied access to scarce resources.3 48 Modern mass communications have the capability of
producing "a voluntary change in attitude or action" of an audience.3 49 This potential could have marked effects in the socialization of children, who are often exposed to television's
stereotypical portrayals during ages when they are developing
conceptions of social inequality. 5 ° If this capability is used effectively to change the mindset of citizens predisposed to discriminatory attitudes, racial stratification could be decreased.
Effective use of the positive potential of the electronic media
has not been a hallmark of the broadcasting market. 5 '
Whether market forces will direct media attention to the possibilities of changing the discriminatory mindset held by many
is a doubtful proposition, in light of the dismal failure of the
market in remedying the effects of discrimination. Research
has shown that "private property, economic competition, and
economic growth have not brought about, and do not necessarily lead to, economic equality. ' 352 The market economy has
assessment for income and employment for blacks is "a pessimistic one." See Bates,
Black Economic Well-Being Since the 1950s, 12(4) REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 5 (1984);
see also D.

FUSFELD &

T.

BATES, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN GHETTO

(1984).

The social conditions for the lowest class of blacks have deteriorated rapidly. See Wilson, The Black Underclass, 8(2) WILSON Q. 88, 92 (1984). Particularly hard hit are
black youths, whose unemployment rate is 48%. See St. James, Black EconomicsIssues, Answers for the Eighties, 89(6) CRISIS 42 (1982).
347. See Hirschman & Wong, supra note 344, finding that "without proximity, it is
difficult for individuals to make the cross-ethnic informal contacts that are often the
source of opportunities." Id. at 604.
348.
349.

TURNER, SOCIETAL STRATIFICATION:
ANDERSON,

A

ANALYSIS 163 (1984).
23 (1971). See also SMITH,

THEORETICAL

PERSUASION: THEORY AND PRACTICE

PERSUASION AND HUMAN ACTION: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
THEORIES (1982) (rejecting strict stimulus-response theories in favor of introducing

"the perception of choice as a defining characteristic of persuasive communication").
350. See Leahy, The Development of the Conception of Social Class. in THE CHILD'S
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY

79 (1983).

351. See supra notes 14-83 and accompanying text.
352. ROSSIDES, THE AMERICAN CLASS SYSTEM 171 (1976); see also Burnim and Rasmussen, The ChangingStatus of EconomicMinorities,1948-1977, 12 REV. BLACK POL.
ECON. 5 (1982), finding that "economic growth alone, despite its virtues in reducing
poverty and fostering a climate favorable for redistribution efforts, does not appear to
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worked in a manner that is consistent with continuing racial
inequality,353 largely because of the neoclassical economic theory on which it is based.354 Moreover, the free-market reliance
that has characterized the Reagan Administration provides an
illustration of the market's treatment of minorities. The outcome of increased marketplace reliance has been increased inequality and antagonism between social classes. 55 Certainly,
reliance on the marketplace has not furthered economic interests of minorities, and is not likely to further minority interests
in limiting inequality through positive use of broadcasting.
significantly increase the income of the economic minorities relative to white males"
and that "growth alone does not generate equality." Id. at 12.
353.

See REICH, RACIAL INEQUALITY: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 305 (1981);

see also J. NELSON, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY: CONFLICT WITHOUT CHANGE (1982).
354. See REICH, supra note 353, at 174-203. Four areas within neoclassical economic theory that recognize failings of the competitive market in allocating resources
and allow for government intervention are externalities, public goods, natural monopolies, and equity. Regulation to minimize inequality could be justified under three of
the concepts, and could be further called for by examining the failings of the economic reality on which the concepts are based. A few such realities include: the capacity of economically powerful groups to enlist the power of the state for their own
ends, the evidence that economies of scale promote monopoly rather than competition, and the observed existence of class-based collective behavior rather than the
assumed individualistic human behavior on which the theory is predicated. See also
L. OSBERG, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1984) (finding that inequality of opportunity and economic result is inevitable under a capitalist market system based on neoclassical economics) and ATKINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY
(1983).
355.

See S. BOWLES, D.

GORDON & T. WEISSKOPF, BEYOND THE WASTELAND

(1983)

(criticizing free-market reliance for increasing inequality and antagonism); Greenberg, The Blacks, Reaganism, and 1984, 30 DISSENT 414, 415 (1983) (Reagan is antagonistic to black aspirations). There is substantial support for the finding that supplyside economics have not aided those of lower income. "The administration's policies
will exaggerate income differentials, not minimize them." Palley, Reaganomics and
Class Cleavages in the United States, 46 J. POL. 938, 939 (1984). Not only the lowest
classes are affected. "The Reagan Administration policies certainly have widened the
gap between the rich and the poor, and it appears that the near-poor, as well as the
most poor, have been adversely affected." Id. at 946; see also Reid, Black America in
the 1980s, 37(4) POPULATION BULL. 3-4 (1982) ("the economic policies of the current
administration have had a strong negative impact on the status of black Americans,
especially that large proportion in poverty or at the brink of poverty"). Reagan Administration policies have effectively frozen black progress, see Wilkins, For Blacks,
Reagan Means a Chilling Effect, 28 DISSENT 147 (1981) (black life is characterized by
"the relative economic impotence of the entire black community in America"), and
the same policies will make it difficult for improvement in the near future. See Anderson, Economic Patternsin Black America, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1982
25-26 (1982) ("because of recent shifts in economic policy, the current environment is
less likely to be hospitable to further progress than at any time in the past").
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The Significance of Legal Action or Inaction

Whether regulation can be more effective than free-market
reliance will depend on the capability of law to provide for
greater equality among social strata. Law has, in the past, provided for legitimization and institutionalization of the interests
of alienated groups in society. 6 There is a tension, however,
between this capability and the interests of the dominant forces
within society. "The more powerful segments of society will expect the legal order to preserve existing inequalities by selectively protecting private activity from government interference. ' ' 35 7 The process of federal regulation, with its public
access provisions,358 may be an effective mechanism by which
the less powerful segments of society can raise their voices if it
is encouraged by the Commission.3 5 9
The regulatory arena may be especially fit for the task of accomplishing greater racial equality among social strata. Unlike
the litigation process, finding representation for public interest
regulatory action is not difficult. In Washington alone several
public-access communications law firms exist.3 60 The cost of
representation can be less burdensome because of the Equal
Access to Justice Act,3 6 ' which the Commission has adopted. 2
356. Schwartz, Law, Violence and Civil Rights, in SOCIETY AND THE LEGAL ORDER
512 (R. Schwartz and J. Skolnick ed. 1970). Examples of such law-fostered equities
include the legitimization of labor unions, German religious communities (gemeinde),
and resistance groups in South Arabia.
357.

R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY

69 (1976).
358. See United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
359. See supra notes 187-229 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Commission's record of encouraging public interest petitioners.
360. See BRANSCOMBE & SAVAGE, BROADCAST REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
(1978).
361. The Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, as
amended by Pub. L. No. 99-80 (1985), allows an agency or court to grant attorneys'
fees to successful public interest litigants. The statute is based on the premise that
some potential litigants are "deterred from seeking review of, or defending against,
unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved." The need for
reimbursement in public interest agency litigation was aptly stated by Chief Justice
Burger:
Always a restraining factor is the expense of participation in the administrative process, an economic reality which will operate to limit the number of
those who will seek participation; legal and related expenses of administrative proceedings are such that even those with large economic interests find
the costs burdensome.
United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
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Finally, the dynamics of the regulatory process may be more
conducive to minority claims. The process is less formal, and
may thus be more attractive to minority parties who prefer informal modes of participation. 6 3 Further, more passive institutions place more reliance on the parties, allowing a greater
advantage to accrue to the economically dominant party. 6 4 A
regulatory agency is a less passive institution than a court. Specifically, the Commission is charged with taking an active part
in aiding a public interest litigant.3 65 This positive duty could
make minority claims especially effective in the regulatory forum, if the decisionmaker is receptive to minority issues.
Legal receptivity to minority issues in telecommunications
has a strong symbolic value in society. A failure to take positive legal action has social impact, as it places the government's
imprimatur of legitimacy on the existing social circumstance.
Similarly, government action or inaction legitimizes the behavior of broadcasters. "Public regulation of the airways lends an
aura of legitimacy to private enterprises in radio and television,
though the public's control over program content and advertising is minimal. '366 Legal symbols attach to social institutions
and to the values that such institutions typify.3 67 Indeed, the
symbolic value of legal action is so strong that it becomes a
"blueprint" for social organization. 68 If legal policy refuses to
intervene when a traditionally regulated media system follows
a pattern of minority exclusion, the law carries a clear symbolic
1966). See generally Tobia, Of Public Funds and Public Participation:Resolving the
Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participantsin Administrative Proceedings, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 906 (1982).
362. See Report and Order, Equal Access to Justice Rules, 88 F.C.C.2d 1022 (1982);
Practice and Procedure, Equal Access to Justice Rules, 47 Fed. Reg. 3,785 (1982).
363. See Lucas, The Social Participationof Blacks: A Proposed Synthesis of Two
Competing Theories, 55 SOc. INQUIRY 97, 100 (1985) (formal structural barriers may be
"effective impediments to black participation"); See also Miller & Roby, Power and
Powerlessness, in THE FUTURE OF INEQUALITY 150-153 (1970) (blacks are as ready as
whites to participate in government processes, but must overcome institutional barriers to do so).
364. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
365. See generally United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n
[II], 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J.).
366.

RoSSIDES, THE AMERICAN CLASS SYSTEM 272 (1976).

367. S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC
POLITICAL CHANGE 17 (1974).

POLICY, AND

368. Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in APTER, IDEOLOGY AND THE DISCONTENT 62 (1964)
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message. Racial exclusion is approved, to the extent that the
law does not see it as a sufficiently important subject for regulatory intervention.
Yet, the possibilities for positive use of the symbolic value of
law and its power of legitimation should not be overlooked. As
Bazelon theorizes, the power behind law can produce changes
of heart and mind, reducing racial tensions'.36 9 The law of communications regulation can make special inroads into discrimination and stratification, as it concerns itself with the behavior
of an institution that holds great power over citizens' conceptions of social order. If law is to reduce stratification, "it is most
likely to do so by altering the perceptions as well as the interactions and exchanges between the strata that compose society. ' ' 370 The media possess the power to change perceptions,
and, if properly encouraged, may change perceptions of racial
prejudices and discrimination. This power of the law could positively reorder social conceptions of justice, and instigate a
change in mindset that could result in a decrease in race-based
stratification.
B.

Societal Consequences of Legally Approved Media Inequality

The positive possibilities held by law are conditioned, of
course, on their use. Media has the capability to forge minority
identities and contribute to social equality. 1 If the regulatory
power of the government stands dormant and relies instead on
market forces to perform its duties, this potential will not be
realized; several societal consequences could result. Media access would continue to be distributed unequally among the population. As the major legal institution that influences
communications, the Commission, implicitly approves an inequitable distribution, the force of law would be in a position of
helping to maintain or, perhaps, exacerbate the system of social
stratification.
1.

Productionof Class-based Knowledge Gaps

An optimistic view of the power of broadcasting once held
that the great increase in the flow of information to the public
369. D. BAZELON, POWER IN AMERICA:
370. Schwartz, supra note 318, at 12.

THE POLITICS OF THE NEW CLASS

305 (1967).

371. See McCormack, Revolution, Communication and the Sense of History, in
KATZ & SZECSKO, MASS MEDIA AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1980).
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would help to modify differences of knowledge resulting from
inequalities in education and opportunity. 72 Some evidence
has shown that such gap-closing can occur in the short run. 3
In the long run, however, the reverse has been shown. A social
group with either superior attention or superior resources gains
much more knowledge than do other groups, thus widening the
gap between social groups.
The knowledge-gap hypothesis does not hold that lower-status populations remain uninformed, or become more information-poor in an absolute sense. Rather, the hypothesis holds
that higher-status segments of society reap a greater growth of
"There is
knowledge compared to lower-status segments."
certainly a class bias in attention to 'information-rich' sources
and strong correlations are persistently found between social
class, attention to these sources and being able to answer infor375
mation questions on political, social, or economic matters.

As higher social classes become able to utilize higher quality
communications media from which to glean information,
knowledge gaps are widened. Because the type of information37 6 from which lower socioeconomic status groups are foreclosed is the type which is useful for social mobility or
advancement, the potential for exacerbating societal stratification is obvious. 7
372. D. MCQUAIL, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 197 (1984).
373.

BLUMLER & McQUAIL,

TELEVISION IN POLITICS: ITS USES AND INFLUENCE

(1968). Studies have also optimistically held that television is a knowledge-leveler,
but such studies assume that the entire public would have equal access to informative
content. See Neuman, Patterns of Recall Among Television News Viewers, 40 PUB.
OPINION Q. 115 (1976) and Gantz, How Uses and GratificationsAffect Recall of Television News, 55 JOURNALISM Q. 664 (1977); but see Stauffer, Frost & Rybolt, Literacy,
Illiteracy, and Learning from Television News 5 COMM. RES. 221 (1978) (finding that
television is not a leveler).
374. Tichenor, Donohue and Olien, Mass Media and the Differential Growth in
Knowledge, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 158 (1970).
375. McQuail, supra note 372, at 198.
376. The type of information contained in programming may be critical; gaps are
more prevalent when topics appeal more to high socioeconomic status viewers. See
Bailey, The Public, The Media, and the Knowledge Gap, 2 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 3 (1971).
When the topic is not of special interest to higher socioeconomic-status groups, the
less advantaged are as likely to garner information from content. See Genova &
Greenberg, Interests in News and the Knowledge Gap, 42 PUB. OPINION Q. 79 (1979).
Indeed, if the information is of interest to both groups, few knowledge gaps are produced-motivation is of prime importance in the production of gaps. See Ettema,
Brown & Luepker, Knowledge Gap Effects in a Health Information Campaign, 47
PUB. OPINION Q. 516, 524 (1983).
377. See Gaziano, The Knowledge Gap: An Analytical Review of Media Effects, 10
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The impact of class-based knowledge gaps on society is great.
The gap in information translates into differences in decisions
and opportunities for different classes. "The information an individual possesses will to a great extent determine the decisions
he makes. ' 37" The trend toward less government encouragement of minority issues could exacerbate the knowledge gap,
because those of less socioeconomic status tend to have less control over the manner in which the media address issues of importance to social mobility. 7 9 The little control such groups do
have is facilitated by government intervention. If such intervention is lifted, minority control will be lessened.
The knowledge-gap phenomenon has long been observed in
newspaper-television comparisons 38 0 and applies with equal
force to the emerging new communications technologies. 8 '
The contrast between the video information abundance available to those able to afford it and the comparative paucity of
COMM. RES. 447, 477 (1983) (knowledge that higher socioeconomic-status consumers
tend to get from media is more useful for social mobility and advancement than that
which lower socioeconomic-status consumers obtain).
378. See BUDGE, BRAND, MARGOLIS & SMITH, POLITICAL STRATIFICATION AND DEMOCRACY (1972):

If the channels through which one group of individuals receives information
are characteristically different from those of some other group, then the two
groups are likely to possess different perspectives and differing amounts of
information over the same decision areas.
Id. at 124.
379. See Williams & Lindsay, Introduction:Language, Communication & Social
Differences, in MORTENSEN & SORENS, ADVANCES IN COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH

(1973):
Social stratification in a subtle way defines the degree of control an individual can have over the media of communication. The individual in various
social roles of the lower socioeconomic strata is relegated to the passive role
of a media consumer. Although only a small minority of persons from the
higher strata have actual control over the mass media, the majority feel an
active identification with media content because much of it is created and
stated in terms of a middle-class value system and lifestyle.
Id. at 372 (quoted in COMPAINE, UNDERSTANDING NEW MEDIA: TRENDS AND ISSUES IN
ELECTRONIC DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION 218 (1984)).
380. Robinson, Mass Communication and Information Diffusion, in G. KLINE
AND P. TICHENOR, CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
(1972).
381. New information gaps may be created by new technologies in mass communications, leaving the information-poor even further behind. See Katzman, The Impact
of Communication Technology: Promisesand Prospects, 24(4) J. COMM. 47 (1974); see
also Rogers, Communication and Development: The Passing of the Dominant Paradigm, in ROGERS, COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
(1976) and Guaratne, A CriticalLook at the New Paradigmof CommunicationDevelopment, 4(2) SOUTHEAST ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 9 (1976).
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information-rich sources available through free broadcast television is striking. 82 The split between those who have and
those who have not "becomes the gap separating the 'knows'
from the 'know-nots.' "383 Empirical research has confirmed
that information gaps exist between those able to afford new
media and those who cannot. 4 Access to new technologies is
critical, because "a new 'illiteracy gap' can create even more inequality than the old,

'385

and minorities are especially suscepti-

ble to the effects of this inequality.386
A socioeconomic bias exists in the ability to afford new communications technology.3 8 7 The existence of new communica-

tions technology is used by marketplace advocates to justify
broadcast deregulation. 88 If the volume of public affairs programming on broadcast television decreases because of removal
of public interest programming requirements,389 only those
able to afford new media will be exposed to such information.
Exacerbation of class-based gaps in knowledge is the empirically validated societal result of these trends. As the holding of
critical information is of growing importance in social life,390
the growth of class-based gaps in access to information could
produce greater stratification between races. 9 '
382. See supra notes 84-139 and accompanying text.
383. See Mitropoulos, Public Participation,As Access, In Cable Television in the
USA, 50 EKISTIcS 385, 385 (1983).
384. See Ettema, Three Phases in the Creation of Information Inequities:An Empirical Assessment of a Prototype Videotex System, 29 J. BROADCASTING 383 (1985);
see also Bowes, Mind vs. Matter-Mass Utilization of Information Technology, in
DERVIN & VOIGT, PROGRESS IN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES, VOLUME 11 (1980).
385. Cater, The Survival of Human Values, 31(1) J. COMM. 190, 193 (1981).
386. See id. at 194, finding that "in an age of communications abundance, there
must be ample opportunity for . . . minorities of all kinds" as part of a "sustained
effort to prevent communications from fostering illiteracy and widening the gap between 'haves' and 'have-nots.'" Id. at 194.
387. There is substantial evidence of a bias in ability to afford new media. See
supra notes 84-139 and accompanying text.
388. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 222.
389. There is substantial evidence that public-interest programming has diminished since the advent of deregulation, and the economics of the change in regulatory
paradigm are such that it will probably diminish more. See supra notes 258-92 and
accompanying text.
390. See KRIESBERG, SOCIAL INEQUALITY 434 (1979); BELL, THE COMING OF POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973).

391. See generally Clarke, Taylor & Wren-Lewis, Inequality of Access to Political
Television: The Case of the General Election of 1979, in ROBBINS, RETHINKING SOCIAL
INEQUALITY (1980).
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Widening of the Social Distance Between Races

The concept of social distance is a measure of the willingness
of people to admit members of other groups into socially intimate situations. 9 2 Minority races have been consistently and
systematically kept distant from the majority race in all areas
of life.39 3 Social distance hierarchies reflect the extent to which
cultural guidelines of approved behaviors and relationships are
consistent with increasing equality.
Whether social distance will be increased or decreased depends largely on how the majority group, which controls the
institutions that may perpetuate social distance,3 9 4 views the
minority group.3 95 The cultural rank of minority groups is established through preconceptions.3 96 "[L]ow evaluations may
also be supported by degrading representations in the media. '397 The role of evaluations in perpetuating a system of
stratification is prominant 9 s The same cultural isolation noted
by Myrda139 9 may be exacerbated, then, if the trend toward
greater isolation in media representations continues. The advancement of ethnic groups could effectively be forestalled by
media representations that prevent their progressive integra392. BOEGARDUS, SOCIAL DISTANCE (1959). Scales have been developed on which
social intimacies in various situations may be measured.
393. See J. SCOTT, THE BLACK REVOLTS: RACIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE U.S.A. 3
(1976); see also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT
(1968) ("our nation is moving toward two societies, one white and one black-separate
and unequal").
394. See Ostrom, The Social Stratification-Government Inequality Thesis Explored, 19 URB. AFF. Q. 91 (1983), finding that white residents may attempt to control
access to scarce resources to insulate themselves from land uses of low-income residents whose public service needs would increase the levels of public support. Id. at 92;
see also Baron, OrganizationalPerspectives on Stratification, 10 ANN. REV. OF SOC.
37, 53 (1984). Housing is a critical determinant of social distance; "physical distances
are indices of social distances." Park, The Urban Community as a SpatialPatternand
a Moral Order, in THE URBAN COMMUNITY 18 (Burgess ed. 1976); see also LAKE, THE
NEW SUBURBANITES: RACE AND HOUSING IN THE SUBURBS (1981) (there is little sign of
reduced discrimination in the urban housing market).
395. See ABRAHAMSON, MIZRUCHI & HORNUNG, STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY
(1976).
396. As society becomes more complex, it is impossible to base decisions on social
interaction on the basis of personal characteristics because of limited intimacy. Social
characteristics, then, become the basis of decisions to interact that define the contours
of social-distance hierarchies. See id. at 9.
397. ROTHMAN, INEQUALITY AND STRATIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 94 (1978).
398. See Della Fave, The Meek Shall Not Inherit the Earth: Sef-Evaluation and the
Legitimacy of Stratification, 45 AMER. SOC. REV. 955 (1980), discussed supra notes
339-41 and accompanying text.
399. G. MYRDAL, R. STERNER & A. ROSE, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 644 (1962).
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tion within society. °°
Decreases in social distance are critical to continued racial
progress. Without social proximity, it is difficult for a minoritygroup member to make cross-ethnic contacts that can be the
source of opportunities. 40 ' Although open discrimination is dissipating, remaining inequalities, rooted in differential access to
institutional settings, are more persistent. 0 2 If the remaining
inequalities are to be diminished and racial conflicts avoided, 0 3
then social distance between the races must be decreased. If
broadcast media are not encouraged to address minority issues
and continually misrepresent minorities, social distances that
perpetuate societal stratification could be exacerbated.
3.

Increases in Race-associatedAnomie

The concept of anomie was originated by Durkheim, who
used the concept to refer to a condition of relative normlessness
in a society or social group.40 4 The concept has been adopted by
Merton to refer to a social condition in which the institutions of
the society place an exceptionally strong emphasis on goals to
be attained without a corresponding emphasis on socially acceptable means. 4 5 The condition becomes problematic as the
culture exerts pressure upon individuals to obtain goals
through other than societally approved means.40 6
Mass communications play a vital role in setting forth the
values of a society's class culture.40 7 A strain toward anomie
could be impelled by consistent exposure to large quantities of
programming portraying goal obtainment through illicit means.
Socially disapproved means are often used to obtain socially e
400. See Massey, Social Class and Ethnic Segregation:A Reconsiderationof Methods and Conclusions, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 641 (1981); Bleda, Intergenerational Differences in Patterns and Bases of Ethnic Residential Dissimilarity, 5 ETHNICITY 91
(1978).
401. See Hirschman & Wong, Socioeconomic Gains of Asian Americans, Blacks,
and Hispanics:1960-1976, 90 AM. J. Soc. 584, 604 (1984); see also Tienda, Sex, Ethnicity, and Chicano Status Attainment, 16 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 435 (1982).
402. See Featherman & Hauser, Changes in the Socioeconomic Stratificationof
the Races, 1962-1973, 82 AM. J. Soc. 621 (1976).
403. Social isolation could precipitate racial conflict. See Bolce, Why People Riot,
22 POL. REV. 119, 139 (1982), concluding that "powerlessness, frustration, and social
isolation" are among the leading causes of conflict.
404. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893).

405. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUC-,
TURE 126 (1967).
406. Aupert, White Collar Crime and Social Structure, 58 AM. J. Soc. 263 (1952).
407. Merton, supra note 405, at 137.
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desired ends in network television. "It would appear that a
state of anomie is consistently being portrayed on television
dramatic programming. ' 40 Television can also be a powerful
force by which viewers are encouraged to conform to middleclass aspirations.0 9 Consistent disenfranchisement from the
social picture of television programming coupled with consistent encouragement to meet socially desired ends regardless of
means used could lead to anomic responses among dedicated
minority viewers.4 10
When television implicitly communicates to a minority audience that its members are undeserving of social inclusion in
portrayals, greater disregard for social norms and acceptable
means could be a likely effect. Class differentials in anomic responses to societal pressures are a documented phenomenon.
Blacks studied showed great assimilation of success-values inculcated by social culture. 411 This may indicate that minorities
are ready targets for anomie. Coupled with findings that television is thought to represent reality to many minorities, an obvious implication is that minority groups may be more
4 -2
susceptible to the models of anomie presented by television.
The strain toward anomie in lower socioeconomic classes can
explain higher incidences of crime among those classes. Blacks
are more likely than whites to be both arrested for and victimized by crime. 41 3 Media-based strains toward anomie can be
among the contributing factors of higher minority crime rates.
"The bitter contrast between the harsh reality of life and
blacks' aroused expectations goes far to explain the high rates
408. Larsen, Gray & Fortis, Goals and Goal-Achievement in Television Content:
Models for Anomie?, 33 Soc. INQUIRY 180, 196 (1963). Larsen noted that about half
the means used were socially undesirable; the analysis held for adult and children's

programming. Violence was used to obtain goals in about half of children's television
content. Larsen concludes that television programming presents models for anomie

and does not present common values and mores. Id. at 195-96.
409. Bogart, The Mass Media and the Blue-Collar Worker, in A.

SHOSTAK &
GOMBERG, BLUE-COLLAR WORLD: STUDIES OF THE AMERICAN WORKER.

W.

410. Internalization of a "success orientation" has a significant positive effect on
anomie, and may be exhibited in all social classes. See Agnew, Success and Anomie: A
Study of The Fffects of Goals on Anomie, 21 Soc. Q. 53, 61 (1980).
411. See Merton, Continuities in the Theory of Social Structure and Anomie, in
SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, supra note 405, at 173.
412. See Simpson & Miller, Social Status and Anomie, 10 Soc. PROBS. 256 (1963),
finding that minority groups are more likely to exhibit pessimism, alienation and cynicism than are whites, as measured by the Srole anomie test.
413. See EDELMAN, PORTRAIT OF INEQUALITY: BLACK AND WHITE CHILDREN IN
AMERICA (1980).
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The role of the media in creating such

responses is obvious. "As consumer goods are advertised
twenty-four hours a day on radio and television, ghetto residents are constantly reminded of the availability of goods and
services which they cannot afford to buy.

' 415

Increases in ano-

mie perpetuate the stratification system by creating increases
in crime rate, which, in turn, create prejudices and
discrimination.416
A more extreme view of the anomie-inducing function of television points out that mass media can contribute to social disorganization. The media can provide an illustration of
participation in society, which has the effect of restricting genuine participation. 417 The mass media can cause the social disorganization of the norm- and value-structure of society by
ameliorating the influence of those who seek to inculcate such
values, and by providing substitute values. Media can undermine normal structure by imposing on all the view of the economically dominant classes.41 This leads to the neo-Marxist
views, which hold that the media create a social milieu in which
only the values of the dominant class are available for mass
consumption. 4 9 This theory of social disorganization exponentially extends the strain toward anomie that is present in television programming. The end result is greater polarization
between social classes.
4. Negative Minority Self-concepts
The government sanctioning of stereotypical portrayals, or,
worse, programming in which minorities are absent, can have
damaging effects on audiences who are willing to believe in the
reality of what they see on television. Lazarsfeld and Merton
point out that television has the power to confer status on social
groups it presents. 42 ° As a powerful social institution, television
414. RossIDES, supra note 366, at 161.

415. Id. at 159.
416. See Hewitt, The Social Implications of Inequality and Deviance, in SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 155-160 (1970); see also Rossides,

366, at 161.
417. Larsen, Social Effects of Mass Communications, in R.

supra note

FARIS, HANDBOOK OF

MODERN SOCIOLOGY (1964).

418. McCron, ChangingPerspectives in the Study of Mass Media and Socialization, in HALLORAN, MASS MEDIA AND SOCIALIZATION (1976).
419. H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964).
420. Lazarsfeld & Merton, Mass Communication, Popular Taste, and Organized

No. 3/4]

DEREGULATION-MINORITY PROGRAMMING

409

serves a status-conferring function 421 that can determine what
issues and classes of actors are socially important ones.4 22
When a social group is absent from the consideration of a
powerful social institution, a reasonable conclusion for an observer of that institution is that such a group is absent or unimportant in a societal sense. 3 The opposite effect has also been
demonstrated. Black children may acquire enhanced self-concepts by being exposed to media content that portrays blacks in
featured social roles. 424 Continued exposure to white-dominated social role portrayals could lead to negative self-concepts,
the study found, because of an implicit understanding of the
meaning of an absence of black actors from social settings. Indeed, a lower conception of the social status of blacks by black
children could account for the higher imitative value given to
white models compared to black models. 425 Viewing stereotypical and underrepresentative minority portrayals on television
could have profound social consequences for minority audiences, who believe in television's reality and use the medium to
learn socialization patterns.4 2 6
The self-concept is of social origin. If one is consistently
treated or portrayed as inferior, one may come to internalize
and accept this status over time.4 27 Discrimination and racial
limitations of opportunity can be damaging to minority selfconcepts. 428 Nationally, basic cleavages have been found in the
Social Action in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION (W. Schramm
& D. Roberts ed. 1971).
421. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE (1967).
422. McCombs & Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, 36 PUB.
OPINION Q. 176 (1972).
423. Reid, Racial Stereotyping on Television: A Comparison of the Behavior of
Both Black and White Television Characters,64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 465 (1979).
424. DIMAS, THE EFFECT OF MOTION PICTURES PORTRAYING BLACK MODELS ON
THE SELF-CONCEPT OF BLACK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN (1970).
425. Neely, Heckel & Leichtman, The Effect of Race of Model and Response Consequences to the Model on Imitation in Children, 89 J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 225 (1973);
Nicholas, McCarter & Heckel, The Effects of Race and Sex on the Imitation of Television Models, 85 J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 315 (1971).

426. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
427. See ROTHMAN, supra note 397, at 113-15; see also L.

RAINWATER, WHAT
MONEY BUYS: INEQUALITY AND THE SOCIAL MEANINGS OF INCOME 17 (1974) (distribu-

tion of well-being in society is determined by the distribution of possibilities for participation in activities that confirm one's sense of oneself as a full-fledged member of
society).
428. See Kerri, Black Progress:Myths & Realities, 36 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES.
431 (1980): "Covert discrimination is also more difficult to counteract, because it is
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self-perceptions of upper- and lower-class people. 429 Racial minority status has been positively associated with high rates of
distress.43 ° High self-esteem is likely to result from interaction
with significant others in one's life.431' To the extent that television is an important element in one's life, it can influence one's
self-concept.
Class-based differentiations in self-concept may also be exacerbated by the amount of television minorities view. 432 Heavy
television viewing may produce marked increases in anxiety
and fearfulness among viewers. 433 Indeed, heavy viewers are
likely to overestimate the likelihood of being involved in a violent incident.4 3 4 Heavy viewers have also been found to be
difficult to observe and prove; its effects, however, remain as damaging as when it was
overtly expressed." Id. at 431; see also M. LEWIS, THE CULTURE OF INEQUALITY (1978).
429. I. KOHN, CLASS AND CONFORMITY: A STUDY IN VALUES 190 (1969); see also
Knox, Communication in Larger Cities, in I. POOL, TALKING BACK: CITIZEN FEEDBACK AND CABLE TECHNOLOGY 105 (1973) (self-esteem "has never been a problem for
those members of the dominant, affluent U.S. groups... however, it is a major problem for members of minority cultures"). But see Foster & Perry, Self-Valuation
Among Blacks, 27 SoC. WORK 60 (1982) (the position of blacks in society has little
bearing on how they value themselves) and Bledsoe, Is Self-Concept a Reliable Predictor of Economic Status?, 49 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 883, 886 (1981) (self-concept is
based largely on economic status; economic self-sufficiency could lead to amelioration
of the association between ethnic status and self-concept).
430. See Mirowsky & Ross, Minority Status,Ethnic Culture, and Distress:A Comparison of Blacks, Whites, Mexicans, and Mexican-Americans, 86 AM. J. SOC. 479
(1980), finding that minority status can be detrimental to psychological well-being and
that feelings of anomie, frustration and powerlessness produce distress. See also Hewitt, supra note 416, at 159, finding that consequences of being unable to develop high
self-esteem include low commitment to society and its norms, high levels of anxiety,
and high likelihood of participation in deviant behavior.
431. See Krause, The Racial Context of Black Self-Esteem, 46 Soc. PSYCHOLOGY Q.
98, 106 (1983) (major determinants of self-esteem lie in feedback from significant
others); see also Taylor & Walsh, Explanationsof Black Self-Esteem: Some Empirical Tests, 42 Soc. PSYCHOLOGY Q. 242, 251 (1979) (reporting the "counterintuitive"
finding that black rates of self-esteem were relatively high because they were influenced by significant others).
432. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
433. See Bryant, Carveth & Brown, Television Viewing and Anxiety: An Experimental Examination, 31(1) J. COMM. 106 (1981); Gerbner, Television Violence, Victimization and Power, 23 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCI. 705 (1980); and Hazard, Anxiety and
Preferencefor Television Fantasy, 44 JOURNALISM Q. 461 (1967).
434. See Gerbner and Gross, Violence Profile No. 6: Trends in Network Television
Drama and Viewer Conceptions of Social Reality (unpublished manuscript); see also
Baker & Ball, The Two Worlds of Violence: Television and Reality, in VIOLENCE AND
THE MEDIA: A STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE (1969). Increases in viewing tend, understandably, to produce a more paranoic attitude toward modern life-although the chances of a violent
incident occurring in most cities approaches one in 50, the chances for such an attack
in television reality is closer to 50%. Id.
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more interpersonally passive and withdrawn.43 5 These effects
of heavy viewing could be particularly harmful to the self-concepts of minority audiences, because of a high degree of reality
correspondence attributed to television portrayals by minority
audiences. Rating television as representative of reality is positively correlated with minority status 436 as well as with amount
of television viewing.4 3 7 Similarly, children of lower socioeconomic status are more likely to believe that television violence
is true to reality. 438 The manner in which minorities consume
television content, then, points to further difficulties in arriving
at positive self-concepts.
The importance of self-concept to the maintenance of a system of racial stratification is great. Stratification is held in
place by implicit self-evaluations. 439 If one's self-concept is adversely influenced by televised portrayals, one may internalize
a lower self-concept and accept a system of institutionalized inequality. 44 0 Television's portrayals of minorities and ignorance
of minority issues, then, can have an impact on the self-concepts that hold a system of stratification in place.
Overall, it is apparent that inequality in the treatment of minorities in the electronic media has marked societal consequences. If the Commission tacitly approves the current
minority exclusion in the broadcasting marketplace by allowing the market to perpetually determine programming
435. See Gregg, Television Viewing as Parasocial Interaction for Persons Aged 60
Years or Older (Master's Thesis); see also Murray, Television in Inner-City Homes:
Viewing Behavior of Young Boys, in E. RUBINSTEIN, G. COMSTOCK & J. MURRAY, TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, Vol. 5 (1972).
436. Donohue & Donohue, Black, White, White Gifted, and Emotionally Disturbed Children's Perceptions of the Reality in Television Programming, 30 HUM.
REL. 609 (1977).
437. Greenberg & Reeves, Children and the Perceived Reality of Television, 32(4)
Soc. FORCES 86 (1976).
438. Greenberg & Dominick, Racial and Social Class Differences in Children's
Perceptions of Television Violence, in E. RUBINSTEIN, G. COMSTOCK, & J. MURRAY,
supra note 435.
439. See supra notes 339-41 and accompanying text.
440. Moreover, heavy consumption of television can contribute to maintenance of
racial stratification by having an adverse impact upon minority education. "The bulk
of research evidence supports the argument that those who spend more time watching
television will get lower test scores and that some groups of students are more vulnerable. In study after study, reading skills in particular are negatively associated with
heavy viewing." Gerbner, Gross, Morgan & Signorielli, Facts, Fantasiesand Schools,
21(5) Soc. 9 (1984).
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choices, government would be in the position of embracing a
mechanism by which racial stratification is perpetuated.

IV
The Limits and Possibilities of Broadcast
Regulation
The federal presence in telecommunications has evolved
from a limited role of technical spectrum allocation to a pervasive system of public interest regulation. Because communications regulation deals with an aspect of expression, the efforts
of the government to equitably distribute the benefits of media
use and access must first be considered against the backdrop of
the first amendment. The public's interest as receiver of diverse communications has been guarded by varied regulatory
mechanisms, as a survey of regulatory justifications will reveal.
A.

The First Amendment and Media Regulation

The justification for regulating the electronic media has been
the theory that the paramount interest under the American
system is that of the public recipients of broadcast communication.44 1 This regulatory and constitutional stance has led to the
"public trustee" model of regulation, which posits that licensees hold the electromagnetic spectrum in trust for the public,
the true beneficiaries of the broadcast system.4 42 This tradi441. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969) (White, J.).
442. The trusteeship model holds that a broadcaster holds a publicly owned share
of the radio spectrum for the benefit of the public, rather than for its own benefit. As
such, it is expected to perform some measure of public service, in the form of nonentertainment programming, in exchange for its use of a government-granted monopoly. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969). As stated by the Justice Department:
Because a broadcast license permits the licensee to make use of the airwaves,
the grant or renewal of a broadcast license in effect confers upon a private
person or corporation an exclusive right to enjoy the use of a part of the
public domain. Accordingly, it has become well-established that a broadcast
licensee is a "trustee" for the public and that the Commission may refuse to
renew his license if he has failed to act in the public interest.
Letter of Stephen Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Rosel
Hyde, Chairman of the FCC, in Nondiscrimination Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 775-77 (1968). See also Television Corp. of Michigan v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 294 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1961), McIntire v.
William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597, 599 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
779 (1946).
The analogy to the law of trusts is well taken. A trustee at common law must meet
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tional regulatory and constitutional stance has been attacked as
anachronistic, and marketplace theories of regulation posit a
new communications marketplace that no longer needs regulation to operate. 443 The result of this justification has been limited first amendment freedom for broadcast licensees.
There is little doubt that the trusteeship approach has limited the first amendment freedoms of broadcasters as compared
to other communicators. The contrast to more expansive newspaper press freedoms, for example, is striking.4 4 4 The printed
press, of course, is not entirely unregulated. State-initiated or
private, state-supported causes of action for libel,44 5 invasion of
privacy,446 obscenity, 447 and antitrust 448 limit the editorial discretion of those who communicate via presses as well as those
who communicate through the broadcast spectrum. 449 Broada "market standard" imposed on fiduciaries operating in similar circumstances. See G.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 93 (5th ed. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
443. Current marketplace theories of regulation reject the trusteeship approach as
"no longer appropriate for today's communications markets." See Fowler, 50th Anniversary of the CommunicationsAct: Introduction, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 71 (1985).
The increase in new video technologies has made the scarcity of broadcast signals an
anachronism, according to the marketplace approach. Because more channels are
available, less justification exists for holding licensees to a standard of public interest.
See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to BroadcastRegulation, 60 TEX.
L. REv. 207, 222 (1982). Chairman Mark Fowler has consistently stated that his mission is to wean the government from the trusteeship model, to provide fuller first
amendment privileges for broadcasters. See infra notes 623-35 and accompanying
text.
444. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), which upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, with
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), which struck down a
Florida statute requiring public access to newspaper columns for potential libel plaintiffs. See also Abrams, In Defense of Tornillo, 86 YALE L.J. 361 (1976); Note, Reconciling Red Lion & Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 563 (1976).
445. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (elucidating constitutional levels required for recovery of libel damages from newspaper). In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court recognized that fear of damage
awards may influence the content of a publication. The Court limited, but did not
eliminate, the cause of action for libel.
446. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (allowing
recovery for an invasion of privacy by a newspaper).
447. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (allowing prosecution for sale
of "obscene" printed material).
448. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (application of
antitrust laws to newspaper organization).
449. As national newspapers, such as Gannett's USA Today and the Wall Street
Journal, make growing use of the electromagnetic spectrum by utilizing satellite
transmission in page makeup, it becomes conceivable that the Commission could ex-
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casters also have been granted fewer freedoms than cable operators, who are on the brink of achieving a status similar to the
"print model" of the first amendment.4 5 ° Commission regulations requiring cable systems to carry local broadcast signals
have been struck down by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, which reemphasized that the first amendment tolerates far more intrusive regulation of broadcasters than of other
communicators.45 1
The comparison with freedoms enjoyed by other media raises
the question of whether the lesser constitutional status of
broadcasters is truly justified by the defining characteristics of
broadcasting. It has become a commonplace in first amendment
adjudication that the "peculiar characteristics of the broadcast
media" justify its lesser constitutional status.452 These characteristics define the parameters of the first amendment protections accorded to broadcasters, and their rationality determines
the reasonableness of requiring special attention to minority
interests.
tend some regulatory jurisdiction over them. See Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 153(o) (1983) (defining "broadcasting" as "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of

relay stations").
450. Cable operators claim that they are more like newspapers than broadcasting
outlets because they do not use the electromagnetic spectrum in the same manner as
do broadcasters. Cable also caters to an audience that has invited it into its homes,
thus it is less intrusive than broadcasting. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104
S. Ct. 2694, 2701 (1984); cf.Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978).
451. See Must-Carry Rules Fall to Court Edict, BROADCASTING, July 22, 1985, at 31.

In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), the court made it clear that cable has a higher threshold of first amendment freedoms than do broadcasters. As Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote for the court,
"in light of cable's virtually unlimited channel capacity, the standard of first amendment review reserved for occupants of the physically scarce airwaves is plainly inapplicable." Id. at 1450. The distinction is of "fundamental significance," because of the
Supreme Court's continued holdings that the first amendment tolerates more intrusive regulation of broadcasters than of other media. The broadcasting industry was
"stunned" by the holding. See "Two FirstAmendments," in Editorials, BROADCASTING, July 22, 1985, at 122.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that cable systems could not
be held to the Pacifica standard of indecency in signal transmission, discussed infra
notes 461-68 and accompanying text. See Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (11th
Cir. 1985); see also Courts Continue to Grant Wider FirstAmendment Rights to Cable,

April 1, 1985, at 88.
452. National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers and Distributors v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 516 F.2d 526, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Goldberg &
BROADCASTING,

Couzens, "PeculiarCharacteristics' - An Analysis of the First Amendment Implications of BroadcastRegulation. 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1978).
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Scarcity and State Action

The most prevalent characteristic permitting broadcast regulation is the physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Because "the facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them," the Commission must allocate frequencies under the congressional standard of the
"public interest, convenience, or necessity. 4 5 3 The changed nature of the communications marketplace and the advent of new
communications technologies has led to speculation about the
vitality of spectrum scarcity as a continuing regulatory
justification.4 5 4
Scarcity, however, is relevant as a justification of regulation
on two levels. Access to broadcasting is indeed limited by the
physical properties of the spectrum, but a more direct limitation exists in the government's protection of the monopoly
rights of a licensee to its slice of the spectrum. The Supreme
Court has recognized that scarcity was based not only in the
limited availability of the spectrum, but in the nature of a government licensing program involving granting exclusivities.
"Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not
available to all. 4 5 5 Some aspects of electromagnetic scarcity
are creatures of the law of allocation policy rather than the law
of physics. 5 6 Intrusions on a licensee's monopoly may result in
criminal liability. "A genuine marketplace offers many risks to
a potential new entrant. Federal prosecution, however, is usually not numbered among them. ' 45 7 There is no doubt that
granting exclusive, state-enforced rights to a channel of communications is unique among media.
This action by the state gives life to the public trustee concept, and has been found by at least one court to constitute
453. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
454. Id. at 226. See also Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (the
goal of the first amendment is to achieve "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources").
455. Id.
456. See Television Assignments, Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952).
The 1952 Table of Assignments created the present structure of license allocations,
and was based on the Commission's policy of localism. Much of the current scarcity of
allocations, and the elimination of a then-viable fourth network, may be traced to the
policy behind the table.
457. Johnson, Should Congress Approve the Senate-Approved Approach to Radio
Deregulation? 63 CONG. DIG. 106, 121 (1984). The Communications Act allows criminal liability for any who would infringe upon a broadcaster's frequency. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 503 (penal provisions and forfeitures).
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"state action" for the equal-protection mechanisms of the fourteenth amendment.4 58 Judge J. Skelly Wright found that a station's refusal to accept editorial advertising violated the
constitution, and was sufficiently tied to federal regulation to
be considered action by the state. "Federal agency review and
guidance of broadcasters' conduct is automatic, continuing, and
pervasive ... broadcast licensees are considered the 'proxies' or
'fiduciaries' of the people. ' 459 Although Judge Wright was reversed by the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger was unable
to command a majority for reversal of the state-action finding.46 ° The entwining of public and private authority in the
broadcast arena is a singular characteristic of the electronic media that justifies service in the public interest.
2. Pervasiveness
Another unique characteristic of broadcasting is its ubiquity.
In Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Foundation,4 6 1 the Supreme Court found two additional regulatory justifications implicit in the omnipresence of the broadcast media.
First, the "uniquely pervasive" nature of the broadcast media
may justify regulation.4 6 2 A broadcast message has the power
to intrude upon the privacy of the unwilling listener, unlike
other media. The Commission itself has characterized television as a "guest in the American home. ' 46 3 Second, broadcasting is "uniquely accessible" to children, thus justifying content
regulation to a limited degree.4 64
The regulatory justifications of pervasiveness and accessibil458. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
459. Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 450 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973).
460. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973). In a section of the opinion concurred in only by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger wrote that "it cannot be said that the government is a
'partner' to the action of the broadcast licensee complained of here, nor is it engaged
in a 'symbiotic relationship' with the licensee, profiting from the invidious discrimination of its proxy." Id. at 119.
461. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
462. See id. at 748 ("the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans").
463. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material. 51
F.C.C.2d 418, 423 (1975).
464. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749
(broadcasting is "uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read"). See
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ity are not unique to the medium of broadcasting, but are based
on an inveterate strand of first amendment theory. The constitutional speech freedoms of communicators are traditionally diminished when the speaker intrudes upon the privacy of the
home,46 5 or when the degree of exposure elsewhere makes it
impractical for an unwilling listener to avoid the message.4 66
The degree to which the communicator's freedoms are diminished depends on the difficulty with which the offensive
message may be avoided. 6 7 With a medium as ubiquitous as
television, it is doubtful that total avoidance is possible.4 6 The
social impact rationale, which can be traced to a dissent by Justice Murphy in NBC v. United States,46 9 may provide a basis for
regulation if the spectrum scarcity theory diminishes in
importance.
Although the present leaders at the Commission reject a soalso id. at 757-59 (Powell, J., concurring) (differential treatment of broadcasting is
justified because children and adults have equal access to the medium).
465. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949) (ban on "loud" sound trucks; "preferred position of freedom of speech does not require legislators to be insensible to
claims by citizens to comfort and convenience"); Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S.
728, 736-37 (1970) (offensive mailings; although "right of every person 'to be let alone'
must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate .... a mailer's
right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee"); Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470-71 (1980) (picketing; "the right to communicate is not limitless ... the state's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of
the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society").
466. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 434 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (radio on bus; subjecting captive passengers to programming violates their
constitutional right to privacy); Rosenfield v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("a verbal assault on an unwilling audience may be so grossly
offensive and emotionally disturbing as to be the proper subject of criminal proscription"). See also Black, He CannotChoose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor,
53 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1953).

467. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) ("the screen of a drivein theater is not 'so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to
avoid it' "); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("absent the narrow circumstances of 'captive audience' the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further bombardment of his sensibilities simply by averting his eyes' "); Rowan v. Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (if Court held addressee had any more control
than notifying postmaster to stop offensive mail, it "would make hardly more sense
than to say that a radio or television viewer may not twist the dial to cut off an offensive or boring communication and thus bar its entering his home").
468. See Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969) ("it is difficult to calculate the subliminal
impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even if not listened to, but it
may reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the written word").
469. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). See also GILLMOR AND BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW 779 (1984).
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cial impact rationale of regulation,"' a recognition of the
unique impact of the broadcast media is implicit in recent Commission actions. 7 ' In determining whether to classify a new
technology as a common carrier or a broadcast medium, the
Commission acknowledged that teletext shared each physical
characteristic of broadcast media except its pervasiveness. 7 2
Because it lacked the broad impact of broadcasting, it was exempted from public service responsibilities. 473 Although the
Commission explicitly rejects the social impact rationale in relation to the broadcast media, it is forced to acknowledge pervasiveness as a functional characteristic.
These unique characteristics of broadcasting define its novel
constitutional status. Because of the limited accessibility of the
spectrum to the public and the concomitant influence of those
who are granted spectrum-use privileges, licensees inherit responsibilities that diminish unfettered exercise of first amendment rights. Thus, "it is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. ' 47 4 This
recognition does not mean, of course, that intrusions on the
rights of broadcasters are without limit. Only a limited form of
public access to broadcasting has been upheld by requiring
equal coverage of controversial topics. 475 These strictly limited

rights of access have a firm basis in first amendment adjudication in other areas. 7 6 Indeed, access to balanced ideas is central
470. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 229 (social-impact rationale is "inconsistent with a society dedicated to free inquiry and expression").
471. See, e.g., Fourth Report and Order, Subscription Television, 95 F.C.C.2d 457
(1983); In re Satellite Business Systems, 95 F.C.C.2d 457 (1983); Operational Fixed
Microwave Service, Report and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203 (1983); Instructional Television Fixed Service, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 98 F.C.C.2d 1249 (1984).
472. See Authorization of Teletext, Report and Order, BC Docket 81-741, FCC 83120, 53 R.R.2d 1309 (1983).
473. Teletext service is broadcast free of charge to the public on the airwaves, and
its allocation is dependent upon the 1952 table of assignments. See id. The Communications Act defines broadcasting as "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations."
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(o). See also National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1981); Chartwell Communications Group
v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1980).
474. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969).
475. See id. The Court found that the fairness doctrine is not only permissible
under the first amendment, but embodies the very spirit the framers intended to personify in the drafting of the amendment. See infra notes 595-608 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the fairness doctrine.
476. Constitutional sanction for a right of access exists in a broad variety of areas.
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to the philosophical core of the constitution. 47 Rights to receive information through the broadcast media do not, however, extend to a first amendment right to have the
Commission review changes in station format.4 78 Neither is
there a private right of access that would allow purchase of
time for editorial advertising 479 Although the rights of broadcasters are circumscribed, it is evident that broadcasters still
possess substantial editorial discretion.8 °
B.

The Commission's Use of its Authority

The Commission's regulatory authority under the Communications Act of 1934481 was a direct response to the failure of
market forces to forge a working broadcast environment. The
earliest attempt to moderate broadcasters' use of airwaves was
in 1921, by then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover. He
See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (post office practice of
screening mail for communist propaganda inconsistent with first amendment); Board
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (school board does not have absolute discretion to
remove books from library shelves); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("the
constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas," even those found to
be obscene); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (academics seeking to hear
Belgian economist); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prison correspondence
protected by the first amendment).
477. The philosophical basis for a right to receive information rests on the nature
of democratic government. If governments are to derive their powers from the consent of the governed, the citizenry must have the right to be informed. The negative
phrasing of the first amendment ("Congress shall make no law . . .") presupposes a
flow of information preexisting the constitutional prohibition against its infringement. The first amendment makes democratic government possible, by ensuring a
right to receive information. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 65-66 (1948); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 57 (1966).
Similarly, Emerson recognizes the primacy of a right to receive information in a democracy and advocates a positive theory of the first amendment to guarantee the flow
of information to the citizenry. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6-8 (1970); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-

MENT 42 (1966).
478. See WNCN Listener's Guild v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 450 U.S.
582 (1981). The Guild asserted a right to receive information based upon Red Lion,
but the Court discounted the argument. "Although observing that the interests of the
people as a whole were promoted by debate of public issues on the radio, we did not
imply that the first amendment grants individual listeners the right to have the Commission review the abandonment of their favorite entertainment programs." Id. at
604.
479. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 113 (1973).
480. In fact, the Communications Act of 1934 proscribes any governmental action
that can be construed as censorship. See id. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1983).
481. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
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attempted to do so by expanding the Radio Act of 1912 from its
intended role of clarifying ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore maritime radio signals.4 2 The disarray of over-the-air signals had
provoked broadcasters to clamor for government intervention.
Hoover remarked that broadcasting "is probably the only industry of the United States that is unanimously in favor of having itself regulated. '483 Voluntary measures and market forces
continued to fail to remedy the chaos that characterized broadcasting. The Radio Act of 1927 was the long-awaited legislative
response to the anarchy of the marketplace.
The 1927 Act established the Federal Radio Commission,
which, like the industry it sought to regulate, was to face considerable internal strife. Its staff of twenty workers was faced
with as many as 170,000 affidavits during a single typical hearing.484 The short-lived agency's plight was resolved by the formation of an expanded Federal Communications Commission
in 1934. The newer, more powerful agency differed not only in
its quantitative allocations but in its qualitative regulatory
charter. A major innovation in the 1934 Act was an emphasis
on long-range planning of social goals. This emphasis was created by the expansion of the public interest charter of the
agency to regulate in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" and the requirement that the Commission study more
effective uses of communcations in the public interest and set
long-range goals. 85
This public service responsibility has been readily accepted
by the Commission. In its primary determination of the public
service required of broadcast licensees,4 86 the Commission established that Section 326 of the Communications Act, which
prohibits censorship, did not prohibit requiring licensees to act
in the public interest. This interpretation has been accorded
substantial deference by courts, which agree that the public
service obligations required by the Commission do not violate
482. E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 11 (1982).

483. Id.
484. L. WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO: A REPORT ON THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 200

(1947).
485. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303(g).
486. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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the first amendment.4 8 7 The public interest responsibility includes many facets, not the least of which involves tailoring
broadcasting to serve minority tastes and interests. 48" Encouragement of a diversity of voices is critical to the first amendment and the public interest. Promoting minority access to the
broadcast market, then, is a direct means by which the public
interest may be served.
Regulatory Mechanisms Designed to Further Minority
Interests

C.

Constitutional analysis of broadcast regulation reveals that
ensuring a diversity of sources is a goal mandated by the first
amendment. The public interest goal of promoting ethnic diversity in telecommunications had been served by various regulatory approaches. A brief survey reveals that the tools are
potentially effective, but that their effective use is contingent
upon the prevailing attitude of the Commission.
1.

Minority Ownership Regulations

The Commission may permissibly use its power to select
among applicants for broadcast licenses to increase the ranks of
minority broadcast owners. The Commission's ownership regulations489 have been upheld by the Supreme Court, which noted
that the avoidance of overconcentration is a goal that is reconcilable with the presuppositions of the Communications Act.4 9 °
Diversification of control is a "factor of primary significance" in
determining who shall be granted a license.4 9 ' Ownership is
important, the Court stated, because it "carries with it the
power to select, to edit, and to choose the methods, manner,
487. G.

ROBINSON,

E.

GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

287

(West 1980 & supp. 1983).

488. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF
BROADCAST LICENSEES (1974). Service to minority groups is one of several guidelines
provided by the Commission to licensees. Other aspects of "public interest" service
include the carrying of opportunities for community expression and children's programming, as well as non-commercial programming in areas that are neglected in the
station's programming; in areas that are unfit for commercial sponsorship due to the
sensitivity of the subject; in service to non-profit organizations; and in program
experimentation.
489. 47 C.F.R. § 73.35 (1981).
490. United States v. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S. 192, 193 (1956).
491. Federal Communications Comm'n v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 781 (1978).
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and emphasis of presentation. 4 92 Although non-minority programmers may pledge to tailor broadcasting to minority tastes,
the Commission has placed reliance on ownership as a major
determinant of content favorable to minority groups.4 9 3
The minority community remains heavily underrepresented
in ownership of broadcast outlets. Minimizing this inequality is
important to the Commission because "minority ownership
would increase diversity of opinion and viewpoints, and thus
further Commission policy. 4 9 4 In encouraging diversity in
viewpoints, minority ownership policies promote the same
goals as limits on media concentration in markets,495 group
ownership,49 6 regional concentration,4 9 7 and cross-ownership.4 9 8
492. Id. at 785.
493. See TV9, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 495 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
494. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON MINORITY OWNERSHIP

IN BROADCASTING 1 (1978). Minority ownership is favored not only because it benefits
minorities; rather, promotion of minority ownership is favored because it promotes
greater diversity of opinion and viewpoint. Without preferences, a task force has argued, "the larger, non-minority audience will be deprived of the views of minorities."
Id. See also Steele v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(finding that female preference is impermissible because it does not result in an increase of diversity).
495. The Commission has prohibited ownership or control of both a radio station
and a television station within the same market. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.35(a); 73.240(a)(1);
73.636(a)(1).
496. The Commission has revised its multiple ownership rules; entities may now
own 12 AM stations and 12 FM stations, as well as 12 television stations, if the combination does not reach more than 25 percent of the nation's television homes. A UHF
station, however, is assessed for only one-half of a market's television homes. A group
broadcaster buying interests in stations that are at least half-owned by minorities may
own up to 14 stations, and may reach 30 percent of the nation's television homes as
long as two stations in each service are controlled by minorities. All ownership restrictions would have expired by 1990, but the sunset provisions were eliminated on
reconsideration. See "Multiple Ownership,"in Where Things Stand, BROADCASTING,
July 1, 1985, at 18, 88.
497. The Commission had prohibited the ownership of three broadcast stations
when two are located within 100 miles of the third station and primary service areas
of any overlap. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a)(2). Regional concentration rules, however,
have recently been eliminated altogether. See "Multiple Ownership,"supra note 496.
498. Ownership of both a television station and a cable system is prohibited if the
broadcast station's signal overlaps any part of the cable system's coverage area and
there is a "cognizable interest" in each facility. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a). Ownership
of both a television station and a daily newspaper is also prohibited, if the station's
signal encompasses the entire market of the newspaper. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(c);
73.240(c). The Commission has shown interest in dropping cross-ownership prohibitions prohibiting networks from owning cable systems, and has been supported by the
Department of Justice in its efforts to do so. See "Crossownership," in Where Things
Stand, BROADCASTING, July 1, 1985, at 18, 22. The Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 prohibits cross-ownership of co-located broadcast and telephone company
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Policy favoring minority entrance into the communications
market, then, is seen as a proper means to achieve the goal of
diversity inherent in both the public interest standard and the
first amendment.
The extent of minority underrepresentation in broadcast
ownership is startling. Out of the total 10,134 broadcast stations in the nation, only 147 are minority owned; of 4,360 cable
systems, only 27 are minority owned - minorities thus own
one percent of broadcast outlets and two percent of cable outlets.4 99 The minority ownership that does exist is concentrated
in radio broadcasting. 50 0 The breakdown within the technologies and minority groups reveals the extent of concentration in
the older technology: only fourteen television stations out of
about 1100 are owned by minorities, eleven by blacks and three
by Hispanics; no other minority-group member owns a television station.50 1
The Commission has sought to equalize participation in
broadcast ownership by providing a unique system of financial
incentives to encourage incumbent majority broadcasters to sell
to minorities.0 2 Tax certificates were granted to permit sellers
ownership of cable systems, but permits newspaper cross-ownership of cable systems.
See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq.
499. See Parityfor Minorities in the Media: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) (statement of Cong. Collins). See also
National Association of Broadcasters,Departmentof Minority and Special Services,
BROADCASTING FACTS

2, 3 (October, 1983).

500. Of the 1% of the broadcasting industry that is minority-owned, 69% is concentrated in radio broadcasting, the oldest technology and one that is capable of serving
small, discrete local audiences. See MINORITY BUSINESS INVOLVEMENT IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 2 (1982) (report to Richard Loeb, U.S. Department of
Commerce).
501. Id. at B-3 (appendix listing all minority owned and managed telecommunications businesses). Native Americans own three radio stations. Asian-Americans own
two radio stations. Hispanics own 48 radio stations (20 AM and 28 FM), and the remainder of minority-owned broadcast outlets are black-owned radio stations. Some
multiple ownership exists. There are 82 black station owners, 25 Hispanic station
owners, two Native American station owners, and one Asian American station owner,
for a total of 110 minority owners.
502. The nature of the financial incentives to incumbents made the minority ownership package acceptable to the broadcast industry. The tax benefit could total 5 to
8% of the purchase price, and the benefits from a distress sale could be much greater.
Such a sale is the only way to avoid the enormous expense associated with a hearing,
as well as the chance that the license will be lost entirely. See Honig, The FCCand
its FluctuatingCommitment to Minority Ownership of BroadcastFacilities,27 How.
L.J. 859, 869-70 (1984).
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to defer capital gains taxation, °3 and "distress" sales were allowed for licensees whose renewals had been designated for
hearing.50 4 In their first four years of operation, the incentives
contributed to the sale of 82 broadcast stations to minority owners.50 5 More recently, however, the incentives have become less
efficacious. As fewer stations are put in "distress" by being designated for hearing by the current conservative Commission,
fewer stations are available for distress sales. 0 6
Comparative and competing hearings can also encourage minority ownership, by considering the "need for diverse and antagonistic sources of information" in determining which party
should be awarded a broadcast license.5 0 7 Indeed, the Commission must provide "favorable consideration" to a minority applicant in a comparative hearing with a majority applicant. 0 '
503. The tax certificates are granted under the tax code. A seller may defer taxation when there is "a substantial likelihood that diversity of programming will be
increased" by sale to a minority. See Internal Revenue Code § 1071, 26 U.S.C. § 1071
(1983) (IRS provision allowing capital-gains tax to be deferred when the transaction
furthers the Commission's regulatory objectives).
504. A licensee may make a "distress sale" to a minority when a license has been
designated for hearing but before the hearing is scheduled to begin. The price cannot
exceed 75% of the station's fair market value. See Blue Ribbon Broadcasting, Inc., 76
F.C.C.2d 429 (1980); Policy Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978).
505. See Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership
in Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 852 (1982).
506. See Honig, supra note 502, at 873 n.72.
507. See Citizens Communication Center v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 447
F.2d 1201, 1213 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1971). A non-licensee may file a competing application
when a broadcast licensee is up for license renewal. A full comparative hearing,
under Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 326 U.S. 327
(1945), is then required. A minority challenger may be able to plead an advantage in
diversity of voice. See also Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (those who would "most naturally
initiate, encourage and expand diversity of approach and viewpoint" should be
favored).
508. See TV9, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 495 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974), in which the court held that "it is consistent
with the primary objective of maximum diversification of ownership of mass communications media" for the Commission to award favorable consideration to minority
status in a comparative hearing. In so holding, the court implied that minority ownership held a greater promise for diversification of voice than pledges made by a majority applicant. The court held that:
it is upon ownership that public policy places primary reliance with respect
to diversification of content, and that historically has proven to be significantly influential with respect to editorial comment and the presentation of
news.
Id. at 937-38. Minority ownership, however, is not alone in its efforts to bring about
responsive programming. "[T]he entire thrust of TV9 is that ownership and participation together are themselves likely to bring about programming that is responsive to
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Through comparative preferences and competitive incentives,
the Commission has several mechanisms at its disposal to remedy the gap between minority population and minority ownership of broadcast outlets.
Despite the availability of these mechanisms, economic factors work against minority owners and perpetuate the majority
dominance of the broadcast marketplace. Financing can be a
significant impediment on minority acquisition of broadcast
properties.50 9 Unlike established broadcasters, who obtained
original licenses at no cost, new entrants into the communications market must raise substantial capital. 10 Past Commission policies aggravated this factor by raising further
impediments during the licensing process. 1 ' Moreover, past
discrimination can be a problem in acquiring a broadcast property even today. 5 2 Because of the difficulties the market places
upon minority ownership, it is appropriate to ask whether the
Commission's policies are merely superficial attempts to offset
the stringencies the market places upon minorities.
The efficacy of the minority ownership policy's stated goal of
increasing ethnic diversity in programming is also open to question. To further its belief that "diversification of control is a
public good in a free society, and is additionally desirable where
a government licensing system limits access by the public to the
use of radio and television facilities,"5 1 the Commission has relied heavily upon minority ownership to produce minority-orithe needs of the citizenry." Garrett v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 513 F.2d
1056, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
509. The Commission has pointed out that minorities have less experience in obtaining financing, and may have difficulty in persuading lenders to back their efforts
because of a lack of broadcast experience. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, MINORITY OWNERSHIP OF BROADCAST FACILITIES:

A

REPORT (1979).

510. See Honig, supra note 502, at 875. Honig describes purchasing media properties at premium prices as the "only viable means of entry" into today's telecommunications market. Every full-power television station and radio station in the top 50
markets has been assigned.
511. Until 1981, the Commission required prospective licensees to demonstrate the
availability of funds to run a station for a year without including revenues. See Ultravision Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 544 (1965). The rule was changed because minorities were particularly aggrieved by its more stringent capital-attracting
requirements. See New Financial Qualifications Standards for Broadcast Assignment
and Transfer Applicants, 87 F.C.C.2d 200 (1981).
512. See Honig, supra note 502, at 873-74 (describing the "old boy network"
through which broadcast outlets are traded).
513.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

IN BROADCASTING 4

(1978).

REPORT ON MINORITY

OWNERSHIP
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ented programming. Whether such reliance is well placed will
depend on the validity of the assumption that minority-owned
stations produce minority-oriented content. The assumption
has been criticized by Singleton, who performed a comparative
analysis of programming to conclude that there was no significant difference in the level of public service programming on
black-owned and non-black-owned stations.514 The data implied that "simply changing the race of the owner of a minorityoriented station will not necessarily improve that station's per'
formance."515
The study indicated, however, that "the relevance, quality, or positioning" of minority-oriented
programming could be affected. 16
Similar findings were reported by Schement and Singleton in
a study of Spanish-language radio. 7 In news, public affairs,
and non-entertainment programming, Latino owners performed no better or worse than majority owners.518 In both
studies, the researchers pointed to the impropriety of expecting
greater public service from broadcasters with less experience
and less capital with which to produce original programming.
Minorities are able to purchase the least desireable stations in
smaller markets, but are expected by the Commission to
produce superior quantities of expensive public interest
programming. 1 9
Aiding minority ownership may, however, be justified as adding to the economic base of the minority community.52 ° Further, minority-owned broadcast outlets tend to hire more
minority employees. 5 21 As minority employees reach decision514. See Singleton, FCC Minority Ownership Policy and Non-EntertainmentProgramming in Black-Oriented Radio Stations, 25 J. BROADCASTING 195 (1981).
515. Id. at 199.

516. Id. Further, minorities tend to own less profitable stations in smaller markets
than majority owners. This fact could limit their ability to produce non-entertainment
programming. As Honig recognizes, minorities are handicapped by late entry into the
the telecommunications market. No black owned a broadcast station until 1958, and
even then blacks often bought stations that "they were able to purchase because nobody else wanted them." See Honig, supra note 502, at 874-75.
517. See Schement & Singleton, The Onus of Minority Ownership:FCCPolicy and
Spanish-LanguageRadio, 31(2) J. COMM. 78 (1981).
518. Id. at 82.
519. See Schement & Singleton, supra note 517, at 83; Singleton, supra note 514, at
199.
520. See Schement & Singleton, supra note 517, at 82; Singleton, supra note 514, at
200. See also Hammond, Now You See It, Now You Don't: Minority Ownership in an
"Unregulated" Video Marketplace, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 633 (1983).
521. See Schement & Singleton, supra note 517, at 83.
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making capacities, research has shown that more minority programming tends to be produced.5 2 2 If such a result is confirmed
by further research, continuing minority preferences would not
be incongruous. A policy of minority ownership could, over
time, lead to a growth in minority employment, which has been
shown to produce minority-responsive programming.
The shift toward deregulation, however, presumes to an even
greater extent that minority-owned broadcast outlets would cater to the segment of the market that prefers minority-oriented
programming. 523 Requiring the greatest public interest service
from a segment of the broadcast market that has been least
able to carry the weight of such programming5 24 because of the
stringencies of late entry into the communications marketplace5 25 is both ironic and inefficacious.
In addition to the decreasing efficacy of the Commission's minority ownership policies, parallel changes in decreasing restraints on majority media ownership may operate to further
disadvantage fledgling attempts by the minority community to
maximize its ownership of broadcast outlets. The deregulatory
approach, with its emphasis on eliminating restrictions on ownership, could have the effect of producing greater concentration
of broadcast ownership in the hands of fewer owners.5 26 The
broadcast industry is already characterized by great concentration. 527 About 72 percent of commercial stations are held by
28 Of 748 television stations, 495 are owned by
group owners. 521
522. See Honig, RelationshipsAmong EEO, ProgramService, and Minority Ownership in Broadcast Regulation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 85 (1983), discussed infra notes 554-58

and accompanying text.
523. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7.
524. See supra note 519 and accompanying text.
525. See supra notes 509-10 and accompanying text.
526. See Bonder, A "Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 36
FED. COMM. L.J. 27, 46 (1984), finding that the Fowler marketplace approach, with its
allocations of property rights in the spectrum held by existing licensees, "could lead to
the dangers of concentration of control of the broadcast media by the affluent to a
greater extent than would a marketplace approach with initial allocations determined
by the market." See also H. LEVIN, FACT AND FANCY IN TELEVISION REGULATION 107
(1980).
527. Broadcasting patterns in the top 50 markets reveal that wealthy corporations
dominate the spectrum. See Comment, The "Top 50 Market Policy": Fifteen Years of
Non-Policy, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 303, 335 (1978).
528. See B. COMPAINE, C. STERLING, T. GUBACK & J. NOBLE, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA? CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE MASS COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

(1982).

361
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165 entities, an average of three each. 29 New technologies are
also characterized by increasing concentration. There are 4,600
cable outlets with 25 million subscribers in the United States,
but 50 companies reach 72 percent of all subscribers. In fact, 40
percent of all cable television subscribers in the United States
are reached by the top eight companies.530
There is little doubt that removal of ownership restriction is
a major part of the deregulatory thrust of the current Commis5 31
sion. The Commission has liberalized multiple-ownership
and cross-ownership 5 2 rules, and its chairman has expressed
hope that such rules will become even less restrictive. 533 The
policy behind the liberalization of ownership rules could tend
to make both established media 34 and new media5 35 increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer entities, at the expense of new entrants into the marketplace-especially
minorities. 36
529. See Hammond, Now You See It, Now You Don't: Minority Ownership in an
"Unregulated" Video Marketplace, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 633 (1983).
530. See id.
531. See Multiple Ownership of Broadcast Stations, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 95 F.C.C.2d 360, 404 (1983) (Rivera, Comm'r, dissenting).
532. See, e.g., Amendment of the Commission'sRule Relative to Eliminationof the
Prohibitionon Common Ownership of Cable Television Systems and National Networks, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,212 (1982). The report stated that cross-ownership rules "do
not necessarily guarantee greater diversity of program content or advance the welfare
of individual viewers." Id. at 39,217. But see Federal Communications Comm'n v.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (no constitutional impediment to restricting ownership of broadcast media).
533. See The Bittersweet Chairmanshipof Mark S. Fowler, BROADCASTING, Feb.
18, 1985, at 39, 42-43, in which Fowler stated that "the Commission did as much as it
could, under the circumstances, to provide as much freedom to broadcasters as we
could.., a future FCC should be able to come back and liberalize these even further."
534. Modification of ownership rules "could result in greater market dominance by
established entities, less diversity and fewer opportunities for new entrants into
broadcast ownership, including minorities. The Commission cannot be blind to the
restructuring consequences of deregulation." STRATEGIES TO ADVANCING MINORITY
OWNERSHIP IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1-2 (1982).

535. Owners of traditional media may increasingly become owners of new media,
in an environment characterized by deregulation and elimination of cross-ownership
restrictions. B. COMPAINE, C. STERLING, T. GUBACK & J. NOBLE, WHO OWNS THE
MEDIA? CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE MASS COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
361 (1982). The authors point out that there is "increasing economic concentration in
cable and related media." Id. at 442.
536. See Minority Participationin the Media, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 159
(1983) (statement of Allen S. Hammond, Media Access Project) ("the danger of deregulation ... is that there will be an increased concentration in the ownership of the
technologies"). See also Strategies to Advancing Minority Ownership,supra note 534,
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There is obvious evidence that increasing concentration and
higher costs of market entry have resulted from the deregulatory changes made by the present Commission. Industry analysts have determined deregulation to be the causal factor in
the increasing size of media companies137 and the increased
profitability of established companies.5 38 The new profitability
means restrictive pricing for new entrants. New stations require outlays of ten times the cash flow of the station,5 3 9 which
can translate into $25-million prices for even small-market
broadcast outlets.5 40 The ultra-high-dollar transactions resulting from escalating values attract, predictably, only the largest
players.5 4 ' Such industry concentration need not rest solely
upon the approval of the Commission, as the Reagan Administration recently appointed an advocate of deregulation to head
the Justice Department's antitrust division. 4 2
and Multiple Ownership of Broadcast Stations, Notice and Proposed Rule Making, 95
F.C.C.2d 360, 403 (1983) (Rivera, Comm'r, dissenting) (newcomers, especially minorities, will be hard-pressed to compete; "in the new, post-rule environment, these conglomerates will bid up the prices of stations in most markets significantly").
537. An industry analyst recently stated that "because of deregulation," media
"players will continue to get bigger." See BROADCASTING, April 29, 1985, at 121. The
size of the players provokes concerns by some about the ability of companies involved
in takeovers to provide public service programming. See ChangingPoint of View at
the FCC, BROADCASTING, June 17, 1985, at 38, 40 (Henry Geller, director of Duke University's Washington Center for Public Policy Research, questioning the ability of
companies with $100 million debts to provide public service programming).
538. Frederic Tannenbaum, a lawyer who represented the state in the AT&T divestiture case, recently stated that "deregulatory policies of Congress and the Federal
Communications Commission in both the cable television and broadcast industries
should increase profitability in those fields." See Financing Broadcast and Cable
Propertiesin Wake of Deregulation,BROADCASTING, March 11, 1985, at 22.
539. Address by Frank Melton (chief executive officer, WLBT-TV, Jackson, Mississippi), Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communications Annual
Convention (Aug. 5, 1985).
540. For example, WITN-TV in Washington, North Carolina, recently sold for
$25,000,000; WREX-TV in Rockford, Illinois, recently sold for $21,000,000; and WPDETV in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, has sold for $14,510,000. See 1985 Television
Sales to Date, BROADCASTING, June 3, 1985, at 102 (advertisement). Stations in larger
markets draw higher prices. The Tribune Company recently purchased KTLA-TV/
Los Angeles for $510,000,000. See Canging Point of View, supra note 537, at 40.
541. Examples of such transactions abound. In one case, Gulf Broadcasting sold
broadcasting properties to Taft Broadcasting for $755,000,000. See Wall St. J., Feb. 5,
1985, at 64, col. 4. American Express offered to buy Warner Communication Inc.'s
interest in Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc. for $450,000,000-in cash. See
Washington Post, July 18, 1985, at El, col. 1. Atlanta broadcast magnate Ted Turner
sought to raise $2.5 billion in cash to purchase CBS before being foiled by an immense
stock buy-back plan. See Washington Post, July 18, 1985, at E3, col. 3.
542. Douglas H. Ginsburg, the Reagan Administration's appointee to the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division, is described as "an administration proponent of in-
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Increasing concentration in the communications industry is
troublesome for several reasons. The most obvious difficulty
with increasing control in decreasing numbers of owners is the
first amendment concern that there be "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources."5 4 3 Economic analysis as well as constitutional analysis is relevant to such a principle. Economic studies show that
"concentration reduces innovation and makes for homogeneity
of product. 5 4 4 Dominance by the few precludes the expression
of views by the many, 545 to the detriment of the viewing public. 5 46 Soaring station prices caused by the Commission's der-

egulatory initiatives have also had the effect of bringing nonbroadcast owners into broadcasting, raising concerns that nonbroadcast-oriented corporations will not serve traditional public-interest goals.5 47 Moreover, the high prices and finance
rates required to enter the broadcast market make it difficult
dustry deregulation" who does not believe in considering "social" factors such as "the
desirability of maintaining a number of competitors in each industry." See Washington Post, July 18, 1985, at E3, col. 4. The Federal Trade Commission, similarly, has
taken a laissez-faire view of its duties in the communications area. It has, for example, refused to enforce previous consent orders regarding advertising for certain products aimed at children, such as vitamins. "This illegal practice is starting again
because the FTC under Ronald Reagan has changed from a federal watchdog to an
industry mascot," said Peggy Charin, president of Action for Children's Television.
See Take Your Vitamins, BROADCASTING, Nov. 25, 1985, at 14.
543. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). The concern for diversity has a primacy among first amendment principles, because the form of democratic
self-government on which the United States is based requires the presentation of diverse viewpoints. "The first amendment presupposes that the right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
(Learned Hand, J.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
544. Powell, Competition Versus Concentrationin the Book Trade, 30(2) J. COMM.
89, 91 (1980). Merger and cross-ownership trends in the book industry are widely
believed to have led to "a narrowing of product." Id. at 94.
545. It has been noted that "vertical integration of cable-system owners controlling
program suppliers has the effect of freezing others out of the marketplace," leading
Sam Simon of the Telecommunications Research and Action Center to conclude that
"the biggest lie in this whole thing is the claim that the marketplace will assure diversity." Koughan, The State of the Revolution: 1982, CHANNELS OF CoMM., Dec./Jan.
1981-82, at 23-26.
546. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) ("it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount").
547. See FCCPanel at Odds over Effect of Deregulation, BROADCASTING, Jan. 27,
1986, at 44. Commissioner James Quello and John Lane, a communications lawyer,
agreed on the possible untoward effects of broadcast ownership by those to whom the
public service concept is not an internalized mode of doing business. Quello expressed
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for broadcasters to "resist the temptation of increasing the
commercial contents" at the expense of public service. 548 It is
painfully obvious that the Commission's deregulatory policies
are a "moving force" behind industry concentration, 549 and
that concentration will diminish the efficacy of the very marketplace upon which deregulatory theory depends.55 °
2.

Equal Employment Opportunity Regulations

Commission mandates of affirmative action are designed not
only to reduce discrimination in the broadcast industry, but to
encourage programming that is responsive to minority groups.
The encouragement of minority programming by the provisions has been termed the "primary objective" of the equal employment programs. 5 1 1 The Supreme Court has approved this
objective, in holding that the regulations are a justifiable means
for the Commission to "ensure that its licencees' programming
fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups." 552
The potential efficacy of this goal is concurrently recognized by
minority researchers, who find that underrepresentation in minority-oriented programming can be attributed to the lack of
minorities in decisionmaking positions in the media.55 3 Empirical study confirms that rates of minority employment are positively correlated with programming that is responsive to
concern over "fast buck artists" who have not "been imbued with the idea of serving
the public with good programming" as have professional broadcasters. See id.
548. See id. Both Lane and Quello expressed concern over the ability of financially
burdened and overvalued properties to produce public interest programming. "It's
going to be very difficult when you pay for and finance a property at the prices stations are now being exchanged at to also maintain staff and do local programs and to
resist the temptation of increasing the commercial contents," Lane said. See id.
549. See Hornet, "Getting the Message": Statutory Approaches to Electronic Information Delivery and the Duty of Carriage,37 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 230 (1985). The
Justice Department, similarly, has been "a prime mover in urging [concentration]
along." Id.
550. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 232-33.
551. See National Org. for Women v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 555 F.2d
1002, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d 226, 229-30 (1976); Weissman, The FCC and
Minorities:An Evaluation of FCCPolicies Designed to Encourage ProgrammingResponsive to Minority Needs, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 561, 575 (1981).
552. NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 n.7 (1976) (citations
omitted).
553. See Thomas, The OtherAmerica: Race-Related News Coverage, 11(4) J. ETHNIC
STUD. 124 (1984). See also JACKSON, BLACK FAMILIES AND THE MEDIUM OF TELEVISION (1982) (if blacks were more broadly represented in the broadcast workforce, the

quantity and quality of minority-oriented programming could be improved).
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minority audiences.55
Minorities are underrepresented in broadcast employment,
holding only 9.5 percent of management-level jobs555 even
though they compose at least 14.3 percent of the population.5 5 6
Although minority employment increased annually beginning
in 1971, it began to decline in 1983. 557 Over the most recent
five-year period, employment of minorities in the broadcast industry has increased only 1.3 percent. 558 The Commission's
EEO requirements are meant to remedy the disparity, by placing a dual obligation on broadcasters.
A licensee has a responsibility, first, to eliminate employment discrimination and, second, to positively seek to employ
minorities.5 5 9 The Communications Act provides for sanctions
against offending licensees. Such sanctions include the assessment of forfeitures and calling a license into question. If the
latter action is taken, the Commission may grant a renewal for
only a limited time, grant a license on a conditional basis, make
a conditional grant for a limited time, impose a fine of up to
$20,000, or revoke a license.56 0 Further, the Commission may
554. See Honig, RelationshipsAmong EEO, Program Service, and Minority Ownership in BroadcastRegulation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 85 (1983). The positive relationship
between minority ownership and content responsive to minority audiences is present
for stations without minority-oriented formats as well as those with such formats.
555. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
LATIONS FOR

BROADCAST

EMPLOYMENT COMPI-

1983 (1983).

556. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF THE
POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE, SEX AND RACE: 1970-1981, Rpt. No. P-

25, 917 (July, 1982).
557. BROADCAST EMPLOYMENT, supra note 555. Among full-time professionals,
black representation slipped from 8.3% in 1982 to 8.0% in 1983.
558. See Parity for Minorities in the Media: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,and Finance of the Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1983) (statement of Mark Nielson, chairman of the Communications Committee of the Church Federation of Greater
Chicago).
559. See FCC Equal Employment Opportunities, 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080, which
provides:
Equal opportunity in employment shall be afforded by all licensees . . . to
qualified persons, and no person shall be discriminated against in employment because of race, color, religion, national origin or sex.
Id. Section 73.2080(b) requires all licensees to "establish, maintain, and carry out a
positive and continuing program" of recruitment, hiring, and training for women and
minorities. See also National Black Media Coalition v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 775 F.2d 342, 344-347 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing dual obligation placed on
licensees by EEO regulations).
560. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 312, 309, 503(b).
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cooperate with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, an entity created under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, to provide individual remedies. 6 '
The FCC was the first federal agency to promulgate an equal
opportunity employment program.5 6 2 Enforcement of the
rules, however, is entirely another matter. 63 The rules require
that a challenger show a disparity between the percentage of
minorities employed and the percentage of minorities in the
workforce that is beyond a "zone of reasonableness. 5 64 The
"'zone" may find reasonable such disparities as seven percent
minority employment in a 24 percent minority workforce.56 5
The Commission's discretion in arriving at a reasonable "zone"
561. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(i). Such cooperation is important to elimination of employment discrimination in the whole of the broadcasting industry, as the Commission's authority is limited to indirect enforcement, and provides no individual
remedies for employees. In a 1978 memorandum of understanding, the Commission
stated that:
a general grant of authority to regulate an industry in the "public interest"
does not authorize the regulation of employment discrimination per se, and
that discriminatory practice may be considered only to the extent that such
conduct is directly related to the agency's statutory responsibilities.
See Memorandum of Understanding, quoted in Kalmanir, A Strange Animal: The
FCCand BroadcastEEO, 6 CoMM. & L. 25, 34 (1984). The EEOC, then, can provide
direct relief for individuals, while the Commission can deal with individual grievances
only through regulation of a licensee's conduct. See Kalmanir, supra, at 35.
562. In 1968, four years after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq., the Commission announced its anti-discrimination policy. Discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could be grounds for denial
of a license renewal. See Nondiscrimination Employment Practices of Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968). In the policy announcement, the Commission
stressed that simple compliance was not sufficient; it asked for "a commitment going
beyond the letter of the policy and attuned to its spirit and the demands of the times."
Id. at 774-75. The Commission also recognized a parallel connection between minority employment and ability to carry out ascertainment and programming responsive
to minority groups. Id. at 770.
Benjamin Hooks, the first black Commissioner and now director of the NAACP,
wrote in 1976: "Considering the FCC's singularity among federal regulatory agencies
in even having a full-scale EEO program, its efforts should be recognized." Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 60
F.C.C.2d 226 (1976).
563. Commissioner Hooks recognized this fact as well, as he wrote that "it was not
so much that our rules were deficient, but our enforcement." Id.
564. Id. at 228.
565. In Stone v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
7% black employment in a 24% black area was approved; in Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 13 (1976), 20.8% female employment in a 36% female area
was approved; and in Avco Broadcasting Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 48 (1975), 27.7% MexicanAmerican employment in a 44.2% Mexican-American area was approved.
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is said to be almost infinite.566 Conscientious enforcement of
EEO standards has been forced on the Commission by federal
courts, which demanded an end to its "curious neutrality in
favor of the licensee" and asked for "more exacting standards. '5 7 Any sanctions for violations of EEO standards have
been rare. 68
Whether EEO standards will, in fact, result in minority-oriented programming depends almost entirely upon whether minority employees will rise to levels within the broadcasting
organization that allow them to influence the course of the licensee's programming efforts. The Commission has acknowledged that "the effectiveness of this policy in achieving the
Commission's public interest objective of diversity will depend
in part on the ability and willingness of minority [employees]
to provide minority programming. ' 569 Similarly, researchers

stress that the position of the minority employee is critical to
her ability to influence programming. 70 If minority employees
are not in positions where they are able to influence programming, however, the EEO's programming goal may be an empty
one.
566. See Kalmanir, supra note 561, at 40. The concept has since been refined. A
"contracting zone" theory may allow the Commission to find a ratio of minority employment to offend its EEO standards even though the same ratio had earlier survived
scrutiny. See National Org. of Women v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 555 F.2d
1002, 1018 n.108 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also National Black Media Coalition v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 775 F.2d 342, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the zone is a dynamic
construct, "which contracts as licensees are given time to implement [the] antidiscrimination rules"), quoting Mission Central Co., 54 F.C.C.2d 581, 586 (1975), aff'd,
83 F.C.C.2d 330 (1980).
567. See, e.g., Black Broadcasting Coalition v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
556 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
568. The Commission prefers the milder sanctions in its arsenal, including shortterm renewals (see Communico Oceanic Corp., 70 F.C.C.2d 1306, 1309-10 (1978) and
renewals contingent upon submission of reports to the Commission (see Rahall
Broadcasting of Ind., Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 295, 300-01 (1977)). Further, the Commission's
willingness to accept subsequent remediation have made non-renewal a rare event.
See Weissman, supra note 551, at 577.
569. See Deregulation of Radio, Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, 44 Fed. Reg.
57,636, 57,660 (1979).
570. See NOBLE, BLACK IS THE COLOR OF MY TV TUBE (1981). Noble concludes
that television could be more responsive to minorities by hiring more black assignment editors, producers, and news directors. A lower-level minority employee could
be frustrated in her attempts to produce minority-oriented programming by white
biases in the selection process. Another view acknowledges that lower-level reporters
are critical as well, because a black reporter in a white institution may keep an editor
sensitive to black issues. See Symposium, American Blacks as Seen by the Media,
16(1) CENTER 8 (1983).

No. 3/4]

DEREGULATION-MINORITY PROGRAMMING

435

The very scale on which the Commission measures minority
employment permits the aggregation of employment positions
and thus makes it difficult to determine whether minority employees have risen to positions that could influence programming. Gains made in minority employment may present an
illusion of progress5 71 because the form used by the Commission aggregates all levels of employment. 7 2 Further, the licensee is given broad discretion to classify its employees by its own
definitions, raising obvious problems of covert discrimination.57 3 Proposed revisions in EEO forms by the Fowler Commission exacerbate these problems by allowing part-time
employees to be aggregated with full-time employees. 5 74 Despite a slight gain in employment, "minorities are employed in
lower echelon jobs and are just not present on levels where
management and program decisions are made. '57 5 Minorities
are often employed in areas having no connection with pro571. See Kalmanir, supra note 561, at 43. The author concludes that an "illusion
of progress" is presented because the total number of minorities employed is up, even
though most hiring is in low-level positions. Minorities still constitute 15.1% of the
broadcast workforce overall, a figure at least 5% from parity with minority
population.
572. Form 395 requires the percentage and number of minority employees in all
positions and in the upper four positions (officials and managers, professionals, technicians, and sales). Obviously, technicians and salespeople do not influence programming. Only stations with more than 50 employees must report job titles. See FCC
Form 395; see also Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of
Broadcast Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d 226 (1976) [hereinafter Nondiscrimination] and
FCC Equal Employment Opportunities, 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1981).
573. See New York Times Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 695, 699 (1977), in
which the Commission found that "the placement of employees, including minority
group employees, in particular positions is and must remain a part of the licensee's
discretion." The Commission eschewed any standard showing underutilization or employment of minorities in menial positions. See Nondiscrimination,supra note 572, at
228.
574. See FCCDrawsFire Over EEO Plans,BROADCASTING, Feb. 10, 1986, at 82. The
Commission proposal was designed to ease the "equal employment opportunity burdens of broadcasters," id., and would allow full- and part-time employees to be aggregated. It would also require no EEO reporting from licensees with up to five
employees, one over the current limit, and the Commission would change its forms to
"emphasize that its primary concern is EEO efforts, not numbers." Id. See also FCC
Wants to Change EEO Standards,BROADCASTING, Nov. 18, 1985, at 42 (Fowler stating
that Commission is "walking on eggshells in constitutional terms" by granting any
preferences for minority employees) and Merely a Beginning, BROADCASTING, Nov.
18, 1985, at 7 (stating that "key FCC source" reported that Reagan administration
officials in the Commission on Civil Rights, Department of Justice, and Office of Management and Budget intended to attack even the less stringent proposals of the current Commission).
575. See Parityfor Minoritiesin the Media: Hearings on H.R. 1155 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
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gramming, and an increase in total minority employment may
have no influence on the station's programming.5 7 6
The efficacy of the Commission's EEO standards, then, is dependent on the enforcement and measurement practices
The standards set by the Comadopted by the Commission.
mission are open to the criticism that they are "vague, variable,
evasive and easily met, even by broadcasters who actively discriminate against protected minorities and women. 5 78 If the
deregulatory stance at the Commission produces an even
greater reliance on licensee discretion, the shift could result in
an abandonment of encouraging responsive programming
through minority employment.5 7 9
Such an abandonment is almost certainly taking place. As
early as 1977, the Commission attempted to exempt stations
employing ten or fewer employees from EEO reporting requirements. 8 ° Between 1976 and 1984, the Commission desigComm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) (statement of Cong.
Collins).
576. The appearance of progress fostered by the Commission's record-keeping
practices may produce a complacency that could actually hamper further gains by
minorities. Indeed, the Commission has explicitly stated that parity is not its goal.
See Nondiscrimination,supra note 572.
577. An early study found that the Commission's indirect modes of dealing with
individual complaints-by jeopardizing license renewal rather than granting individual remedies-has the potential to bring about statistically significant increases in minority employment at stations challenged under the rules. See Honig, Effects of the
FCC's Petition-to-DenyProcess on Minority Employment in the BroadcastingIndustry, (April, 1974), University of Rochester Graduate School of Management, Systems
Analysis Program,Working PaperSeries S7402 discussed in Honig, The FCCand its
Fluctuating Commitment to Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 27 HOW.
L.J. 859 (1984).
578. Bowie & Whitehead, The Federal Communications Commission's Equal Employment Opportunity Regulation-An Agency in Search of a Standard, 5 BLACK
L.J. 313, 314 (1975). A 1984 study revealed that the methods of enforcement and data
collection are unchanged since the Bowie & Whitehead observation; see Kalmanir,
supra note 561. The authors observed that among licensees having 10 or more fulltime employees in cities with at least 5% minority population, 378 "employ absolutely
no minority full-time employees." Bowie & Whitehead, supra, at 314.
579. It is perhaps telling that the sole objection to the Commission's adoption of
EEO regulations in 1968 came from the National Association of Broadcasters, the industry's predominant trade association and a staunch advocate of licensee self-regulation. The NAB argued that the Commission had no jurisdiction over civil rights. See
Bowie, "The Communications Act of 1978": An Expression of CongressionalWill to
End Civil Rights and Equal Employment in the Broadcast Industry, in T. HAIGHT,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE CITIZEN: PUBLIC INTEREST PERSPECTIVES ON
THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT REWRITE 146 (1979).

580. See United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 560 F.2d
529 (2d Cir. 1977), in which the court held the Commission could not exempt small

No. 3/4]

DEREGULATION-MINORITY PROGRAMMING

437

nated no hearings on complaints of EEO violations, even
though hundreds of such complaints were filed.5 8 ' Even a complaint stating that more than twenty large stations in urban areas with large minority populations had not had any minority
employees for more than six years was ignored by the Commission. 582 Indeed, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently found that the Commission's lenient treatment of a
licensee with an egregious history of EEO violations "was not
faithful to either the letter or the spirit of its precedents. 5 8 3
Even the implementation of the congressionally mandated
EEO provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 has been criticized as unconstitutional by other actors in
the Reagan Administration and has only recently been undertaken,5 4 despite the dismal minority employment history of
stations; the Commission had previously found substantial underrepresentation of minorities in broadcasting and had not reversed that finding, thus a policy eliminating
EEO requirements for two-thirds of the nation's stations could not be rational.
581. The last hearing designated by the Commission occured in Federal Broadcasting System, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 356 (1976). The case was an obvious one, as the station
did not have a written affirmative action program and had had no minority employees
since 1951.
582. Letter from Laurence Harris to Pluria Marshall, Chairman, National Black
Media Coalition (Sept. 23, 1982), cited in Honig, The FCCand its FluctuatingCommitment to Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities,27 How. L.J. 859, 868 (1984).
583. See National Black Media Coalition v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 775
F.2d 342, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Commission had considered improvements in minority employment made by a licensee after the expiration of the term in which the
licensee was accused of EEO noncompliance by minority groups. Under Rust Communications Group, Inc., 73 F.C.C.2d 39 (1979), aff'd sub nom. Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 670 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1981), post-term
improvements were held to be non-probative of a licensee's true minority employment conduct because the licensee is on explicit notice that its behavior is being monitored. Considering improvements under such circumstances "is akin to
congratulating an ex-speeder for driving 55 miles per hour when surrounded on all
sides by police cars each going 50 miles per hour." National Black Media Coalition, 775
F.2d at 356 n.18, (quoting Appellant's Reply Brief at 10 n.7). Each of the Commission's proffered justifications for granting renewal of the license based on post-term
improvements was rejected and Rust was reaffirmed by the court. The court noted, in
fact, that the sudden improvement in the licensee's minority hiring made renewal
even less supportable by casting substantial doubt on the validity of the licensee's
earlier claims that it could not hire minorities because of financial and geographic
limitations. Id. at 357.
584. Objections to the Commission's use of EEO processing guidelines to monitor
cable EEO performance came from the Reagan-appointee-dominated Commission on
Civil Rights and the Department of Justice, who claimed the guidelines constituted
unlawful "quotas." See EEO for Cable, BROADCASTING, Aug. 26, 1985, at 7. The standards were finally implemented, albeit in less stringent form. See Cable Compliance,
BROADCASTING, Sept. 23, 1985, at 10. The Commission stated that if "good faith efforts
to recruit and employ minorities" are made, "certification will be granted irrespective
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the cable industry.5 85 The growth of deregulation has witnessed a concomitant diminishment in the efficacy of equal employment opportunity enforcement before the Commission.
3. Public Participation
The licensing process has sought to serve the public interest
by involving the public in its weighing of the rights of the affected parties. 8 Access to this right of participation, discussed
earlier,-8 7 has allowed minority groups to successfully influence
the course of local broadcasting.
By filing petitions to deny license renewals, minorities can
influence the programming choices of broadcast licensees. The
petitioning process is a "secondary level of access" to the
broadcast media 588 and gives a voice to those who have little
power in the broadcast marketplace. 89 The right of the public
to participate has been guarded against encroachment from an
antagonistic Commission,9 and has been seen as sufficiently
important to strike down a deregulatory policy that could make
the exercise of the participatory right more difficult. 9 ' This
of any disparity between the number of minorities and women employed in specific
job categories and their respective proportions in the relevant labor market." Id.
585. After empirical study, Engsberg concluded that "the flow of minorities and

women into cable employment has been more sluggish than anticipated, albeit not for
a lack of interest on the part of job candidates." Engsberg, Cable Employment: Where

Have All Those New Jobs Gone?, 15 PERSP. 51, 51 (1983). White males dominate the
decisionmaking jobs in the industry; the few minority jobs that exist are in sales or
technical work. The picture is not improving, as cable employment increased by 14%
in 1980-1981, but minority employment increased only 2%. See also ENGSBERG, WALTERS & NETTINGHAM, CABLE SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT: 1980-1981 (1982).
586. In United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n [I], 359 F.2d
994, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966), then-Judge Burger found that "consumers are generally
among the best vindicators of the public interest."
587. See supra notes 140-314 and accompanying text.
588. See Rosen, CommunicationsLaw, 1982 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 183; Gottfried v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 655 F.2d 297, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1144 (1982).
589. See infra notes 14-83 and accompanying text.
590. In United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n [II], 425 F.2d
543, 547-48 (D.C. Cir. 1969), then- Judge Burger held that "the commission and the
examiners have an affirmative duty to assist in the development of a meaningful record which can serve as the basis for the evaluation of the licensee's performance of his
duty to serve the public interest."
591. In United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n [III], 707 F.2d
1413, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the Court held that the public's "unassailable right to participate" cannot be "undermined indirectly by [an] inadequately explained refusal to
require licensees to make available information on their issue-responsive
programming."
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inparticipatory mechanism is one means by which the public
5 92
procedures.
licensing
in
ascertained
directly
be
may
terest
Public participation depends greatly on Commission discretion for its efficacy. Although the Commission has built institutional barriers around the right of participation that are
difficult to surmount,59 3 the process has held great promise for
minority groups whose programming needs may not be dealt
with in the commercial market.5 9 4
4.

The FairnessDoctrine

The fairness doctrine is a qualified provision of access, which
requires that "discussion of public issues be presented on
broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues . . . be
given fair coverage. ' 595 Broadcasters have two duties under the
doctrine: to devote a reasonable amount of time to the presentation of public issues, and to provide a reasonable opportunity
for presenting contrasting views on controversial issues of public importance.5 9 6
Although the fairness doctrine is not designed specifically for
the use of minorities, it is a "useful tool for minorities seeking a
forum for issues important to them. '597 It is among the pri592. See PROwIrr, GUIDE TO CITIZEN ACTION IN RADIO AND TELEVISION 1 (1971)
("that amount of concentrated power demands responsibility to and regulation by the
public-the people").
593. See Weissman, The FCC and Minorities: An Evaluation of FCC Policies
Designed to Encourage ProgrammingResponsive to Minority Needs, 16 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 561, 571 (1981), stating that minorities seeking to challenge licensees
"encounter virtually insurmountable barriers." Accord Note, Use of Petitions by Minority Groups to Deny BroadcastLicense Renewals, 1978 DUKE L.J. 271, 277.
594. Public participation coalesces minority interests, and inspires citizen-group action in the Commission's processes. See R. LABUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER
SEIGE: THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 104 (1981); See also The Pool of
Experts on Access, BROADCASTING, Sept. 20, 1981, at 36.
595. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367,
369 (1969).
596. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, Fairness Report Regarding
Handling of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,375 (1974). A fair amount of licensee discretion exists under the doctrine. As the requirements are stated in the Commission's
Report on Editorializingin 1949:
The licensee, in applying the fairness doctrine, is called upon to make reasonable judgments in good faith on the facts of each situation-as to whether a
controversial issue of public importance is involved, as to what viewpoints
have been or should be presented, as to the format and spokesmen to present
the viewpoints, and all the other facets of such programming.
(Quoted in M. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM AND
CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA 420) (1969).

597.

Weissman, The FCC and Minorities:An Evaluation of FCC PoliciesDesigned
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mary tools used by organized interest groups in negotiating for
balanced coverage of issues in the electronic media.5 98 Its use
by minorities attempting to equalize coverage of minority issues is especially appropriate considering the unbalanced history of television's minority coverage. "There is no record that
during the civil rights struggle any black was ever invited to
appear in a discussion on a controversial issue."59' 9 Indeed, the
major case establishing the rights of participation on which minority intervenors rely began as a fairness complaint in response to continual racial discrimination.0 0 In another action,
the Commission ordered a full hearing when a one-sided version of the desegregation controversy was aired.6 '
The doctrine is seldom invoked in the consideration of a
broadcaster's license renewal. 0 2 Further, it is "extremely
rare" for the Commission to require a particular issue of importance to be covered by a licensee.60 3 Although the substantial
to Encourage ProgrammingResponsive to Minority Needs, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 561, 562 n.10 (1981) (citing Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, Deregulation of
Radio, 44 Fed. Reg. 57,636, 57,659 (1979)).
598.

F. ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, PROSPECTS 72 (1984).

Rowan cites an interview with Andrew Jay Schwartzman, executive director of the
Media Access Project, in which Schwartzman credited the doctrine with creating informal relationships between local groups and broadcasters. The actual rate of success of bringing a fairness doctrine suit approaches 1 in 2,000 and the Commission has
only twice endangered license renewals because of violations of the doctrine. Such
figures, however, do not include the success of informal negotiations between groups
and stationowners. See id. at 41, 72-73.
599.

See F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMEND-

MENT 89-102 (1975).
600. In United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966), the Court ordered the Commission to vacate its renewal of WLBT in
Jackson, Mississippi. See supra notes 140-313 and accompanying text.
601. See Radio Station WSNT, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 993, 999 (1971), in which a hearing
was ordered after WSNT aired the Georgia governor's speech opposing desegregation
but refused to devote time to demonstrations by black groups favoring integration.
WSNT was the only station in Sandersville, Georgia, which had a 60% black
population.
602. The only nonrenewal other than WLBT involving the fairness doctrine occurred in Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 565 (1971), aff'd sub nom.
Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 473 F.2d 16
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). The case rested more heavily on
grounds of misrepresentation by the licensee to the Commission. Thus, the Commission has never revoked the license of any station solely for violations of the fairness
doctrine. WLBT's license was not renewed on order of a federal court, and the Brandywine license was not renewed on grounds of misrepresentation. The preferred
sanction for fairness violations, from the Commission's view, is "more speech." M.
GELLER, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN BROADCASTING 5 (1974).

603. See R. LABUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SIEGE 17 (1981).
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sanctions6 0 4 available to the Commission under the doctrine are
seldom used, the existence of the doctrine serves a clear need to
minority audiences. Like participatory rights, the existence of
an access doctrine not only encourages "minority groups
around the country to assert themselves in broadcast matters,"
but provides "practical lessons in how pressure could be
brought, in how the broadcast establishment could be
65
challenged. °
There is little doubt that the current Commission is antagonistic toward the fairness doctrine. In a recent report and order, the Commission claimed that the doctrine disserves the
public interest by chilling public debate and is offensive to the
first amendment. 60 6 Further, the Commission has made stereotyping of minorities a difficult issue to litigate in a fairness
604. The sanctions available to the Commission include admonishing the station in
a letter that is placed in the station's file and considered during renewals, and writing
a letter to the station asking it how it intends to comply with the doctrine on a particular issue. Both sanctions are only meaningful if another offense by the station jeopardizes its license. S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 15 n.28
(1978).
Although the sanctions are advisory, they are seen as weighty by the broadcast industry. "[T]he broadcaster's perception is that his license is at risk." See F. ROWAN,
BROADCAST FAIRNESS: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, PROSPECTS

57 (1984) (quoting Stephen

Nevas, First Amendment Counsel, National Association of Broadcasters). The importance of such a letter to a licensee is testified to by the uproar in the broadcasting
industry after Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 736
(1978), a case which was widely decried in the electronic media as permitting "censorship." Broadcasting Magazine reported that the Commission had been granted the
power to "punish" the electronic press and stated that first amendment protection for
broadcasting was "shattered." See WBAI Ruling: Supreme Court Saves the Worst for
Last, BROADCASTING, July 10, 1978, at 20. See also Seven Dirty Words: Supreme
Court Ruling Raises Fear of Censorship, PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, July 17, 1978, at 84;
Justices Back FCC on Offensive Words, N. Y. Times, July 4, 1978, at 1; FCC Dirty
Words Warning is Upheld, Washington Post, July 4, 1978, at Al.
605. The Pool of Experts on Access, BROADCASTING, September 20, 1971, at 36.
606. In a proceeding approved 4-0 (Commissioner Rivera not participating), the
Commission found that the doctrine inhibits broadcasters from discussing controversial issues of public importance, and that the doctrine infringes on "fundamental constitutional principles." See FairnessDoctrine: The FCC Doesn't Like It, But Says It
Will Be Enforced, BROADCASTING, Aug. 12, 1985, at 30. The report was hailed by the
industry as a brief for a court challenge of the fairness doctrine, see FCCOffers Ammo
for FairnessChallenge, BROADCASTING, Aug. 26, 1985, at 38. Industry lawyers apparently intend to seize upon the proceeding to attempt to overturn the landmark Red
Lion decision, discussed supra at notes 474-77 and accompanying text. See Volunteer,
BROADCASTING, Aug. 12, 1985, at 7 (author of notice of inquiry into fairness doctrine
offers services pro bono to anyone wishing to challenge constitutionality of doctrine).
See also F. ROWAN, supra note 604, at 3 (Commission has sought repeal of the doctrine
before Congress). Additionally, the Commission has indicated that the doctrine will
not apply to some new communications technologies, such as teletext. See FCC Re-
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complaint by holding that the broadcasting of racist programming was not a "discussion" of a controversial issue of public
importance.6 °7 Indeed, recent actions make it clear that even
violently racist broadcasts attacking Jews, blacks, and other minorities will not be actionable under the current Commission."' The fairness doctrine as an access tool available to
minority groups is endangered by a trend toward deregulation.
It is predictable that many of the traditional regulatory devices designed to ensure minority participation in broadcasting
will be undermined by deregulation, which is, by definition, a
movement that is intended to eliminate regulations. The cogent question becomes whether the elimination of rules facilitating the discussion of minority viewpoints is in the public
interest. If a shift in the regulatory paradigm is made, the
Commission must inquire into whether the new paradigm will
provide for minority issues as did the traditional regulatory
structure.

V
Deregulation: Elevating the Market Over the
Public Interest
Traditional regulation of telecommunications has centered
on the public interest requirements placed on broadcast licensees. Deregulation involves a shift in the regulatory paradigm.
It rests on the assumption that the workings of the market will
require licensees to operate in the public interest, and that the
market will do so more efficiently than government intervention. This shift in regulatory philosophy has had an enormous
impact on the actions of the current Commission.
port No. 17,427 (April 1, 1983); see also Neustadt, Skall, & Hammer, The Regulation of
Electronic Publishing,33 FED. COMM. L.J. 331 (1981).
607. Flower City Television Corp., 57 F.C.C.2d 112, 116-17 (1975). In National Org.
of Women v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 555 F.2d 1002, 1012-15 (D.C. Cir.
1977), however, the court indicated (without deciding) that there was a significant
question of whether stereotypical portrayals raised the controversial issue of a group's
place in society.
608. The Commission refused to designate programming issues against KTTL-FM
of Dodge City, Kansas, which had broadcast attacks on Jews, blacks and other minorities. See A Win for FirstAmendment, A Break for Daytimers,BROADCASTING, April
29, 1985, at 38. The station advocated "cleansing the earth" of "black beasts," and
stated: "If a Jew comes near you, run a sword through him." See BroadcastRegulation
Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance,98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (statements of Bob Dole, R-Kan., and
Newton Minow, former FCC chairman).
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The Evolution of the Marketplace Regulation Concept

Although the advent of "marketplace" regulation has been
hailed by current Commission leaders as the trend of future
media regulation, deregulation is not a new or novel concept.
Some forms of deregulation 60 9 have been advocated for decades.61 0 Much of the regulatory reform now -being accomplished by the Commission had its genesis during the 1970s.6 11
The Ferris Commission instigated deregulatory policy, but saw
the loosening of certain restraints as incompatible with goals of
diversity. 1 2 The goal of reform during the 1970s was increasing
competition within the communications industry, by eliminat609. Definitions of deregulation reflect the various degrees of regulatory change
advocated by reformers. It may mean "the removal of choice restriction," "the removal of governmental restrictions on economic activity," the elimination of specific
regulations, or the reduction in effectiveness of a particular program. See B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 418-19 (1980). Overall, deregulation
in communications is seen as "a process of orgranizational reduction which results in
the restriction of bureaucratic power." Heffron, The Federal Communications Commission and BroadcastDeregulation,in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE POLITICAL
PROCESS (J. Havick ed. 1983).
Such phrases describe rather than define. A working definition from the realm of
administrative law provides the most precise sense of the term. Deregulation may be
seen as the demise of "command and control" regulations, by which a regulatory body
requires or proscribes specific conduct by regulated firms. See Honig, The FCCand its
Fluctuating Commitment to Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 27 How.
L.J. 859, 861 n.13 (1984). Remedies for noncompliance with such regulations take the
form of penalties, fines, or denials of licenses and renewals. See Stewart, Regulation,
Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
1256, 1264 (1981). Deregulation lessens the requirements of licensees to varying degrees, depending upon the particular scheme of regulatory reform posited.
The deregulation recommended by most advocates is not complete or full-spectrum
deregulation, but partial decontrol. Partial deregulation encounters less resistance
from those who object to radical breaks with the current regulatory framework. See
Levin, Resistance to Spectrum Deregulation:A Role for Experiments in A PrioriAssessment, in T. GIES & W. SICHEL, DEREGULATION: APPRAISAL BEFORE THE FACT 129
(1982).
610. See Herzel, Public Interest and the Market in Colour Television Regulation,
18 U. CHI. L. REV. 802 (1951), presenting one of the earliest major plans for deregulatory reform. Herzel advocated total elimination of regulation, arguing even that the
military, forest service, amateurs and others should compete on the open market for
frequencies. See also Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1959), presenting an early argument that marketplace regulation is in the
public interest.

611. See Ferris, Direct BroadcastingRules: A Piece of the Video Puzzle, 33 FED.
COMM. L.J. 169 (1981).
612. See id. at 171. Among the restraints seen as necessary by the Ferris Commission were network cross-ownership prohibitions, many of which have been eliminated
by the Fowler Commission. See "Cross-ownership," in Where Things Stand, BROADCASTING, July 1, 1985, at 18, 22.
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ing federal rules that prohibited entry into the market.613
Such targeted deregulation is foreign to the current Fowler
Commission, which seeks wholesale elimination of federal
communications regulations on a broad scale. 614 The Commission has become the flagship of the Reagan Administration's
overarching commitment to lessening government influence in
the marketplace. 615 The Commission has become a zealous

agent of regulatory reform, and its innovations have been swift
and deliberate. 616 The number of actions designed to eliminate
regulatory rules is staggering,61 7 and the speed with which the
Commission has achieved its reform is remarkable. Almost
nine-tenths of all industry regulations have been eliminated altogether.618 The Commission's efforts have not been limited to
613. See Wiley & Neustadt, U.S. CommunicationsPolicy in the New Decade, 32(2)
J. COMM. 22 (1982).
614. Fowler has pledged, presumably to the industry, "to take deregulation to the
limits of existing law." See Middleton, A Clear Signal from the FCC, Nat'l L. J., Jan.
21, 1985, at 1. In so doing, he has eclipsed early attempts at deregulation that eliminated rules in certain areas. Under the Fowler Commission "the focus is shifting: Deregulation is now an assault on all kinds of regulations." Wiley & Neustadt, supra
note 613, at 22.
615. President Reagan has appointed Chairman Fowler, and Commissioners Dawson, Rivera, and Sharp, and has reappointed Commissioner Quello. "The Reagan Administration, due to normal turnover and early resignations, has had a greater impact
on the makeup of the Federal Communications Commission than on any of the other
independent regulatory agencies." Johnson, Technological Abundance and the Future of Video Delivery Service Regulation, 5 COMM. & L. 51, 57 (1983).
616. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has noted the extraordinary speed
at which deregulatory reform has been accomplished. It noted the "rising tide of deregulation" in United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 590 F.2d
1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and recently acknowledged that "since that time, the tide
has become a tidal wave." United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1413, 1442 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The rapidity of the changes has not
escaped Congress's attention. See 129 CONG. REC. H4757 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (Fowler "has pushed the FCC into a headlong rush to'
deregulation").
617. Consider the impact of a recent regulatory agenda of current and projected
rulemakings, which included the following actions: Elimination of Restrictions on
Network-Cable TV Cross Ownership; Repeal of Network Syndication and Financial
Interest Rules; Deregulation of Commercial TV Programming; Radio Deregulation
(2); Repeal of Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules; Deletion of Regional
Concentration of Control Rules; and Deregulation of Noncommercial Radio and TV.
See Unified Agenda, 49 FED. REG. 16,600 (1984).
618. In his four years as chairman, Mark Fowler and his Commission have "addressed more than 250 mass media items and reviewed, changed or deleted 89 percent
of the agency's some 900 mass media rules. In the process, the Commission estimates
that it has reduced the broadcast industry's paperwork burden from 33.5 million
hours to about six million." The Bittersweet Chairmanship of Mark S. Fowler,
BROADCASTING, Feb. 18, 1985, at 39.
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its own rulemaking. It has urged Congress 619 to amend the
Communications Act to replace the "public interest" standard
with a phrase stating that "marketplace forces will normally be
favored over regulation. ' 620 Even though some experts see deregulation as a short-term trend, it is certainly a movement
that has left indelible marks in American communications
regulation.6 2 1
The success of the Fowler Commission in eliminating broadcast regulation may be ascribed to the avidity of its chairman,
Mark Fowler. Four factors characterize Fowler's deregulatory
rationale.6 2 2 First, it is claimed that new forms of technology
have drained the "scarcity" rationale of its meaning, by providing alternative delivery systems by which the public's interest
may be served. In today's market, "technology is an independent variable that makes scarcity a relative concept. '623 The radio spectrum is like other scarce commodities such as capital
and land, none of which are as pervasively regulated as broadcasting.6 2 4 Second, it is asserted that the same rapidity of technological change that has destroyed the scarcity rationale has
619. Legislation to deregulate radio and television has been common in Congress,
as advocates of deregulation seek to codify the reforms of the Fowler administration.
See Dereg Revisited, BROADCASTING, April 1, 1985 (deregulatory legislation being introduced; National Association of Broadcasters lobbies for passage). See also Groundwork Laid for Push Eliminating Broadcast Equal Time, Fairness Rules, Cong. Q.
(June 2, 1984) at 1302 ("Freedom of Expression Act," applying only to radio); Early
Showdown Developing Over Broadcast Deregulation, Cong. Q. (Jan. 21, 1984) at 93
(full deregulation bill passed the Senate in 1983); PactLeads to Hearingson Broadcast
Rules, Cong. Q. (May 28, 1983) at 1050 (House has consistently frustrated Senate efforts to deregulate industry).
620. See FCC Goes for Broke to Free Radio-TV, BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981, at
23.
621. See Perton, The Future of Telecommunications:A Delphi Survey, 31 J. COMM.
177 (1981). Respondents viewed deregulation as a short-term process. More than 66%
of subjects predicted that "deregulation of the entire U.S. broadcasting and telecommunications industry" would never occur, and an additional 9.6% responded that it
could only occur in the "long-term future." Id. at 186-87.
622. It is not unfairly stated that Fowler's pledge "to take deregulation to the limits of existing law" has created an "entrepeneur's paradise." See Middleton, supra
note 614, at 1.
623. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 222. Cf.Geller, Television and Legal
Problems in the Decade of the Eighties,in REDLICH & CRANE, LAW AND TELEVISION
OF THE 80's 3 (1983) ("we are moving in this decade towards a TV of abundance. We
are not there yet"). See also Fowler, 50th Anniversary of the CommunicationsAct:
Introduction, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 71 (1985). The communications "revolution" has
meant an increase in new technologies so vast that the "public trusteeship" model, see
supra note 442, is "no longer appropriate." Government regulation inhibits innovation, technological development, and competition. Id. at 71-72.
624. See Fowler, The Public's Interest, 4 COMM. & L. 51 (1982). "Land, capital, la-
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undermined the regulatory process, and made it impossible for
regulation to serve the public interest. 625 Because new technologies are said to be developing quickly and becoming viable in
the marketplace before the regulatory structure can deal with
them, the marketplace approach posits that it is incorrect to
forestall the availability of new technologies by regulating
them.
Third, Fowler's approach seeks to maximize the first amendment rights of broadcasters by eliminating government obligations of service. Requiring the broadcaster to be a "trustee" for
the public intrudes on its discretion, and should not be allowed. 626 The first amendment rights of listeners to receive

suitable programming 627 will be advanced by such an apbor, and oil" are all scarce, but none are federally regulated. Id. at 53. This argument
follows Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
625. See D. BRENNER & N. RIVERS, FREE BUT REGULATED: CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA LAW (1982). Brenner, Fowler's assistant, finds that three social
forces, technology, economics, and individual discovery, combine to outdistance the
ability of the regulatory process to cope with the media.
A pervasive disrespect for the ability of the regulatory process to cope with change
is at the heart of the writing of many marketplace advocates, who find that "any
movement away from government regulation is laudable." See CENTER FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS STUDIES, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, CHALLENGES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION HANDLING FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 143-44

(1981) (remarks of Sheldon Richmond, Director of Research, Comm. for a Competitive Economy). This disrespect is often coupled with awe at the size of the regulatory
machinery assembled in the United States; currently, 136 federal agencies exist, employing 141,000 and accounting for $8 billion of the federal budget. See R. POOLE,
INSTEAD OF REGULATION: ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1982).
626. See Fowler, supra note 624. Respect for broadcasters' exercise of unfettered
first amendment rights has a primacy in the marketplace approach. "The most compelling reason to dissolve the trusteeship approach, however, goes beyond the fictions

it depends on, even beyond the true facts behind scarcity. This desire comes from the
first amendment to the U.S. constitution." Id. at 54. The need then, is to wean the
government from the trustee concept toward a marketplace approach, "where broadcasters would be free, utterly free, to program." Fowler, The Boom Goes Bust, The
Bust Goes Boom, 6 COMM. & L. 23, 23-24 (1984).
627. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969). The concept of "listeners' rights" has been criticized by former Commissioner Robinson:
As a general conception, the listeners' rights theory makes nonsense of the
first amendment; in fact, it stands it on its head. The first amendment may
indeed belong to everybody ...but it cannot truly belong to everybody unless
it first belongs to each and every particular somebody. To deny the individual right in the name of the collective right transforms the first amendment
from a guarantee of individual freedom into its very oppositive, rule by public
clamor.
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58
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628 because broadcasters
proach,
will respond to viewers' desires
to draw an audience to sell to advertisers.62 9
Fourth, Fowler's lack of concern with the social impact of
deregulatory policy 6 30 is founded on a denial of the social significance of the mass media. Because a "television is just another
appliance-it's a toaster with pictures," regulation is simply not
needed.631 The "appliance" analogy applies equally well to the
telephone.6 3 2 Because the telecommunications market, broadly
defined, is no more societally significant than the kitchen appli633
ance market, regulation is not needed to further social goals.
F.C.C.2d 691, 706-07 (1976) (separate statement of Comm'r Robinson), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
628. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 239 (the free market would allow the
viewers' rights to be served).
629. Fowler has stated that "broadcasters respond to market forces as any other
businesses do." Fowler, Forewardto the Institutefor CommunicationsLaw Studies
of the Catholic University of America, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 523, 523-24 (1983). But see
infra notes 738-65 and accompanying text (deregulated market intensifies the economic function of viewer-as-product to advertiser-as-consumer, rather than the
viewer-as-consumer).
630. The social impact of deregulation has not been studied by the Commission,
even though Fowler was directed to perform a study on the effects of deregulation
several years ago. See Broadcast Regulation: Quantifying the Public Interest Standard, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1983). Timothy Wirth, House
Telecommunications Subcommittee chairman, directed Fowler to provide information on the then-recently deregulated radio market, which Fowler promised to provide within two weeks. Almost two years after Wirth's request, no data on the effects
of radio deregulation had been given to the subcommittee and none seems forthcoming. Interview with Nancy Leach, House Telecommunications Subcommittee (April
15, 1985).
Further, the Commission has instigated no studies on deregulation, even though
radio has been substantially deregulated for four years and has been used as a precedent for television regulation. Letter from James C. McKinney, Chief, Mass Media
Bureau, to Kurt Wimmer (March 21, 1985) (stating that the Commission has not compiled any aggregate data regarding the effects of radio deregulation).
631. See Mayer, FCC Chief's Fears,Fowler Sees Threat in Regulation, Washington
Post, Feb. 6, 1983, at K6, Col. 4. Fowler acknowledges that the media has influence,
but states that "my view is that because something is a powerful medium, it's all the
more reason it should be free." See Middleton, A Clear Signal from the FCC, Nat'l L.
J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 1.
632. Fowler broadened the appliance analogy for use with the telephone. "A telephone is like a clock radio or a toaster. You just plug it in. Why shouldn't this be
open to competitive market forces?" Middleton, supra note 631, at 1.
633. There is evidence that Fowler's lack of conviction of the importance of the
industry he is charged with regulating has not been well received in Congressional
circles. A group of senators "appalled at the indifferent attitude" the Commission has
displayed toward corporate takeovers wrote to Fowler: "If your past tendencies apply
in this instance, you will let forth a huge yawn and say something brilliant like 'the
broadcasting industry is no different than making or selling toasters.' We urge you not

COMM/ENT

L. J.

[Vol. 8

The social impact regulatory rationale is rejected as "inconsistent with a society dedicated to free inquiry and expression."6 3' 4
Under the auspices of these deregulatory justifications,
Fowler has constructed a theory of marketplace "unregulation." Because of a perceived abundance of new technology,
Fowler advocates allowing market competition to determine
the public's needs and the methods broadcasters may use to
serve such needs. 635 An examination of the potential impact
that such a philosophy would have is best accomplished by reviewing the proposed means to the desired ends.
Property rights in the broadcast spectrum would be open to
bidding, under a belief that the highest bidder would produce
the most acceptable service.63 6 Consumers would theoretically
"vote with dollars" to obtain programming they favor.63 7 Both
to do your big yawn in the Turner-CBS matter." Letter from Thomas Eagleton, Wendell Ford, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, James Sasser, Jeff Bingaman and John Exon to
Mark Fowler quoted in CongressionalConcern for CBS, BROADCASTING, April 29,
1985, at 35.
634. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 229.
635. Id. at 222. This method of content determination would return broadcasters'
first amendment rights to parity with their colleagues in the printed media, thus serving national policy. See supra notes 626-29 (first amendment rights of the broadcaster
are paramount). See also supra notes 441-68 (current differing treatment of print and
electronic media under the first amendment).
636. See Fowler, Brenner, supra note 7, at 222. The approach would not immediately use an auction. "The marketplace approach could be most expeditiously introduced to broadcasting by granting existing licensees 'squatter's rights' to their
frequencies." Id. at 224. The broadcaster would have rights to exclusive use in
perpetuity, and thus possess a freely transferable property right subject only to the
impediments ordinarily associated with property ownership. See id. at 221; see also
Bonder, A "Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 36 FED. COMM.
L.J. 27, 28 n.7 (1984).
The resulting property right in the spectrum would encompass the right to exclude
others who might interfere with one's signal. See Minasian, PropertyRights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221,
228 (1975). The locus of interference disputes would shift from Commission jurisdiction to original state-court jurisdiction, as property rights are creatures of state law.
See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). It is not unusual for interference disputes to end in court under current regulation. See New York Clear Channel Daytimer Loses Appeal, BROADCASTING, April 1, 1985, at 75 (Supreme Court
denies review of interference dispute between New York and Minneapolis stations).
See generally Bonder, supra, (citing Jones, Use and Regulation of the Radio Spectrum: Report on a Conference, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 71, 85); Devany, Eckert, Meyers,
O'Hara & Scott, A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic
Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-EngineeringStudy, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1501 (1969).
637. "Voting with dollars" means supporting advertisers who sponsor programming one prefers. The market does not work by producing programming. Rather, it
works by producing audiences to sell to advertisers. Programming that is chosen by
more viewers produces a larger audience and attracts more advertisers, thus perpetu-
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the ownership of the right to broadcast and the programming
that would be broadcast would be determined entirely by the
marketplace, without intervention from the federal government. Ownership could be determined by auction, lottery, or
by allowing free resale of initial licensee grants. 3 8 The latter
approach is seen by Fowler and Brenner to be more practicable,
as it would disrupt current service less and not frustrate expectations of current licensees.6 39 Sale of licenses would be fully
deregulated, allowing windfall profits to fall to current licenseholders.6 40 New assignments could be made by lottery or
auction.6 4 '
Content and business restrictions would be 'eliminated entirely. Any government regulation that could influence content would be eliminated, from ascertainment requirements to
the fairness doctrine. 642 Any restrictions on cross-ownership or
multiple-station ownership would be eliminated, to further effective market functioning and to make alternative networks
more viable.64 3 Any remnants of public interest influence by
the government would subsist in the collection of spectrumating the content choice. See OWEN, BEEBE & MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 4
(1974). This concept of viewer choice, however, inevitably ignores the economic reality that some audiences are more desired by advertisers than others. See id., discussing demographics of age, sex, and income composition; see also infra notes 738-765 and
accompanying text.
638. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 243.
639. See id. Although auction or lottery would have been ideal at the beginning of
broadcast regulation, the authors state that current use of such techniques would be
unfair to those who currently hold licenses and to their customers, whose service
would be disrupted.
640. See id. Some windfall profits have already been recovered in limited resale of
licenses, and the capital-gains tax would recapture part of the windfall to government
rather than wholly to the licensee. See id. & n.158.
641. See id. at 244. Lottery and auction would be used for new licenses and new
technologies. Lotteries are currently being used to develop a system of license distribution for low-power television, as well as for multi-channel, multi-point distribution
systems. See FCCReleases MMDS Order, BROADCASTING, Feb. 11, 1985, at 56. Fowler
has publicly advocated Congressional sanction to allow the Commission to auction all
"future releases of spectrum." See In Brief, BROADCASTING, April 15, 1985, at 197.
Indeed, the Mass Media Bureau recommended lottery allocation for new FM allotments resulting from the Docket 80-90 decision. See FM Flood Control, BROADCASTING, Jan. 21, 1985, at 7.
642. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 244. Government content oversight
"arrogates editorial responsibilities protected by the first amendment and interferes
with the functioning of market forces as well." Id.
643. See id. at 246. Fewer restrictions upon multiple ownership would lead to
greater diversity in programs, the authors conclude, because new group owners could
combine to produce viable alternative networks.
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and disposition of user fees to support the public
broadcasting system.6 4 5 Under the Fowler scheme, much of the
remaining public-interest programming responsibility would
fall on public broadcasters. Unfortunately, such broadcasters
are currently the least able to viably produce such content and
distribute it to a large audience. 646 The user-fee system would
seek to bolster the viability of public broadcasters by funding
their programming, at the expense of the type of ideologically
pure market system that would abhor such an artificial crosssubsidy.6 4 7
user

1.

DeregulatoryRulemaking: Changing Theory
into Reality

The Fowler theory of marketplace regulation has rapidly
been transformed into reality by the current Commission. In
five years, it has eliminated almost 90 percent of the regulations built up over the first 50 years of broadcast regulation. 48
There is every indication that the remaining years of the Commission's tenure will be just as impressive a testimony to its
ability to translate deregulatory theory into regulatory fact.64 9
644. See id. at 247-49. Because frequency allocations would become a property
right in an unregulated marketplace, user fees would be appropriate to recoup the
exclusivity which government has given freely in the past.
645. See id. at 250-55. The fees would be used to promote the public interest by
funding public broadcasting. The FCC has recommended a schedule of cost-of-regulation fees to Congress. The Commission estimates that it could collect $50 million in
the first year, which is an amount equal to almost half its annual budget. See FCC

ProposesFee Structure, BROADCASTING, March 11, 1985, at 42.
646. See Bonder, A "Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 36
FED. COMM. L.J. 27, 46 (1984) (Fowler approach would require public broadcasters to
provide public-interest programming. "[P]ublic broadcasters already have a difficult
time meeting their budgetary needs without being put at such a disadvantage"); see
also Public Broadcasting:A Survivor, BROADCASTING, April 15, 1985, at 163 (public
broadcasters are struggling for funds upon which to exist after Reagan administration
budget cuts).
647. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 255 ("It may seem somewhat incongruous to require broadcasters to finance a government-sanctioned competitor").
648. See supra notes 614-21 and accompanying text.
649. Henry Rivera, a Democratic commissioner identified as the "chief advocate of
minority rights and causes" on the Commission, has resigned. It is likely that he will
not be replaced by a minority, although Rivera's seat has been held by a minority
since the early 1970s. See No Reserved Seat, BROADCASTING, Sept. 16, 1985, at 7. Upon
resignation, Rivera was described by Mickey Leland (D-Tex.) as "a voice of reason
and compassion on virtually every issue affecting those groups traditionally underrepresented or ill-served by the marketplace approach to regulation." See Rivera Applauded as He Leaves, BROADCASTING, Aug. 12, 1985, at 31. Rivera's resignation also
lessens the influence of commissioners Jim Quello and Mimi Dawson, similarly
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Most visible among the Fowler Commission's deregulatory
efforts are the completion of the Ferris Commission's deregulation of radio 650 and its own deregulation of commercial television.611 Inquiry into radio deregulation was instigated in 1979,
and sought "potential reduction or elimination of regulations
'652
no longer appropriate to certain marketplace conditions.
The Commission received more than 22,000 replies, which overwhelmingly opposed deregulation.6 3 In 1981, the Commission
issued a Report and Order largely deregulating radio. 4 The
Report eliminated quantitative guidelines for nonentertainment programming, eliminated ascertainment procedures,
eliminated guidelines for commercial time, and eliminated programming logs. 655 Except for the latter provision, each revision
has been judicially approved.6 5 6
Television deregulation was instigated in 1983, using the success of radio deregulation as a paradigm. 657 The same four areas were sought to be eliminated, and the long-form audit,
which provided substantial information to the Commission, was
targeted for elimination. 5
In 1984, a Report and Order was
issued which substantially deregulated commercial television
in each of the five areas of inquiry.659 Reconsideration and judiknown for advocating rights of women and minorities. Rivera's departure will allow
Fowler to "solidify control" of the Commission with a "more dependable third voteassuming [the] White House is cooperative." See Eyeing Exit, BROADCASTING, March
4, 1985, at 7. There is every indication that the White House will cooperate. Fowler has
stated that "so long as Ronald Reagan remains President... the government will be a
spectator-not a dictator-when it comes to content [regulation]." See Fowler Sings
Marketplace Praises, BROADCASTING, April 22, 1985. The five-member Commission
operates on a three-vote majority. A conservative consolidation of control is almost
certain to increase the velocity of the trend toward deregulation.
650. See Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1014-15 (1981).
651. See Deregulation of Television, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984).
652. See Deregulation of Radio, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, 73
F.C.C.2d 457, para. 2 (1979).
653. See Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d at 972.
654. See id.
655. See id.; see also Deregulation of Radio, Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d
930 (1984), appeal docketed sub nom.United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, No. 84-1239 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 1984) (eliminating program logs after
remand); Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981) (discussing issues
raised by petitions for reconsideration and clarifying certain aspects of the decision).
656. See United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 707 F.2d
1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983), discussed infra notes 690-711 and accompanying text.
657. See Deregulation of Television, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 94 F.C.C.2d
678 (1983).
658. See id.
659. See Deregulation of Television, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984).

COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 8

cial approval are pending.66 ° In both radio and television deregulation, a "bedrock obligation" to serve the public interest is
said to remain with broadcast licensees. 6 61 The changes lie
more in determining how the public-service obligation would
be met than in eliminating the necessity to provide public-interest programming. 662
In radio deregulation, the Commission justified its action by
pointing to the changed nature of the radio marketplace. The
number of stations had risen from 583 in 1934 to 8,654 in 1983.663
Additionally, radio's function in the telecommunications marketplace had changed. It became a secondary medium of information because of television, as well as a specialized medium of
news and entertainment.6 6 4 As such, market forces would
work to produce programming the public desired.6 6 5
In television deregulation, however, the availability of another established medium was not available as a deregulatory
justification. As television is the primary medium of telecommunications in the United States,66 6 television deregulation
could not be premised on the existence of another medium, as
was radio deregulation. 6 7 Rather, the competition that would
premise an efficient deregulated market was that of the nascent market in new communications technologies. 6 8 Because
660. Petitions for reconsideration have been filed, and appeals undoubtedly will
follow. See Petitions for Reconsideration in Docket No. 83-670 (Telecommunications
Research and Action Center and Henry Geller, petitioners) (1985).
661. See Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1077 "Our action here, however, does not
constitute a retreat from our concern with the programming performance of television station licensees. Thus, as in related actions ... we are by this Order retaining
the obligation of licensees to provide programming that responds to issues of concern
to the community." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Deregulation of Radio, Report and
Order, 84 F.C.C.2d at 1022 (licensee has a "bedrock obligation" to "discuss issues of
concern to its community of license").
662. See Deregulation of Television, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1157-58 (Rivera, Comm'r, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
663. See Deregulation, 73 F.C.C.2d at 484-86.
664. See id. at 486-90.
665. See id. at 491-97. The competitive forces of the new marketplace would be
more responsive to the public than the old regulatory system. Indeed, continued governmental intervention would restrict the flexibility of radio stations to respond to
their audiences. Id.
666. See Multiple Ownership of Broadcast Stations, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 95 F.C.C.2d 360, 404 (1983) (Rivera, Comm'r, dissenting), stating that "television is
the dominant information and entertainment medium for all Americans . . . Television is not characterized by the abundance and ownership diversity that exists in
radio."
667. See Deregulation,73 F.C.C.2d at 486-90.
668. See Deregulation of Television, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 94 F.C.C.2d
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such technologies are "just beginning to assert themselves," the
Commission abandoned this justification on issuance of a final
report and order, premising its action instead on the first
amendment concerns continually expressed by its chairman.6 6 9
Other aspects of broadcasting have also been the subject of
substantial deregulatory efforts. Renewal procedures have
been pared down from long-form renewal applications to fivequestion postcard renewals, 670 and the Commission is investigating strategies to allow renewal without any consideration of
past program content.6 7 1 Ascertainment requirements were deleted for small radio and television markets even before fullscale deregulation was implemented. 672 Rules limiting regional
concentration of ownership have been eliminated,6 7 3 as have
many cross-ownership 674 and multiple ownership 67 5 rules.
Less visible aspects of broadcast regulation have also been
eliminated. Rules prohibiting licensees from falsifying ratings
and from using stations to promote non-broadcast business in678, para. 27 (1983). The Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984), admits that it is
premature to rely upon new communications technologies before they are viable upon
a nationwide basis. See id. at 1084, para. 23 n.38.
669. See id.; see also Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, passim.
670. See Revision of Application for Renewal of License of Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM, and Television Licensees, 87 F.C.C.2d 1127 (1981).
671. Both Commissioner Mimi Dawson and Chairman Mark Fowler have stated
that the Commission will concoct standards for "renewal expectancy" that will not be
based on content, a long-held goal of the Chairman. See End to Content Criterion,
BROADCASTING, April 15, 1985, at 7; What's New at the FCC, BROADCASTING, April 22,
1985, at 58. One mechanism contemplated is a plan to base renewal solely on whether
the incumbent complied with non-programming-related rules. See End to Content
Criterion,supra.
The character of a licensee has traditionally been open to Commission examination
upon renewal. See RKO General, Inc., 78 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980); see also Sharp & Lively,
Can the Broadcasterin the Black Hat Ride Again? "Good Character"Requirements
for BroadcastLicensees, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 173 (1980). The character related rules
upon which reliance would be placed are also being targeted for elimination by
Fowler. See Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 87
F.C.C.2d 836 (1981); see also CharacterCount, BROADCASTING, June 10, 1985, at 7;
More Dereg on Way, BROADCASTING, May 13, 1985, at 7 ("FCC's hope is to confine its
perusals of license character to broadcasting conduct or relevance. 'The idea is to get
away from trying to cure all of the ills in the world through broadcasting' ").
672. See Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants: Small
Market Exception, 86 F.C.C.2d 798 (1981).
673. See ReconsiderationDenied, BROADCASTING, June 3, 1985, at 85 (Commission
denied reconsideration of elimination of regional concentration rule. "[W]e continue
to believe that the public interest is best served by repeal of the regional rule").
674. See Crossownership,in Where Things Stand, BROADCASTING, July 1, 1985, at
18, 22.
675. See 12-12-12. FaitAccompli, BROADCASTING, Dec. 31, 1984, at 35.
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terests were eliminated, as were other rules governing licensee
business conduct." 6 The Commission has proposed to eliminate required filing of network affiliation and transcription
contracts, despite unanimous opposition.67 ' Finally, even technical rules preventing interference are being targeted for elimination, amidst concerns that the marketplace will not control
technical aspects of broadcasting.678
Any overall appraisal of the Fowler Commission's activities
must conclude that the actions taken have been ideologically
consistent and aimed toward a singular goa16 79-transferring
the locus of industry control from government to the industry
itself.6s 0 The Fowler Commission has been swift and effective

in its efforts, largely due to the enthusiasm of its Chairman.
The value of this stance has not been lost on the broadcasting
industry, which holds Fowler in a respect bordering on papal
reverence."' There can be little doubt that the marketplace
theory has been largely converted into regulatory fact.
676. Other rules targeted include those regarding fraudulent billing, combination
advertising rates, outside interests of station employees, false and deceptive advertising, and contests and promotions. See A Day of Deregulation,BROADCASTING, Jan. 21,
1985, at 35. The Commission refused to reconsider its decision upon petition of the
Telecommunications Research and Action Center. See In Brief,BROADCASTING, May
27, 1985, at 113.
677. See Keep It, BROADCASTING, April 1, 1985, at 78. Group W, Fisher Broadcasting, and the Media Access Project all asked the Commission to retain the requirement. Group W stated that "the simple filing requirement which the commission is
proposing to eliminate is precisely the type of nonintrusive, nonpaperwork-producing
regulation which the commission should be relying upon to foster the efficient functioning of the competitive marketplace." Id.
678. See Technical Deregulation:The Last Frontier?, BROADCASTING, Feb. 18, 1985,
at 105. James McKinney, Mass Media Bureau Chief, said that the action "was just the
start... we're going to be doing these sorts of items in all of the mass media services."
Whether the market can control technical aspects of broadcasting is open to question,
considering the history of the Commission's reliance on the marketplace to choose an
AM stereo system that is in the public interest. Twenty years after the technology
became feasible and eight years after the Commission began to consider it, a viable
system has not evolved. See Meyer, The FCCand AM Stereo: A DeregulatoryBreach
of Duty, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 265 (1985).
679. Commissioner Mimi Dawson stated that Fowler "had a clear goal, he had a
clear philosophy, and he knew how and why he was doing it." See The Bittersweet
Chairmanshipof Mark S. Fowler, BROADCASTING, Feb. 18, 1985, at 39.
680. Fowler distills his contributions to one goal: "attempting to maximize freedom to the maximum extent possible .. attempting to apply the clear wording of the
first amendment to this great industry ....
See id. at 41.
681. During a recent speech to an industry group, Fowler received standing ovations both before and after his speech, which was interrupted by applause seven times.
See Fowler Sings Marketplace Praises,BROADCASTING, April 22, 1985. See also The
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JudicialReview of DeregulatoryRulemaking

Although appellate courts reviewing deregulatory rulemaking have not accorded the activities or their instigator the same
exalted status as has the broadcasting industry, the trend toward marketplace regulation has fared well in judicial tests.
Courts have held that the marketplace approach is a permissible mechanism by which the Commission may meet its regulatory charter, but several reservations have been interposed.
The most important endorsement of the marketplace approach came from the Supreme Court in 1981, in the WNCN
Listeners Guild decision.6 82 The Commission had concluded
that "reliance on the market is the best method of promoting
diversity in [radio] entertainment formats," but the court of appeals, upon review, insisted upon Commission intervention if
"there is evidence that market forces have deprived the public
of a 'unique' format."6'8 3 The Supreme Court, however, found
that the Commission's decision to cease regulation of radio format changes in favor of relying on the assumption that market
forces will produce suitable formats was entitled to substantial
judicial deference.6 8 4 The decision allows the Commission to
satisfy its public interest obligation by implementing a general
marketplace policy, rather than examining each individual applicant for a format change.68 5
Although the decision allows the Commission to refuse to review specific market failures, the Supreme Court did interpose
Bittersweet Chairmanship,supra note 679, at 39 (Fowler is "the man who turned
broadcast regulation around-and who made the marketplace a law unto itself").
It is perhaps telling that the industry has backed the Fowler initiatives wholly, but
has stopped short of supporting spectrum-usage fees. The attractiveness of a free
marketplace for the benefit of the public interest apparently halts when it interferes
with the moneymaking potential of the industry. See FCC Proposes Fee Structure,
BROADCASTING, March 11, 1985, at 42.
682. Federal Communications Comm'n v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582
(1981).
683. See WNCN Listeners Guild v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 610 F.2d 838
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
684. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,
596 (1981).
685. The significance of WNCN is not overstated by Heffron, who wrote that
"although that decision did not guarantee that all FCC deregulation efforts would be
upheld, the possibility that at least some of them would withstand legal challenges
was considerably increased." Heffron, The Federal Communications Commission
and Broadcast Deregulation, in HAVICK, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1983). See also FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 815 (1982); and Edwards,

Judicial Review of Deregulation,11 N. KY. L. REV. 229, 267 (1984).
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an obligation to revisit the deregulatory decision if marketplace
assumptions did not correlate with regulatory reality. The
Court stated that "the Commission should be alert to the consequences of its policies and should stand ready to alter its rule if
necessary to serve the public interest fully."68' 6 Requirements
that an agency monitor the efficacy of marketplace predictions
are not uncommon in judicial review of deregulatory actions." 7
The Commission did not garner approval of its policies from
all corners of the WNCN opinion. In dissent, Justices Brennan
and Marshall decried the policy's lack of flexibility and the impossibility of any re-examination of the policy's efficacy. 688
Rather than allowing the Commission to "blindly assume" that
market forces would serve the public interest, the dissenting
Justices would encourage a "safety valve" in case predictions of
market efficacy did not prove true.6" 9
Building on its Supreme Court sanction, the Commission has
had similar success in winning approval of deregulatory actions
in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Its major victory
came in 1983, when the court upheld the majority of the Commission's attempt to deregulate radio. 690 The court required
the Commission to show a "reasoned analysis indicating that
prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not
casually ignored."6 91 The court found that the Commission had
686. See WNCN, 450 U.S. at 603. The Court quoted National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S, 190, 225 (1943): "If time and changing circumstances reveal
that the 'public interest' is not served by application of the Regulations, it must be
assumed that the Commission will act in accordance with its statutory obligations."
WNCN, 450 U.S. at 603.
687. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380 (1974), in which the
Court upheld that agency's power to exempt small businesses from certain regulations but noted "the Commission's intention to keep the experiment under close review." Id. at 392.
688. See WNCN, 450 U.S. at 604.
689. See id. at 609.
690. United Church of Christ [III], 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
691. Id. at 1425. Although the court did not challenge the agency's right to overrule long-standing policies, it stated that "such abrupt shifts in policy do constitute
'danger signals' that the commission may be acting inconsistently with its statutory
mandate." Id. (Joseph v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 404 F.2d 207, 212 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (Leventhal, J.)) and State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Transportation, 680 F.2d 206, 220-22 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2856
(1983). The State Farm decision, decided by the Supreme Court after the United
Church of Christ decision was released, supported this standard of review. See Sunstein, Deregulationand the Hard-Look Doctrine,1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177; see also Edwards, JudicialReview of Deregulation,11 N. Ky. L. REV. 229, 267 (1984) and Carter,
Judicial Review of the 'Reagan Revolution,' 65 JUDICATURE 458 (1982) (substantive
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carried its burden in three of the four areas it sought to deregulate,692 and allowed the Commission to eliminate quantitative
processing guidelines for non-entertainment programming,693
formal ascertainment of community issues, 694 and limitations
on the number of commercials per hour that could be broadcast.695 The court did not, however, allow the Commission to
eliminate the requirement that licensees maintain programming logs. 696 The court held that programming logs are imper-

ative to citizens wishing to exercise rights of public
participation in license renewal proceedings and are critical to
the Commission's responsibility to monitor deregulation.69 7
The Commission's efforts to exempt small radio and television licensees from ascertainment requirements also survived
review is important; "in the context of the kind and quantity of changes the Reagan
Administration has proposed, short-sighted and socially irrational administrative
choices are increasingly likely to happen").
692. The Commision's burden is a limited one, because it is entitled to substantial
judicial deference to its own determination of how the public interest should be
served. See United Church of Christ[III], 707 F.2d at 1424; see also WNCN, 450 U.S. at
596; Federal Communications Comm'n v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775, 810 (1978); Federal Communications Comm'n v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223,
229 (1946). The United Church of Christ court noted that this deference is not complete, but is constrained by statutory and constitutional mandates that the court alone
may interpret. See United Church of Christ [III], 707 F.2d at 1424.
693. No specific types of public affairs programming need be provided by broadcast
licensees, but licensees must be "responsible to community issues." United Church of
Christ[III], 707 F.2d at 1421. The guidelines now allow a licensee to focus on an individual audience.
694. All formal procedures for ascertainment of community issues were eliminated. A licensee must now only "determine the major issues" and may do so by any
means available. Id. at 1430.
695. Commercialization processing guidelines were eliminated. The prior limit of
18 minutes per hour was rescinded, as the marketplace would presumably limit the
amount of commercial time listeners would tolerate. Id. at 1437.
696. Id. at 1438. Under the Commission's plan, detailed programming logs would
be replaced by an "issues/programs list," which would specify five to ten issues of
concern to the community and provide examples of how the licensee dealt with those
issues. No other record of programming would be provided in the licensees' public
files. Id. at 1439.
697. See supra notes 140-314 and accompanying text for a discussion of public participation in Commission processes. In United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n [I], 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.), the court crafted a
right of public participation in licensing decisions. The court, reviewing radio deregulation, held that elimination of programming logs on the proferred explanation was
impermissible, as it would infringe upon this right. Further, the elimination of logs
would have an adverse impact on the Commission's ability to "assess the accuracy of
[its] predictions" by minimizing the amount of information it would gather from stations in the marketplace. See United Church of Christ [III], 707 F.2d at 1442.
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judicial review. 69 Based on earlier statements that small community broadcasters know their communities thoroughly, "not
only its majorities but also its minority elements," 699 the Commission held a three-year experiment to determine whether
broadcasters in small communities could determine community
interests without ascertainment. °° In approving the subsequent rulemaking doing away with ascertainment requirements in small markets,70 1 the court noted that the action did
not require empirical validation to survive review.70 2 The Commission, then, need not produce empirical evidence to justify
deregulation.
The Commission also won judicial support for its abolition of
the long-form renewal application. 70 3

The Commission re-

placed the longer application with a five-question form that
could be submitted on a postcard.70 4 The information to be required was limited to questions bearing no relationship to programming and of only tangential relevance to licensee
conduct.70 5 On appeal, the Commission successfully argued
698. See National Black Media Coalition v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 706
F.2d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

699. See Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 53
F.C.C.2d 3, para. 69 (1975).
700. The experiment applied to communities of less than 10,000 people. After the
experiment ended, the Commission concluded that the small market exemption was
"[a] desirable refinement" of the ascertainment process. See Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants: Small Market Exemption, 78 F.C.C.2d
444, para. 12 (1980).
701. The radio deregulation order mooted the aspects of the small-market exemption that applied to the radio marketplace. The exception for small television markets was affirmed. See Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants: Small Market Exemption, 86 F.C.C.2d 798, para. 4 (1981).
702. The Commission's finding was based not on "a rigorous statistical evaluation
of data obtained as a result of the experiment," but on a finding that "there has been a
significant absence of formal protest against [the exempt] licensees." National Black
Media Coalition, 706 F.2d at 1226. Rigorous testing would have been "quite costly."
Id. at 1227. The Commission did not enter the experiment "with the intent of designing a highly structured analytical tool." Ascertainment, 78 F.C.C.2d at 447. The reviewing court concluded that "the Commission need not have conducted this
experiment prior to taking the action it did." National Black Media Coalition, 706
F.2d at 1228.
703. See Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 719
F.2d 407 (1983).
704. See Radio Broadcast Services: Revision of Applications for Renewal of License
of Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM, and Television Licensees, 46 Fed. Reg.
26,236 (1981).
705. The five questions require a licensee to reveal: 1) name and address; 2)
whether the licensee has filed annual employment reports; 3) whether the licensee is
in compliance with regulations on alien control or ownership; 4) whether an adverse
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that it could require less information from licensees because it
depended on public participation to inform it of the workings of
the market.7 °6 The approval of postcard renewal drew a vehement dissent from Judge Wright, author of the decision approving radio deregulation. 7 Judge Wright argued that failure to
investigate each licensee's merits abrogates the public trustee
function of the licensee.70 s
The court of appeals has approved the vast majority of the
Commission's deregulatory action.70 9 It has not done so, however, without substantial conflicts with the Commission.7 10 The
court has also made it clear that each licensee retains a responsibility to air public interest programming regardless of the
deregulatory climate the Commission has fostered.7 1 1
finding "as to particular conduct bearing on a licensee's character" has been made;
and 5) whether the licensee has placed all required documents in its public file. See
Black Citizens for a FairMedia, 719 F.2d at 410 n.4. The only additional information
the Commission would draw from the marketplace would be in the form of random
long-form audits of television licensees, falling on about 1% of licensees each year, see
id. at 416, and random on-site inspections that would be reduced from the current 16%
per year to 10% per year, see id. at 422.
706. The Commission stated that "we have found that the best vehicle for bringing
violations to our attention has been through public participation in our processes,"
and the court held, through Judge Bork, that the minimal information the Commission would collect is permissible because the agency will have "the input of the public." Id. at 409, 413.
707. See id. at 418 (Wright, J., dissenting)
708. See id. at 419. Judge Wright stated that the "mandates of the statutory language of the Communications Act ... require the Commission to investigate the programming of each applicant for renewal of a broadcast license." If such an
investigation is not made, the Commission assumes that each licensee's efforts have
produced programming in the public interest. Id. at 434.
709. The court has also sided with the Commission on the issue of preferences,
which the Commission has traditionally granted to women in comparative renewal
hearings. The preference was recently struck down, by a panel that stated the public
interest mandate "is not a license to conduct experiments in social engineering conceived seemingly by whim and rationalized by conclusory dicta." See Women's Preference Thrown Out, BROADCASTING, Aug. 26, 1985, at 136. The opinion probably will
not affect minority preferences, as it recognized the value of preferences to "cohesive
ethnic cultures." Id.; see also Steele v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 770 F.2d
1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
710. See, e.g., United Church of Christ[III], 707 F.2d at 1443; see also supra notes
234-283 and accompanying text (debate between the court and the Commission on the
elimination of logging requirements); Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 719 F.2d 407, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wright, J., dissenting).
711. See Committee for Community Access v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
737 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1984). A broadcaster's renewal expectancy may be eliminated
even under the deregulatory rules, which, unlike previous regulation, imply no clearcut goals for a licensee to meet. "[U]nder either means, the broadcaster must air programs directed at ascertained needs." Id. at 77. See also Lindemann, Simon Geller
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Although the court has accepted the mainstay of the Commission's efforts, it has not permitted a wholesale substitution of
the marketplace concept for the trusteeship concept.
B.

The Economics of the Market: Programming for Profit

An analysis of the economics of a shift in regulatory paradigm calls into question the wisdom of substituting a marketplace concept for the trusteeship concept. Such an analysis
reveals inadequacies in the broadcast market's ability to serve
the diverse groups that compose the viewing audience.
Several preconditions exist for functioning markets. Given
competitive behavior, efficient markets in all goods, and a
mechanism for measuring the preferences of consumers, resulting allocations will be efficient reflections of consumer
preferences.7 12 True competitive behavior, however, cannot exist under the industry structure of broadcasting. 1 3 All broadcast markets are not functional71 4 and the market does not
provide a mechanism by which programming decisions will reflect consumer desires. 715 The myriad economic assumptions
upon which deregulation is based, then, are open to both theoretical and empirical question because of the unique nature of
the broadcast marketplace.
At the heart of the deregulatory movement is the assumption
that sufficient competition exists to provide a working market.716 The Commission 717 and the courts 718 have long recognized that the public interest involves more than simply
promoting competition. A shift to marketplace reliance, howand the Comparative Renewal Process: What's Good for Gloucester?, 6 COMM/ENT

L.J. 163 (1983) (dealing with same licensee's loss of license).
712. See Brennan, Economic Efficiency and BroadcastContent Regulation, 35 FED.
COMM. L.J. 117, 120 (1985).
713. See infra notes 716-737 and accompanying text.
714. See supra notes 526-550 and accompanying text.
715. See infra notes 740-776 and accompanying text.
716. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 232 (1982).
717. The Commission explicitly recognized that the public interest involves more
than the promotion of competition in the recent Cellular Comumunications Systems,
Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, para. 15 (1981).
718. Courts have long held that there is no national policy in favor of competition.
See Federal Communications Comm'n v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93
(1953) ("The very fact that Congress has seen fit to enter into the comprehensive
regulation of communications.., contradicts the notion that national policy unqualifiedly favors competition in communication"). The Commission may foster competition in a particular instance only if, after conscientious analysis, the Commission
concludes that competition is a desirable means to serve the public interest. Id. at 96.
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ever, is dependent on the existence of true competition.
Whether such competition actually exists, 719 will exist with the
advent of new communications technologies, 720 or will be facilitated by a deregulatory paradigm 72 1 is open to question.
is
A major concept left undefined by deregulatory theorists 722
the point at which a market may be deemed "competitive.
A principled approach to marketplace regulation would, almost
by definition, base regulation on the capabilities of the particu72 3 Deregulatory efforts, in both thelar marketplace involved.
ory724 and policy,7 25 assume broadcast competition on a
nationwide basis. Such competition is arguably present only in
the largest markets; more than 2,000 communities exist with
only one radio station. 726 Indeed, the recent trend toward me719. Smythe argues that deregulation rests on the "transparently shoddy and

fraudulent foundation" that "a nonmarket will behave as an imaginary perfect, abstract market of perfect competitors with priced transactions is assumed by idealist
philosophers to work." Smythe, Radio: Deregulationand the Relation of the Private
and Public Sectors, 32(1) J. COMM. 192 (1982).
720. See supra notes 84-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential
of new technologies, such as cable television, to produce meaningful competition in
the video marketplace.'
721. See Cornell & Webbink, The Present Directionof the FCC: An Appraisal, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 194 (1983), in which the authors find that Ferris Commission deregu•lation facilitated open entry and promoted competition, unlike Fowler Commission
deregulation. "The momentum pushing open entry and promoting competition in
communications has definitely been blunted if not entirely broken." Because current
policy does not promote competition, "it may not be politically feasible to let the market, rather than the government, serve as the arbiter of the public interest in communications." Id. at 194.
722. See Webbink, The Recent DeregulatoryMovement at the FCC, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS AND POLICIES 72 (Lewin ed. 1983): "A major issue behind many of these questions is at what point one can conclude that a local
television market is sufficiently competitive that none of the existing television regulations, except those that affect interference to other stations, are appropriate anymore." Id.
723. See Centerfor Telecommunications Studies, George Washington University,

in CHALLENGES

IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION HANDLING FOR THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION 53 (1981) (remarks of Marcus Cohen, attorney).

724. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 222 ("technology is an independent
variable that makes scarcity a relative concept").
725. See Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, Report
and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634 (1984); cf id. at 658 (Rivera, Comm'r, dissenting) (policy
change is based only on "conclusory assertions about the current conditions" of the
video marketplace).
726. See Parker, Should Congress Approve the Senate-Approved Approach to Radio
Deregulation? 63 CONG. DIG. 106, 109 (1984). Parker, long involved in public interest
litigation for the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, states that
"it is fashionable to claim-without the slightest shred of evidence-that marketplace
forces will fulfill the program needs of listeners." Id.

COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 8

dia concentration points to the existence of broader market
forces that would lead to an anti-competitive environment if
unrestrained. 27
Although the Fowler Commission has embraced pro-competitive rhetoric, it has not acted in a manner that would facilitate
a competitive broadcast atmosphere. The Commission has not
acted to produce inter-medium competition, preferring instead
to promote competition on a limited basis by creating new services that are secondary to established media.7 2

Examples of

policy limiting open entry that would produce significant competition may be seen in new technologies, 729 radio, 730 and television. 711 Such actions are not unusual in light of the
Commission's traditional stance protecting established licensees from the rigors of new competitors,732 but are certainly disingenuous when coupled with marketplace theories that
727. See Rowland, The Process of Reification: Recent Trends in Communications
Legislation & Policymaking,32(4) J. COMM. 114 (1982). "There are contradictions not

only in unregulation, but in the basic terms of deregulation itself. For... there are in
fact broader, independent marketplace forces that tend to lead precisely to the anticompetitive conditions that deregulation is supposed to avoid." Id. at 134.
728. See Cornell & Webbink, supra note 721, at 194.
729. See id. at 195. The authors point to Fowler Commission policies on low-power
television and direct broadcast satellites in which the Commission has taken actions
that "may increase competition sometime in the future, [but] are more limited in their
likely ultimate impact than other steps the Commission could have taken."
730. See 9 kHz Channel Spacing for AM Broadcasting, Report and Order, 88
F.C.C.2d 290 (1981); see also Cornell & Webbink, supra note 721, at 195 (reduced
spacing could have opened entry in competitive markets). Similarly, plans for new
competition on the FM spectrum have been slow in materializing. See Before the
Flood, BROADCASTING, Aug. 26, 1985, at 36.
731. 'See Cornell & Webbink, supra note 721, at 196 (the Commission voted to allow drop-ins but did not authorize a single facility in more than two years. Drop-ins
would be preferable to low-power television because they "could cover a much higher
potential audience [and] they pose a much larger competitive threat to existing stations"). See also VHF Drop-In Proceeding, Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 160, para.
22 (1982) (only 4 of 96 applicants granted). Rather than progress with the VHF dropin proceeding, the Commission preferred to foster the growth of low-power television,
a medium which cannot compete with powerful full-power licensees. "LPTV was an
exception, proving the rule that the FCC will open established markets to new competitors only under duress. The 'free market' is free principally for incumbents." See
Couzens, LPTV: Still Afloat After a Rough Five Years, BROADCASTING, Sept. 9, 1985,
at 32.
732. The Commission has traditionally granted standing to competitors who wish
to challenge the grant of a license on the grounds that economic harm would result to
them. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940); but see VHF Drop-Ins, Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 169 (by providing
more VHF stations, Commission did not fail in its duty to protect UHF stations; as
UHF has gained in competitive power, the need to protect it has diminished).
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require competition to function.73 3
The impact of this contradictory stance on minorities is obvious. Minorities are handicapped by late entry into broadcasting
and are underrepresented among owners of broadcast outlets.7 3 4 Deregulation has made one of the mechanisms by
which minority owners may obtain outlets less functional, 735
and the market for broadcast outlets is becoming more difficult
to penetrate without substantial capital.7 36 If new outlets are
restricted to new technologies such as low-power television, access to the competitive market by minority owners will be difficult.7 37 Reliance on a competitive marketplace without truly
competitive policies will have a disproportionately heavy impact on minority ownership policies.
The most fundamental fallacy of deregulation's economic
theory is the assumption that the market will provide a mechanism by which broadcasters will produce diverse public affairs
programming. The shift to reliance on the market causes a fundamental shift in the economics of the viewer-broadcaster relationship. Under regulation, the viewer has power as a
consumer, because the viewer may exercise Commission
processes to tailor programming more closely to her tastes.7 38
733. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 209.
734. See supra notes 510-12 and accompanying text.
735. The mechanism allowing distress sales has been undermined by the deregulatory attitude of the Commission, which places fewer licensees in "distress." See
supra notes 505-06 and accompanying text; see also The Bittersweet Chairmanshipof
Mark S. Fowler, BROADCASTING, Feb. 18, 1985, at 39, reporting minority concerns that
Fowler has undermined the distress-sale policy by refusing to designate licensees for
hearing. "There does appear to be some evidence of the Fowler administration's
relutance to designate ....
[W]hile there were 25 distress sales from the time the
distress sale policy was adopted in 1978 through 1980, there have been only seven
since 1981, the year Fowler stepped in as the agency's chairman." Id.
736. See supra notes 539-42 and accompanying text.
737. At least one minority owner sees low-power television as no great boon. If
minority issues are to reach majority audiences, it must be through the dominant media rather than secondary media. Address by Frank Melton (CEO, WLBT-TV, Jackson, Mississippi), Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
Annual Convention (August 5, 1985).
738. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (allowing viewers to
file petitions to deny license renewal). The shift in identity of the consumer from the
viewer to the advertiser is clear:
Under regulation ... the listener or viewer is the consumer and the broadcast
programming is the product. Regulation requires programming to respond to
the interests of the audience. Deregulation posits an indirect relationship between the broadcaster and the listener, that is, the broadcaster will seek to
satisfy its audience in order to maximize its revenue from the sale of
advertising.
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When programming decisions are left to the marketplace, however, the viewer is no longer a consumer. The viewer is simply
a product sold to the advertiser, and the advertiser becomes the
true consumer in the unregulated marketplace.7 3 9
The indirectness of the broadcast market is admitted by
Fowler, who states anecdotally that the market generally
works. 4 0 His analysis, however, employs economic theory
"without examining whether broadcasting markets meet the
conditions for efficient economic performance. '741 Under examination, it is obvious that broadcasting is a nonmarket. The
only hard market that exists is between advertisers and broadcasters.74 2 The conspicuous absence of viewers in the market
raises questions about the ability of the market to produce programming for the needs of minority audiences.7 43
Early economic theory in broadcasting assumed, incorrectly,
that the product of the marketplace was programming and its
consumers were the viewing audience. 74 4 Although it had long
been assumed that advertisers financed television,7 45 theorists
minimized advertising's influence by considering television a
pure public good.74 6 More recent theory has recognized that
the broadcast industry is advertiser-dominated, and that the
consumer of programming is "barred from direct participation
Hagelin, Broadcast Deregulation: Some Unanswered Questions 13 (unpublished
manuscript).
739. See B. OWEN, J. BEEBE & W. MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 4 (1974).

The authors define the marketplace relationships: "Broadcasters are in the business
of producing audiences, not programs; audiences are the products sold to advertisers,
the consumers." See also MELODY, CHILDREN'S TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF ExPLOITATION 12 (1973) ("the bait for attracting an audience is a program").
740. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 232-33 ("the broadcasting marketplace is indirect and imperfect, but we know that it generally works").
741. Brennan, supra note 712, at 117. Brennan finds that the broadcast market
"cannot even be judged under an efficiency standard." Id. at 136.
742. See Smythe, Radio: Deregulationand the Relation of the Private and Public
Sectors, 32(1) J. COMM. 192 (1982), arguing that broadcasting is a nonmarket: "It is
impossible to show that these relations are a market or amenable to the discipline of

the market, as that term is known in neoclassical economic theory." Id. at 197.
743. See supra notes 50-83 and accompanying text.
744. See, e.g., Landau & Davenport, PriceAnomalies of the Mass Media, 36 JOURNALISM Q. 291 (1959).
745. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATION COMMISSION, REPORT ON SOCIAL AND ECO-

(1938).
746. See Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. &
STATISTICS 332 (1958); Minasian, Television Pricingand the Theory of Public Goods, 7
J.L. & ECON. 71 (1964); Samuelson, Public Goods and Subscription TV: Correction of
the Record, 7 J.L. & ECON. 81 (1964).
NOMIC DATA PURSUANT TO THE INFORMAL HEARING ON BROADCASTING
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in the determination of either the type or amount of programming offered. 7 47 If the direct participation that is available
through the Commission's processes is removed, the relationship between the viewer and the broadcaster will change
dramatically.
The direction of the change will be toward programming tailored for the needs of upper-class audiences. Once it is recognized that broadcasters are in the business of assembling
audiences to suit advertisers, two scenarios are possible. First,
an advertiser may desire a large audience, and broadcasters
may thus tailor programming to suit the larger majority audience. 748 To assume that maximizing audience size is a consistent goal, however, is an oversimplification.7 49 Advertisers are
interested not only in the size of the audience, but in the attractiveness 750 of its demographic characteristics. 75 1 Second and
more likely, then, a broadcaster may tailor programming to a
particular demographic group.5 2
The group for which programming will be tailored will be the
young, white, high-income demographic-that segment of the
market that controls the most disposable income. 5 3 Because of
747. Bates, Economic Theory and Broadcasting 6 (paper presented at Association
for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Annual Convention, August,
1985). It is clear that the direct participants are advertisers. See H. LEVIN, FACT AND
FANCY IN TELEVISION REGULATION: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES

(1980); S. LONG, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TELEVISION NETWORK OLIGOPOLY (1979);

Larson, The U.S. Television Industry: Concentrationand the Question of Network
Divestitureof Owned and Operated Stations, 7 CoMM. RES. 23 (1980); Parkman, The
Effect of Television Station Ownership on Local News Ratings, 64 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 289 (1982).
748. See H. LEVIN, FACT AND FANCY IN TELEVISION REGULATION:

AN ECONOMIC

STUDY OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES (1980). Audience maximization leads to programming for the lowest common denominator. "[I]f left to the unregulated market entirely, unqualified profit-maximizers are believed likely to 'take the line of least
resistence,' and act in ways that reduce standards of taste, morals, and culture." Id. at
72 n.36. See also R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 10 (1973) ("the sale of advertising now governs the extent of diversity on commercial television").

See B. OWEN, J. BEEBE, & W. MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 4 (1974).
750. See id. at 75, recognizing that "advertisers value some groups more highly
749.

than others."

751. Demographics refer to the age, sex, and income composition of the audience.
"[S]ome audiences of given size are more valuable than others." Id.
752. The quest for attractive demographics is likely to be better business for advertisers and broadcasters alike. "[P]rofits may well be higher with restricted audience[s],
...going after a selected fragment of audience is more profitable than going after
mass audiences." Bates, supra note 747, at 3 n.1.
753. See Year of Yuppie?, BROADCASTING, April 1, 1985, at 73 ("The networks are
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the growing economic gap in American society between the disadvantaged segment, which remains static in size, and the affluent segment, which is becoming larger, advertisers that in the
past sought a mass audience75 4 will now seek to "appeal to the
affluent."7 5' 5 Such marketing strategies are explicit in current
network programming.7 5 6 The logic of the economic shift is unassailable. "Since broadcasters earn their revenues through advertising, they tend to serve demographically or socioeconomically desirable groups. The marketplace may provide
little incentive for broadcasters to serve the poor, the elderly,
children, or minorities."7 5' 7 Ironically, such groups are precisely
those who put television to its greatest use.7 58
Whether an unregulated broadcasting market will produce
diverse public interest programming is a question that may be
addressed empirically as well as theoretically. In the radio
market, for example, the existence of 9,000 outlets seems to indicate that diversity of programming will exist. However, 1,500
of those stations are fully automated. 7 9 Since deregulation in
making 'an attempt to reach that well-paid, self-indulgent, baby-boom audience,'" in
the opinion of respected industry analysts).
754. For example, R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, supra note 748, at 49, stated

that "the present three-network system tends to produce programming for a mass
audience, neglecting the demands of viewers with special tastes" in 1973, before the
current passion for reaching attractive demographics had took hold and become technologically feasible. See also Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the
Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting,66 Q. J. OF ECON. 194 (1952). It is
interesting to note that minority audiences are disenfranchised under either analysis.
755. See PredictingFuture of Audience Measurement, BROADCASTING, April 22,
1985, at 76. See also Tuning in on the Viewer, NEWSWEEK, March 4, 1985, at 68 (because current technology allows audience measurement with great demographic accuracy, "the networks may decide that shows with small yet ardently devoted followers
among upscale consumers, though lacking in mass appeal, should be allowed to survive if only to attract top-of-the-line sponsors").
756. For the 1985-86 programming year, for example, both NBC and ABC "had
announced strategies to capture what they think is the more desirable younger audiences." Ready, Set and Almost Go on TV's New Year, BROADCASTING, Sept. 2, 1985, at
34.
757. Schmeltzer, Clearingthe Air. Deregulationof the BroadcastIndustry. 29 FED.
B. NEWS & J. 398, 402 (1982).
758. See G. COMSTOCK, S. CHAFFEE, N. KATZMAN, M. MCCOMBS & D. ROBERTS,
TELEVISION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1978). Women, blacks, the poor and the elderly
are described as "four highly attracted publics" who are society's heaviest viewers of
broadcast television. See id. at 289. Children, similarly, are "very heavy consumers of
television." See id. at 173.
759. Automated radio stations are a "cost-effective contradiction of the medium's
most unique properties." Watson, Second Fiddle, 32(1) J. COMM. 212 (1982); see also
P. FORNATALE & MILLS, RADIO IN THE TELEVISION AGE (1980) and Le Duc, Deregulation and the Dream of Diversity, 32(4) J. COMM. 164 (1982). Although thousands of
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the radio market, moreover, public affairs programming has declined by 26 percent in major markets and sixteen percent nationwide. 76 ° The situation in the newly deregulated television
market is equally dismal. A study by the House Subcommittee
on Telecommunications revealed that major network affiliates
spent 1.73 percent of broadcast time on public affairs
programming.

61

The present market system has not operated to produce diration
versity and public interest programming. 762thIndeed, the rain
ale behind protecting certain minority interests in the public
interest is precisely because the market does not produce such
programming on its own. 763 Because such programming is not
stations exist, "if we look to program content rather than only number of broadcast
facilities, this diversity is far less pronounced and the marketplace for ideas far more
restricted." Id. at 168.
760. A survey done by the Radio and Television News Directors Association, selfservingly entitled, revealed that public affairs programming has dropped dramatically
since deregulation but news content has stayed relatively stable. This is presumedly
because news is a money-making operation for broadcast outlets. See Stone, Survey
Finds Little Effect from Deregulation,RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, May 1985, at 1. See
also Yardstick on News, BROADCASTING, Jan. 28, 1985, at 7 (complaints from radio
personnel about declining emphasis on broadcast news and loss of news jobs prompted
study). An earlier study found that "the number of radio stations cutting back on
local news programming has increased so dramatically that local news may soon become the exception on radio rather than the rule" partially because of "the federal
government's recent deregulation of radio." Pryor, Local Radio News Programming
Slowly Fading Out, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Dec. 20, 1984, at 1.
761. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND
FINANCE, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF TELEVISION DATA SURVEY (October 13, 1983).

Minority programming is even less prevalent, taking up about .21% of a major network affiliate's broadcast day. See supra notes 50-71 and accompanying text.
762. Homet, for example, finds that American programming is not characterized
by diversity, and, by contrast, the British system of heavy regulation and only four
channels produces a far greater diversity of programming. See Homet, "Getting the
Message": Statutory Approaches to ElectronicInformation Delivery and the Duty of
Carriage,37 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 219-21 (1985). Compare Milne, A View from the
Brits: Westward No!, CHANNELS OF COMM. 63-64 (1983) ("try switching from channel
to channel in the United States and make up your own mind whether the fare offered
there is as varied as the programming our four national television stations provide")
with Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7, at 231 ("anyone proposing changes in our licensing system must concede the comparatively high quality of our domestic productions"). See also Back to Basics, BROADCASTING, July 29, 1985, at 20 (letter charging
that broadcasters "have abandoned their own principles and the trust that the public
has come to place in them").
763. See H. LEVIN, FACT AND FANCY IN TELEVISION REGULATION: AN ECONOMIC
STUDY OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES (1980). Levin finds that "minority tastes become a
public interest to be protected because there are so few stations catering to them, and
because there is no widely used pay mechanism to register the viewer's intensity of
desire and consumer surplus." Id. at 47-48.
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caster cannot be expected to produce such programming
against its own economic self-interest.7 6 5
The basic mechanism by which the marketplace approach to
regulation produces programming, then, is hampered by fatal
flaws in both economic theory and practice. The broadcast
market is unique,7 6 6 and cannot meet the standards for marketplace efficiency required by an unregulated atmosphere.7 6 7
Even if the market could work responsibly without regulation,
economic analysis is impotent to deal with questions of fairness
and ethics, which abound in the broadcast arena.76 8 Such ques764. See Smythe, Radio: Deregulationand the Relation of the Privateand Public
Sectors, 32(1) J. COMM. 192, 196 (1982). Smythe finds that claims of broadcast-market
efficiency deny basic precepts of neoclassical economics. "[I]f market forces and market discipline mean anything, they mean price-motivated behavior: no prices, no incentive structures."
Efficiency in broadcasting cannot be measured in traditional neoclassical terms because programming is a free public good. No additional cost is incurred in serving
additional viewers, and no price-value is expressed by consumers choosing programs.
Viewers may value a certain program more than another, but if each are watched by
an equal number of viewers the programs are each valued the same by a broadcaster.
See S. BESEN, T. KRATTENMAKER, A. METZGER & J. WOODBURY, MISREGULATING
TELEVISION: NETWORK DOMINANCE AND THE FCC 22 (1984).
765. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the inconsistency in allowing the broadcast industry to decide for itself what is in the public interest. "The
only way that broadcasters can operate in the 'public interest' is by broadcasting programs that meet somebody's view of what is in the 'public interest.' That can scarcely
be determined by the broadcaster himself, for he is in an obvious conflict of interest."
National Ass'n Indep. Television Producers & Distribs. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 516 F.2d 526, 536 (2d Cir. 1975).
766. The unique nature of the broadcast market has been admitted by free marketeers who cannot accept broadcast deregulation with the same enthusiasm reserved for
other economic deregulation:
When a business is dependent for success on nothing more than a good idea
and some capital, government should get out of the way. But when the very
existence of a business is dependent on a government allocation of a scarce
commodity-such as a piece of the radio spectrum-regulation is the tool
needed to foster competition.
Wilson, DeregulationFails with Broadcast Ownership, ACCESS, Aug. 1984, at 7. This
view is consistent with economic theory. In traditional industries, entry by new firms
occurs until excess profits are reduced to zero and effective competition is produced.
See B. OWEN, J, BEEBE & W. MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 11 (1974).
767. Several preconditions exist for functioning markets. See Brennan, Economic
Efficiency and Broadcast Content Regulation, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 120 (1985).
768. See Bonder, A "Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 36
FED. COMM. L.J. 27 (1984). Bonder states that a system of strict economic evaluation
does not serve interests in "freedom of speech, fairness and equality, diversity of information sources and ideas, [and] public access to channels of effective mass communication." Id. at 36. See also Firestone & Jacklin, Broadcast Deregulation and the
Pursuit of Fairness,in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE CITIZEN: PUBLIC IN-
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tions should be the centerpiece of any discussion of broadcast
regulation rather than aspects of inquiry that cannot be addressed by the model of regulation proposed.
One need that plainly cannot be addressed by the marketplace model is the need for programming of interest to ethnic
and cultural minorities. The Fowler Commission has been described as an "absolute disaster" for minority needs, 769 a theme
echoed in criticisms of most Reagan Administration deregulatory efforts. 77 0 This disregard comes at a time when "a large
number of political, social, racial and ethnic groups view public
access to the television media, and input into its operation, as
vital to their welfare. 771 Blacks, in particular, see television as
potentially efficacious in dealing with community problems.7 2
Whether the medium will do so in an unregulated atmosphere,
however, is questionable.
It is no secret that Fowler violently opposes minority preferences in employment or ownership opportunities. 77 3 This personal dislike has spread to an institutional disregard for
TEREST PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT REWRITE 107 (T.

Haight ed.

1979).
769. See The Bittersweet Chairmanshipof Mark S. Fowler, BROADCASTING, Feb. 18,

1985, at 39, 40 (reporting statement of Pluria Marshall, chairman of the National
Black Media Coalition, that "any policies that minorities would benefit from, [Fowler]
has either opposed them, or refused to enforce them").
770. Some see deregulation and the elimination of minority interests as an integrated package. "The Reagan Administration is currently dismantling the federal affirmative action plan by applying its master theme of deregulation." Ronfeldt &
Galloway, Nullifying Affirmative Action Through Deregulation, 16 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 107 (1982). The two trends logically interconnect, as equal-employment plans
are ineffective without monitoring, and deregulation's goal is to limit intrusion into
regulated industries. Id. at 118. The limits translate into "a systematic campaign to
destroy the effectiveness of the affirmative action compliance system." Id. at 111.
771. See Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in New Technology: The BroadcastCable Controversy, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 427, 432 (1975); see also Weissman, The FCC &
Minorities:An Evaluationof FCCPolicies Designed to EncourageProgramming Responsive to Minority Needs, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 561, 563 (1981) (minorities
have needs "which radio and television, because of their pervasive influence on societal attitudes are ideally suited to confront").
772. See McCain & Hofstetter, Leaders of Opinionfor Ascertainment in the Black
Community: The Method is the Message, 19 Soc. ScI. J. 25 (1982). About 92% of blacks
surveyed viewed television as a potential force in solving community problems by providing "awareness" of black problems and projecting positive, realistic black images.
Id. at 26.
773. See Fowler Tells MinoritiesPreferencesShould Go, BROADCASTING, March 25,
1985, at 58. Addressing a group of black lawyers, Fowler stated that preferences don't
work, and could violate the constitution. Instead, Fowler suggested that minorities
should expend their energies on business strategies designed to further minority ownership. Id. See also In Brief, BROADCASTING, March 11, 1985, at 104-05 (Fowler ex-
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minority issues, which manifests itself in all aspects of Commission policy 7 4 and rulemaking. 75 This disregard has lessened

the participation of minorities in the broadcast marketplace.
"Blacks are still failing to make headway in their efforts to affect American society through media, and the deregulation policy being followed in Congress and at the FCC is among the
reasons why.

'776

The roots of the relation between deregula-

tion and lessening participation of minorities in the media lies
in the fact that the marketplace
cannot provide sufficient pub777
lic interest programming.

Although the Commission asserts that minorities will be
served efficiently by broadcasters in the unregulated marketplace because they are attractive to advertisers, 778 economic
presses "vehement objections" over preference given to minority woman broadcaster
in white community).
774. Commission policies on minority issues are apparent in the refusal to designate programming issues against KTTL-FM in Dodge City, Kansas, which had aired
tapes urging listeners to kill blacks and Jews. See A Win for the FirstAmendment, A
Breakfor Daytimers,BROADCASTING, April 29, 1985, at 38; see also Broadcast Regulation Reform, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,Consumer Protection, and Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole, RKan., including suitably shocking examples of KTTL programming).
775. A prime example is the debate over new entry into the FM spectrum, in
which AM daytime stations have been given a preference. See FCCGrants AM Daytimers 80-90 Preference, BROADCASTING, March 18, 1985, at 27. The National Black
Media Coalition argued that later proposals to delete the minority preference but
leave the AM preference was "but one more instance of the steady evisceration of
minority ownership protections." See Division Over AM Eligibility, BROADCASTING,
June 24, 1985, at 46-49; see also Fatter Chance, BROADCASTING, June 17, 1985, at 7
(Commission survey claims that minorities won't be harmed by AM daytimer preference). Mickey Leland, D-Tex., stated that "one-third to one-half of the licenses that
could have gone to minorities will now go to daytimers." See In Brief, BROADCASTING, March 18, 1985, at 112. Another example in minority ownership is Commission
action on a plan to encourage majority sale to minority owners by allowing repossession if the buyer failed on payments, which was found by the Commission to be contrary to the Communications Act. See In Brief BROADCASTING, Jan. 14, 1985, at 217.
776. See Bleak Report on Blacks, BROADCASTING, Feb. 25, 1985, at 75 (Aspen Institute report on minorities concludes that deregulation is among factors precluding
black access to media).
777. See Facing Off on Scarcity, BROADCASTING, April 22, 1985, at 66. In a debate,
Sen. Larry Pressler, R-S.D., stated that "the marketplace doesn't determine everything needed by the public." Id.
778, See Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981). The
Commission stated that "minority groups represent a large and ever-increasing economic force which makes it likely that there would be advertiser support for programming directed to issues specifically related to minority groups as they move into
the economic mainstream of society." Id. at 13,938. This view is based upon a tradepublication assessment of the opinions of a black network president. See Jackson, The
Black Market Becomes a Must-Buy, BROADCASTING, Oct. 6, 1980, at 22. The Commis-
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analysis reveals that groups of lower socioeconomic status are
less likely to be preferred demographic audiences. 779 The Commission's naive view, which has been contradicted by more candid views by the Commission's own economic analysts,7 8 0
ignores the lesser socioeconomic status of many minority
groups, and the fact that the income gap between blacks and
whites is growing larger rather than smaller.7 8 1 The lower income potential of the black audience makes it a prime candidate for marketplace exclusion under the economic model.78 2
The working assumption of broadcasters producing programming is that minority concerns won't attract high-income white
demographics sought by advertisers. 8 3 Minority taste programming is simply underproduced in an advertiser-supported
television economy.8
Minorities will also be foreclosed from relying on minority
owners to produce minority programming, because marketplace regulation will produce greater impediments to minority
entry into the telecommunications marketplace. 7 5 The Comsion's overgeneralization of Jackson's view treats local black audiences as if the national aggregate income were available at each local market. In reality, blacks are less
affluent than whites and more than one-third live below the poverty line. See N.Y.
Times, Aug. 28, 1985, at 1, col.4. Minorities could, of course, constitute major markets
if they acted precisely alike in buying habits. It has long been recognized that black
efforts to coalesce economic clout could work, but the black community has not
wholly supported such efforts. See Symposium, American Blacks as Seen by the Media, 16(1) CENTER 8, 12 (1983). The same could be said of the large Hispanic market in
the United States. See Accent on Spanish, BROADCASTING, June 17, 1985, at 17.
779. See Hammond, Now You See It, Now You Don't: Minority Ownership in an
"Unregulated" Video Marketplace, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 633 (1983).
780. Deregulation of Radio, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 73 F.C.C.2d 457
(1979), the Ferris Commission analysts conceded that the broadcast market could not
serve minority interests:
The market takes as given... the distribution of income and wealth, and if
past (and present) discrimination has caused certain groups to have little
wealth and income, those groups will have small voices in the market. Therefore, their wants may remain underrepresented in the current market allocations. In this case, the market may provide less than the optimal amount of
"minority programming."
Id. at para. 213.
781. See supra notes 344-46 and accompanying text.
782. See supra notes 738-68 and accompanying text.
783. See B. RUBIN, SMALL VOICES AND GREAT TRUMPETS: MINORITIES AND THE
MEDIA (1980), finding that the media's ignorance of minority views and concerns is a
matter of arithmetic and marketing.
784. See R. POOLE, INSTEAD OF REGULATION: ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 107 (1982) ("highly valued, minority-taste programming" is underproduced if left to the free market).
785. See supra notes 509-12 and accompanying text.
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mission has, in the past, relied on minority-ownership and
equal employment to produce minority oriented programming. v8 6 Such reliance will not continue to be viable, 78 v because

the deregulatory paradigm promotes elimination of minority
emphases incorporated in broadcast ownership regulation and
equal employment regulation.788
Current rulemaking favors lotteries over comparative hearings to determine license grants. Minorities may be granted a
preference in lottery selection 789 over Fowler's protests, 79° but
the selection of a license is still entirely left to chance. 79 1 "It

seems unlikely that the public's first amendment right to have
service responsive to its needs and desires can be best protected
by a system of random selection. ' '792 Whether a coherent regu-

latory policy may be furthered by a system based on chance remains to be seen.793 Other ownership policies, however, have a
786. See supra notes 489-585 and accompanying text.
787. See supra notes 514-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the viability
of the Commission's reliance on equal employment and minority ownership.
788. Fowler has continually advocated eliminating all minority preferences in
spectrum allocation. See The Bittersweet Chairmanshipof Mark S. Fowler, BROAD-

Feb. 18, 1985, at 39, 42 ("I think, for example, the lottery, which gives minorities two balls instead of one because of skin color, is plain wrong and
unconstitutional").
789. See Sharp, Lotteries at the FCC: The Prelude to Experience, 35 ADMIN. L. REV.
45 (1983).
790. In its MMDS Order, the Commission followed the "intent of Congress" in apCASTING,

plying minority preferences, although Fowler held "grave reservations" about includ-

ing preferences. See FCC Releases MMDS Order, BROADCASTING, Feb. 11, 1985, at 56.
Other services did not include minority preferences in lotteries. A lottery may be
used when a comparative hearing results in a tie. Minorities claim the Commission is
in "clear and flagrant disregard" for congressional intent in refusing to provide minority preferences. See Lottery Review Requested, BROADCASTING, Jan. 28, 1985, at 94. In
operational fixed services, no minority preference exists, even though such operations
exercise content control and probably qualify as a medium of mass communication.
See Rivera Protest, BROADCASTING, Feb. 25, 1985, at 64.
The inclusion of minority preferences is a hard-fought battle that is won only by the
efforts of major players still sympathetic to minority issues. See In Brief BROADCASTING, Feb. 25, 1985, at 97 (Mickey Leland, D-Tex., opposing deletion of minority preferences from expanding AM services rules) and Quello on Touchy Subjects,
BROADCASTING, Feb. 4, 1985, at 71 (Comm'r Quello pledging to help minorities win
lottery preferences).
791. See Geller, The AppropriateUse of Lottery in Federal Licensing, 35 ADMIN. L.
REV. 67 (1983), stating that the government "deceives itself" when it claims that the
public interest can be served through a lottery. Id. at 70-71.
792. See Kendrick, The FederalCommunications Commission and Low-Power Television: Managing the New Gold Rush, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 233, 260 (1983).
793. Kendrick states that "it would be tantamount to dereliction of the FCC's duty
to conserve and manage the national resource of the electromagnetic spectrum to
withdraw from the active and vigilent performance of its licensing function behind
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more concrete impact on minority ownership. The easing of
multiple-ownership restrictions, for example, will almost certainly have a detrimental effect on minorities seeking to own
broadcast outlets. 9 In the face of current marketplace activities, special efforts to encourage minority participation will be
necessary.79 5
It is foreseeable that Commission deregulation would remove
all equal employment opportunity regulations.7 9 6 Although
Congressional deregulation would probably continue to support
equal employment, it is uncertain that champions of public interest provisions in Congress will continue to exert influence. 797 The Commission's diminishing attention to equal
employment has already translated into less minority participation in the broadcast trade-both numerically and as a percentage of total employees, minority employment dropped in
1983. v~s It seems beyond doubt that encouragement of minority
the facade of a lottery." Id. at 285. No system of selection may predict the future, but
the responsible course of action is to improve the system, not to abandon attempting
to serve the public interest. Id. at 260.
794. The National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters has petitioned for review of the liberalized ownership rules, because higher limits make it more difficult
for minorities to enter the marketplace. See Appeal Activities, BROADCASTING, April
1, 1985, at 80. A group with an opposite ideological bent is also appealing the rule,
charging that any special consideration for minority owners in the rules is unlawful.
See Minorities Issue, BROADCASTING, March 18, 1985, at 72 (American Legal Foundation appeal); see also In Brief,BROADCASTING, Feb. 4, 1985, at 108 (Comm'r Mimi Dawson questioning the wisdom of separate caps for minority ownership).
795. See Going to Source, BROADCASTING, June 3, 1985, at 5 (Mickey Leland, DTex., making efforts to ensure that minorities will be able to purchase some of stations spun off from ABC and Capital Cities merger); NBMCfor Turner, BROADCASTING, July 29, 1985, at 52 (National Black Media Coalition supporting Turner's bid to
take over CBS because spin-offs would create diversity).
796. See The Bittersweet Chairmanship,supra note 769, at 42 (EEO guidelines
"smack of quotas," and "the day will come" when they are eliminated).
797. In the recent Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, for example, EEO
requirements were included. The House Telecommunications Subcommittee reported that "all congressional parties involved ... understood and anticipated that the
legislation adopted would permit the Commission to continue to utilize processing
guidelines in monitoring cable industry EEO compliance." See In Brief,BROADCASTING, June 24, 1985, at 96. Although Timothy Wirth, D-Colo., subcommittee chairman,
continues to push for public interest issues in the House, see Still At It, BROADCASTING, Aug. 12, 1985, at 82, "Wirth won't have as much control as he did in the last
Congress." Telecomsubcom One of Largest in House, BROADCASTING, Feb. 4, 1985, at
32. Whether EEO will survive remains unclear.
798. See FCC on EEO: Defacto Dereg, ACCESS, Feb. 1984, at 8. Blacks are losing
positions fastest in the professional category. There were 271 more professional employees in 1983, but 107 fewer black professionals. There is little doubt that the
Fowler Commission's lessening of the regulatory reins has contributed to the decline.
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programming through minority ownership or employment
would be a policy eliminated by marketplace regulation.
Even if the marketplace approach were to succeed in producing minority-oriented broadcast outlets to deal with minorityoriented programming,7 9 9 minority programming would not
work toward promoting understanding of minority issues by
the majority audience. In the unlikely event °° of the emergence of a specialized market share to deal with minority issues, the market would promote a counterproductive
segregation of the airwaves. 80 ' Black programming would be
available to blacks but not whites, and only on the least desirable stations.0 2 The potential broadcasting holds for promoting
racial accommodation would be squandered.0 3
Overall, a trend toward marketplace reliance will mean disenfranchisement of many aspects of the American public from
participation in broadcasting. The strengths of the marketplace approach come from its criticism of the traditional approach to regulation. When comparing perfect competition to
imperfect regulation, regulation seldom wins. When regulation
is compared to the real world marketplace, however, the case
In 1979, 200 stations were sanctioned for equal-employment violations, but in 1983,
only 50 stations were sanctioned. Id.
799. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 7.
800. The Commission has made it clear that deregulating a medium does not increase the responsibility of any licensee in a market to provide specialized programming. See Clarification, BROADCASTING, July 1, 1985, at 73; see also August,
Children's Television: Deregulatingthe Underregulated,8 J. Juv. L. 1, 5 (1984) (citing
United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir.
1983) and arguing that deregulation allows a licensee to find that children's programming is being provided elsewhere in the market and thus have no obligation to provide such programming, even if children's programming only exists on pay cable).
801. Benjamin Hooks, a former Commissioner and now president of the NAACP,
wrote that "non-minority listenership stands to lose the very positive benefit of exposure to serious discussion of these types of issues. This loss will occur despite the
attention given to minority related issues by other media sources." Hooks, Reflections
of a Former FCC Commissioner on the Radio DeregulationDecision, 25 J. BROADCASTING 209, 210 (1981).
802. Pluria Marshall, chairman of the National Black Media Coalition, has recognized the potential for broadcast segregation:
Only persons who are most attractive to advertisers will be targeted for program service by the strongest stations. Minorities and the poor will be served
only by a few specialized ethnic stations, usually with weak signals and inferior facilities, if at all. We will have de facto segregation of the airwaves.
Marshall, Should Congress Approve the Senate-Approved Approach to Radio Deregulation, 63 CONG. DIG. 106, 117 (1984).
803. See supra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
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for marketplace regulation is not compelling. 0 4 The comparison, moreover, reveals that marketplace regulation would be
beneficial only to an already profit-soaked industry 8 5 and detrimental to the public whose interest broadcast regulation is ordained to serve.
Minorities are the paradigmatic epitome of the public interest dysfunction of the broadcast market. Even though minorities consume more television than other groups,80 6 the
marketplace is structured to exclude them. 0 7 Deregulation
means increased reliance on market forces that cannot be harnessed without monetary clout. This reliance will result in a
decline in minority programming, with a concomitant increase
in that produced for the vastly smaller high-income majority
audience.

VI
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This inquiry concludes that the movement toward deregulation8 08 has significantly undermined the traditional minority interest concerns of the Commission and courts.0 9 It has done so
by its reliance on a broadcast "market" that cannot respond to
the demands of lower socioeconomic classes81 0 and its prema804. See Phillips, Book Review, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1985) (reviewing P. JOSKOW

& R. SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983)).
805. It is not wholly unfair to characterize the move toward deregulation as an
extreme example of industry capture. See Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and
Deregulation:The PoliticalFoundationsof Agency Clientele Relationships,44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 171 (1981) (Commission policies implement "policies highly
favorable to its clientele"); Gormley, A Test of the Revolving-Door Hypothesis at the
FCC, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 665, 681 (1979) (appointment of former employees increases
the likelihood of decisions favorable to industry); Rowland, The Process of Reification: Recent Trends in Communications Legislation and Policymaking, 32(4) J.
CoMM. 114, 134 (1982) (Commission's actions described as "seeking a means for negotiating the conflicting needs of the major industrial interests already in control of most
aspects of American communications"). Industry capture is among the broad explanations of the Commission's general behavior. See Mahan & Schement, The Broadcast Regulatory Process: Toward a New Analytical Framework, in 5 PROGRESS IN
COMMUNICATION SCIENCES (M. Voight & B. Dervin ed. 1984); see also Heffron, The
Federal Communications Commission and Broadcast Deregulation,in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS (J. Havick ed. 1983).
806. See supra notes 18-49 and accompanying text.
807. See supra notes 738-768 and accompanying text.
808. See supra notes 609-711 and accompanying text.
809. See supra notes 489-608 and accompanying text.
810. See supra notes 769-808; see also notes 18-83 and accompanying text.
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ture dependence on new technologies that are beyond the financial reach of minority viewers.8 ' Coupled with the
experiment of market reliance is a disregard for the primary
mechanism by which market failures may be brought to the
Commission's attention-public participation. 2 The market's
failure in producing minority-oriented programming cannot be
remedied through the Commission's participatory mechanisms
because deregulation itself has defeated the efficacy of the petitioning process.
The answer to the apparent incompatibility of minority issues and marketplace reliance need not be, however, a system
of pervasive content regulation. Pre-deregulation community
service regulation might have been fair to those who could not
hold state-protected monopoly rights in a slice of the spectrum,
but it was content oriented. Deregulation properly reduces
governmental intervention in programming decisions of licensees, but is not fair to those excluded from the broadcast market. 1 4 The unfairness inherent in deregulation can be
remedied by turning to market mechanisms that can facilitate
minority participation in the electronic media.
A major mechanism that has been effective in minority ownership incentives has been the tax certificate. 1 5 It would be
possible to use this proven incentive as a paradigm to produce
public interest tax incentives. 1 6 Because the rigors of the
broadcast market make the provision of minority interest programming unprofitable, limited tax deductions could be
granted to broadcasters who produce minority-oriented programming, air the suitable programming of outsiders, or allow
minority access to programming time. Such a solution accounts
for the concerns of both minority groups and broadcasters by
being sensitive to the first amendment claims of both groups:
[G]overnment intrusion into the editorial determinations of
811. See supra notes 84-138 and accompanying text.
812. See supra notes 140-314 and accompanying text.
813. See supra notes 283-314 and accompanying text.
814. This analysis follows the cogent perspectives expressed in Firestone and Jacklin, Deregulationand the Pursuit of Fairness,in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND
THE CITIZEN: PUBLIC INTEREST PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT REWRITE

108 ( T. Haight ed. 1979).
815. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
816. See Bonder, A "Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 36
FED. COMM. L.J. 27, 57-60 (1984), for an analogous discussion suggesting that price
incentives for public interest programming be considered in spectrum-user fees.
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broadcast licensees is minimized in a manner consistent with
the first amendment ...the idea behind these incentives is to
provide a monetary recompense for socially desirable programming services so that the marketplace will take account of
these non-economic concerns.8 17
This system takes account of the theoretical ideal that private
sector primacy should be the rule rather than the exception in
the American economy, 1 8 as well as the practical reality that
the telecommunications arena has been, for better or worse,
overwhelmingly changed by the movement toward deregulation.8 1 9 Because minority-oriented programming is not profitable in the broadcast marketplace, it can only be furthered by
requirements that force broadcasters to produce it, or by incentives that transform public service into a profitable venture,
and encourage broadcasters to produce minority programming.
The latter course is more consonant with the first amendment
interests advocated by broadcasters.
In an atmosphere already altered by the trend toward deregulation, one aspect of public interest policy takes on predominant importance; the rights of public participation must not be
minimized. It is not unfairly stated that the advent of citizen
participation in broadcast licensing decisions was the turning
point of media regulation.8 20 The process allows citizens to
have a voice in decisions that will affect their lives. Participation in administrative decisionmaking gives direct life to American democracy.8 21 This right is especially important to
817. Id. at 57.
818. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1967); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); M. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY (1978).

819. Indeed, the movement has eliminated 90% of the rules formerly existing
under federal regulation, see supra notes 616-18 and accompanying text. It would require a Herculean orgy of promulgation to reconstruct the former regulatory agenda.
820. See Symons, Making Yourself Heard (and Seen): The Citizen's Role in Communications, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 814, at 9. Symons points out that
many markets are not competitive. "[Gliven this critical flaw in the marketplace
model, any reformulation of communications law must guarantee citizens an active
role in shaping the nation's telecommunications system." Id. at 20.
821. Public participation can be seen as a unqualified goal in a democracy. See
Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE
L.J. 1537 (1983); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970); R.
UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 239
(1976); M. KWEIT & R. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 7 (1981).
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minority groups, to whom television is an increasingly impor8 22
tant aspect of daily life.

Participation takes on renewed magnitude when regulatory
reform of an experimental nature is pursued on a broad scale.
Modifications in regulation can only conscientiously be implemented on a market-by-market basis, as some markets are competitive and some are not.82 3 - The Commission has relied on
public participation to inform it of the workings of the market825
place,82 4 to the exclusion of other mechanisms available to it.

The Commission can only determine which markets are appropriate for a lessening of regulation by attention to citizen intervention in its processes. Any regulatory change, then, that
infringes upon such participation cannot be allowed.
This inquiry has demonstrated that deregulatory changes in
the receptivity of the Commission to public interest intervenors
have resulted in greater difficulties for citizens wishing to participate in licensing decisions.8 26 Citizen participation is a critical aspect of regulation, and is one that must not be allowed to
lapse. Other aspects of minority interest regulation, especially
equal employment opportunity regulations and minority ownership provisions 827 should not be eclipsed by deregulation.
These mechanisms, like public interest tax incentives, provide
content neutral means by which minority-oriented content may
be produced in the marketplace. 2 8
Rather than mourn the demise of substantial federal regulation, minority groups must advocate their cause with renewed
vigor. The injustice of marketplace regulation has the potential
to promote renewed interest in the socioeconomic dimensions
of broadcast reform by portraying the market's inequities in
stark relief. Communications is a critical aspect of social rela822. See supra notes 19-49 and accompanying text.
823. See supra notes 716-37 and accompanying text.
824. See, e.g., Deregulation of Television, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1077
(1984) ("existing procedures such as citizen complaints and petitions to deny will continue to function as important tools in [monitoring licensees]"); see also supra notes
307-14 and accompanying text.
825. See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the Commission's decreasing use of information from licensees and its refusal to conduct its own
marketplace analyses.
826. See supra notes 283-314 and accompanying text.
827. See supra notes 459-585 and accompanying text.
828. See supra notes 551-54 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the efficacy
of minority employment to prompt minority-responsive programming; minority ownership may also promote minority programming, if ownership furthers employment.
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tions8 29 Indeed, "every society which denies its people true access to the actual processes of mass communications denies its
people freedom to the same degree. 8 3 ' Freedom of expression
subsists in granting freedoms to those who have not been
granted state-supported communications monopolies as well as
to those who have. 31 Until and unless the market can demonstrably work to the advantage of the many rather than the few,
marketplace regulation remains an abdication of a societal
responsibility.

Epilogue
After this article went to press, the major players in the communications arena took several actions that will have a lasting
impact on the minority presence in broadcasting. The Commission issued a notice of inquiry into the constitutionality and advisability of all minority preferences, 3 2 and asked the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals to remand a case challenging the
minority preferences to it.8 33 The Commission held all pending
cases dealing with minority preferences in abeyance.8 3 4 Almost
simultaneously, the United Church of Christ released a fiveyear study of minority employment in the broadcast industry
that demonstrated declining minority representation in employment. 35 The House Telecommunications Subcommittee,
on hearing of the impending notice of inquiry, wrote to Chairman Fowler, cautioning the Commission not to undertake a
wholesale dismantling of the minority preference structure because it had developed a factual record supporting its legality
829. See, e.g., J. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 166-207 (1958) (suggesting that

communications is the bridge between external experience and internal understanding that allows social communion).
830. See Hall, Controlling Public Telecommunications: Theory and Practicefor
Human Managementof ElectricLiterature,in TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 814,
at 169.
831. See Minninberg, Circumstances Within Our Control: Promoting Freedom of
Expression Through Cable Television, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 551 (1984).
832. See Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress
Sales and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic, or Gender Classifications, Notice of Inquiry, 52 Fed. Reg. 596 (Jan. 7, 1987).
833. See Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, No. 84-1600 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
834. See Reexamination, supra note 832, 52 Fed. Reg. at 599.
835. See Wachtel, Television Hiring Practices,1980-1985 (Dec. 10, 1986).

COMM/ENT

L. J.

[Vol. 8

and usefulness. 36 The notice of inquiry is scheduled to yield a
final policy statement in mid-1987.

836. See Washington Watch, Broadcasting, Nov. 24, 1986, at 73.

